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ABSTRACT 
Before agricultural reform, cooperatives and state farms were responsible for 
production decisions. Rural credit was supplied by the State Bank of Vietnam 
branches throughout the country to cooperatives and state farms according to plan 
allocations. Agricultural reform began in 1981 and was then enhanced by the 
introduction of the household responsibility system in early 1988. This reform 
transferred farm management and the decision-making authority from the 
cooperatives to individual households. Agricultural reform and financial reform 
have significantly changed the shape and structure of the rural financial market. 
The main function of the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture, established in 1988 is now 
to lend to individual rural households. A new system of rural credit delivery with 
more di versified financial institutions is emerging from the old mono-bank 
structure. 
It is argued in this thesis that the policy of setting interest rate ceilings, the lack 
of a sound legal system, and the lack of experience in dealing with information 
relating to new clients-individual households-not only give rise to fom1al 
lenders' heavy emphasis on collateral requirements and a concentration on 
production loans, but also lead to the shifting of transactions costs to borrowers. As 
a result, these transactions costs for borrowers from formal sector lenders are very 
high, resulting in very high effective rates of interest for formal sector loans, 
especially small ones. 
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Data used in the dissertation were obtained from a sample survey of 150 rural 
households carried out by the author in 1996 in a typical area of the Red River 
delta in northern Vietnam-Binhluc district, Narnha province. Borrower 
transactions costs are defined as all non-interest expenses that borrowers have to 
incur in seeking loans. The estimation of transactions costs indicates that 
prospective borrowers from the formal sector have to have on hand about VD 50 
thousand to cover the out-of-pocket expense threshold. Borrower transactions costs 
are found to be an important barrier, discouraging small borrowers from obtaining 
formal loans. While these transactions costs are equivalent to 9. 7 percent of the 
loan amount for the smallest borrowers, they account for only 0.4 percent of the 
loan amount for the largest. The effective costs of borrowing from various lenders 
show that the partition of the credit market occurs at the loan size between VD 
500-1,000 thousand. The estimation of the transactions costs function shows the 
significant relationships between transactions costs, loan amount applied for and 
interest rates. The larger the loan amount applied for, the higher the transactions 
costs, and the lower the interest rate, the higher the transactions costs. Probit 
estimations of the determinants of applying for credit are undertaken separately 
across loam from formal lenders, relatives and friends, moneylenders, and all other 
informal sources. The results confirm the existence of segmentation of the credit 
market with respect to the loan amount applied for and loan use. An analysis of the 
determinants of loan rationing by the formal sector is also undertaken. The probit 
estimation shows that loans outstanding and loan use are used by the formal sector 
as indicators for rationing loan demand. 
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Higher interest rate ceilings, and certain financial innovations are 
recommended. These will contribute to the reduction of borrower transactions costs 
and the segmentation of the credit market, and thus bring formal sector credit to a 
larger portion of the rural population. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
'Those of us who work on rural finance face the dual challenge of dealing with 
nagging problems in low-income countries and also helping to reconstruct 
financial markets in economies that formally were centrally planned. The lessons 
learnt during the past four decades in low-income countries provide valuable 
guidelines for meeting both challenges.' 
('Transaction Costs in Decentralised Rural Financial Markets,' Adams, 1993, 
Economic and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 2093, Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University) 
1.1 Introduction 
Rural Financial Markets 
Although the role of finance and the financial system in the process of 
mobilising resources for investment and economic growth has long been recognised 
(Schumpeter, 1934), economists did not emphasise the role of money and finance in 
economic development prior to the contributions of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973). Both McKinnon and Shaw argued that the conventional views of money 
and finance in economic growth were more suited to developed economies but 
appeared to be inappropriate to developing countries. According to them, the 
economies of developing countries are characterised as highly fragmented, with no 
uniformity of prices. The capital market is cited as a highly fragmented one, in 
which one's investment opportunities, endowment of deployable capital, and 
opportunities for external borrowing are poorly correlated. According to McKinnon, 
fragmentation of the capital market results in the misuse of land and labour, and 
condemns the economy to using inferior technology. 
The least developed countries are characterised by the dominant role of 
agriculture in the economy, the employment of a large part of the population in 
agriculture, and widespread poverty especially in rnral areas. The issues of deep 
divisions between rich and poor as a world characteristics and of the way that the 
poor can overcome their plight were hotly debated. Those who place emphasis upon 
the need for wealth re-distribution from the rich to the poor as a precondition to 
successful poverty reduction are so-called 'the redistributionnists ', while those who 
emphasize upon the virtues of self-help for income generation as the most 
sustainable solution to the problem of poverty take a form of 'the wealth-
creationists'. Most of the more successful and effective programs of income 
generation include a significant component of small-scale revolving credit to help 
the poor to help themselves and access to credit by the poor is an essential part of 
poverty alleviation (Remenyi, 1991: ix-x) The vicious circle confronting farmers 
in developing countries can be described as follows: farmers have low earnings 
since they have low productivity; they have low productivity because they are 
constrained to traditional farming methods; they are constrained to the traditional 
farming methods because they lack funds to acquire the new technology; and they 
do not have enough funds because their earnings is low. External finance 'is 
therefore needed to make it possible to invest in better seeds, livestock, fertilisers, 
new technology, and so on. The 'traditional' view suggests, however, that since the 
market interest rate is too high for farmers, the only way to induce farmers to 
borrow in order to adopt new technology is to offer them cheap credit. The cheap 
credit policy is often accomplished by imposing ceilings on lending rates and/or by 
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setting up supply-leading financial institutions whose only function is to deliver 
cheap credit to farmers (Lamberte and Lim, 1987: 38). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, many governments in developing countries, 
assisted by various aid agencies, expanded the volume of agricultural credit very 
rapidly, with some countries experiencing increases of 50 to 100 percent in a single 
year through a vast number of rural financial settings (Adams and Nehman, 1979: 
165). Cheap or subsidised credit was often used to help the rural poor, and the 
objective of most credit programs was to reach a large number of targeted small 
rural farmers. Unfortunately, it became increasingly apparent that despite the 
sizeable expansion of credit, only a relatively small fraction of small farmers seems 
to have received such credit. It has been estimated that only 5 percent of farms in 
Africa, and about 15 percent in Asia and Latin America, have had access to formal 
sector credit, and 5 percent of borrowers have received 80 percent of the available 
credit (Braveman and Guasch, 1986: 1255). 
Faced with these disappointing results, from the early 1970s a large number 
of evaluation studies were undertaken, which challenged the traditional view of 
cheap rural credit, including Donald (1976), Adams (1971, 1978), Gonzales-Vega 
(1976), Adams and Nehman (1979), Vogel (1981), von Pischke (1981), Ladman 
and Tinnermeir (1981), Adams, Graham and van Pischke (1984), and Ladman 
(1984). These studies argued convincingly that low interest rates are the major 
factor contributing to these failures. Cheap credit inhibits growth by misallocating 
funds to poor investments (Adams and Graham, 1981 ). Low interest rates have led 
to non-interest rate rationing in favour of better-off farmers, and credit allocation 
has tended to favour those who are more wealthy or better able to provide collateral 
(Gonzales-Vega, 1976). Low interest rates also have detrimental effects on the 
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viability of financial institutions, creating disincentives for savings, and inhibiting 
the accumulation of capital by those institutions, thus increasing their dependence 
on external borrowing. The percentage of loanable funds derived from rural sources 
in commercial banks and state-funded institutions has ranged from 5 percent to 40 
percent, with the median much closer to the former figure than the latter (Braveman 
and Guasch, 1986: 1256). Such specialised rural credit institutions operate in the 
absence of active competition i:nd self-sustainability fostering corruption and other 
forms of inefficiency and inequality (Ladman and Tinnermeier, 1981). 
Several authors have explored the role of transactions costs m credit 
rationing under interest rate ceilings. Gonzales-Vega ( 197 6) developed a 
microeconomic model of formal financial institutions in developing countries 
subject to interest rate ceilings, and showed the role of lenders' transactions costs in 
determining the profitability of a lending insti~tion. Under a restrictive uniform 
interest rate, and assuming that the costs of loan procedures and paperwork do not 
vary with loan size, the lender can reduce costs per unit of money lent by making 
larger loans. The iron law of restrictive interest rates suggested by Gonzales-Vega 
(1976) indicates that the lower the interest rate ceiling, the greater the degree of 
credit rationing of small borrowers, and the greater the concentration of credit 
amongst relatively few large borrowers. 
There have also been some studies on the borrower transactions costs. 
Nehman (1973) undertook a study of a rural market in Brazil, and found that many 
small borrowers did not use formal sector credit because, when transactions costs 
were added to the interest cost, informal credit became very competitive with 
formal loans. Pablo (1979) in a study of a region in the Dominican Republic found 
that small farmers had to incur very high transactions costs from the formal low 
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interest credit. Adams and Nehman (1979) examined how borrowing behaviour is 
affected by total borrowing costs. Relying on evidence from several countries, they 
also showed that relatively large borrower transactions costs discourage small 
borrowers from borrowing from formal lenders. Gonzales-Vega (1981) showed that 
under the interest rate ceilings, the lenders shifted some of their normal lending 
transactions costs onto the borrowers. This, accompanied by poor infrastructure 
prevailing in developing countries, makes the borrowing costs from formal lenders 
excessive high. Under these circumstances, the borrowers might not demand formal 
sector credit Using a sample survey of rural households in Bangladesh, Ahmed 
(I 982) found that there were sharp differences in borrower transactions costs 
between formal and informal, and small and large, loans. Ladman (1984) presented 
a model explaining how borrower transactions costs play an important role in the 
structure of rural credit markets, confirming his results in an empirical study 
undertaken in Bolivia. In a study carried out in the Philippines, Abiad et al. (1988) 
obtained similar results though Vvith smaller estimated borrower transactions costs 
as eompared to the Bangladesh case. They demonstrated that the borrower 
transactions costs were higher during the period of regulated interest rates than 
deregulated, indicating the impact of financial deregulations in reducing 
transactions costs. Cu~vas and Graham (1984a) found that transactions costs were 
not equal for all borrowers, but that new and non-preferred clients often incurred 
higher transactions costs than did repeated and preferred borrowers for given loan 
types. Adams and Vogel ( 1986) argued that non-preferred clients may be forced to 
incur transactions costs normally absorbed by the lender as a way of discouraging 
them from asking for loans. 
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New perspectives on rural finance analyze the need to build efficient and 
complete rural financial markets to achieve sustainable increases in rural incomes 
and significant and irreversible reductions in rural poverty (Yaron et al., 1997: 52). 
Hettige and Steel (1996) found evidence of significant financial market 
fragmentation in Africa. Besley (1994) pointed out that although the policy 
environment and the legal and regulatory framework may be favourable, there 
might still be market failures in rural financial markets Empirical research by 
Hulme and Mosley (1995) suggested that while credit may be an effective vehicle 
for boosting the incomes of the poor, it has failed in helping the poorest of the poor 
raise their living standard. 
Rural Financial Markets in Vietnam 
Prior to the 1980s, Vietnam followed the.centrally-planned economy (CPE) 
model. The economy was characterised by state ownership of the means of 
production, and government control of prices and the financial system, 
notwithstanding having some features that differed from other CPE models in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries.1 Savings mobilisation and 
lending decisions were separated and programmed, and there was essentially no 
financial intermediation. Savings were mobilised by the network of a single 
government bank, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). Funds were then lent to SOEs 
and cooperatives in accordance with central plans. The financial system was, 
therefore, passive and pseudo. 
In the rural sector before the agricultural reform, the government strictly 
controlled agricultural input and output markets. Production and management 
1 See, for example, Fforde and Vylder (1988). 
6 
decisions were .made by the cooperatives. Funds for working capital and other. 
investment came from the resources of the cooperatives or as loans from rural 
financial institutions. The main functions of the rural financial system were to 
transfer credit from the SBV to the cooperatives according to planned allocations, 
and to mobilise rural savings, a major share of which was transferred to the SBV. 
The economy in general, and agriculture in particular, operated inefficiently, 
leading to persistent shortages of goods and, by the end of the 1970s, food 
production had fallen to very low levels, as a result of which Vietnam had to import 
large amounts of rice (Fforde and Vylder, 1988). The failure of the CPE model 
became increasingly apparent, and pressure to reform the economy, and the 
agriculture sector in particular, increased significantly. 
The first step to reform the agricultural sector was taken m 1981. The 
government tried to improve incentives in agriculture by introducing the product 
contract system, in which farm production was undertaken jointly by cooperatives 
and households. Under this system, the input market was still fully controlled, while 
the output market was only partly controlled; farm households could retain their 
output in excess of the contract level, and were allowed to sell it in the 'free' 
market. The most important change, however, was marked by the introduction of 
the household responsibility systerrlin April 1988. This system officially transferred 
farm management and the decision-making authority from the cooperatives to 
individual households. The results of these reforms were quite impressive. From a 
country characterised by persistent food shortages before 1988, Vietnam had 
become the second largest rice exporter in the world by I 995. 
Accompanying agriculture reforms, since 1988 the government has 
undertaken a wide range of financial sector reforms, of which the most important 
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feature has been the dismantling of the mono-bank system. The SBV gradually 
devolved its commercial banking functions and shifted its role more to that of a 
modem central bank. Four state-owned commercial banks were created, including 
the VBA, which was established in July, 1988 by restructuring a fonner department 
of the SBV, the Agricultural Development Bank ofVietnam.2 After implementing a 
pilot test in 1990, the year 1992 saw the first step of the VBA's switch from lending 
mainly to SO Es to rural households. 
These refo1ms have changed the shape and strncture of the rnral credit 
market radically. The reorientation of the VBA's portfolio is reflected in the 
substantial increase of lending to rural households. In 1990 rural households 
received a minor proportion ( 4 percent) of fonnal sector credit to the rural sector. 
By 1992, lending to rnral households was 35 percent of fonnal sector credit, rising 
to 60 and 76 percent in 1993 and 1994, respecti\ely (World Bank, 1996: 54; VBA, 
1995). The growth rate for VBA loans for the period 1990-94 was 49 percent p.a. 
Lending to SOEs grew at only 8 percent p.a., while the corresponding figure for 
non-SOEs, mainly rural households, was 157 percent p.a. The proportion of rural 
households reached by the VBA was 9 percent in 1992, increasing to about 20 
percent in 1993, and to about 30 percent in 1994 (World Bank, 1995a: 67; World 
Bank, 1996: 54). 
The emergence of several alternative financial institutions was also 
encouraged by the SBV during 1992-93. During these two years, the network of 
rural credit cooperatives, which had collapsed, was replaced by private rural 
2 The three other commercial banks are the Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank), the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank (Incombank), and the Bank for Investment and Development of 
Vietnam. 
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shareholding banks (RSBs) and popular credit funds (PCFs). Following the decision 
to allow the establishment of PCFs in July 1993, the number of PCFs rose to 153 in 
March 1994, and to 207 at the end of May 1995, while the number of members 
increased nearly five-fold during this period (World Bank, 1996: 52). 
With the help of foreign donors and funds from the Government's Hunger 
Eradication and Poverty Reduction program, another attempt to enhance the 
provision of financial services to the rural poor was the establishment of the 
Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) in 1995, which aims to reduce poverty by 
becoming the main source oflow interest loans for the rural poor. 
However, despite these efforts to inject an enormous volume of formal 
sector credit into the rural sector, recent studies on the rural credit market in 
Vietnam3 have indicated that informal markets still account for the bulk of rural 
lending. For example, in a survey covering seven provinces in 1990, between 68 
and 94 percent of farm households were reported as receiving credit from informal 
sources (Seibel, 1992: 72). The Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) also 
provides nation-wide evidence of reliance of rural households on the informal 
market: about 73 percent of total loans of households were obtained from informal 
sources in 1992-93, of which moneylenders accounted for 33 percent, and friends 
and relatives accounted for 40 percent (SPC and GSO, 1994: 22). 
Several years have passed since formal institutions in the rural credit market 
shifted away from lending to state fann enterprises and collectives, and began to 
direct attention to the emerging private sector, where farm households dominate. A 
number of questions arise. Has the objective of the formal sector credit institutions 
' See, for example, Tran et al. (1992), Cao and Dao {1992), Seibel {1992), World Bank {1995a; 
1996). 
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to increase farmers' access to finance been achieved? How has the increase of 
formal lending to the household sector affected informal lending? What are the 
features of the rural credit market now? 
1.2 Objective and Approach of the Dissertation 
It has been shown in most studies on the rural credit market in Vietnam that 
among the rural population, poor and small borrowers have had less access to 
formal sector credit; they have thus relied upon informal lenders and their limited 
self-finance. The VBA offices reported that approximately l 0 percent of their loan 
volume went to poor households, which made up about 40 percent of all rural 
households (World Bank, 1995a: 65). The most common explanation for 
constrained access to formal sector credit use among the rural poor is the small size 
of loans, and the lack of collateral. For example, a study by the Swedish 
International Development Authority (SIDA) in 1991 in four provinces showed that 
from 64 to 100 percent of the interviewees reported that they did not borrow from 
the formal sector because the loans were small (Tran et al., 1992: 39). Another 
study by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) in eight villages in four provinces 
indicated that lack of collateral was given as an explanation for not borrowing by 
poor households in 50 percent of cases (DAI, 1995: 8). In a recent study carried out 
in Tanlap commune, Bacquang district, Hagiang Province, Tran and Nguyen (1998: 
40) found that 80 percent of the poor's borrov.ring, most of which was small and for 
consumption can1e from informal sources. However, these studies did not examine 
in great depth why small borrowers did not seek loans from the formal sector, and 
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quantitative analysis using econometric techniques was not used in explaining the 
choice of credit source among borrowers and credit rationing. 
The object of this dissertation is to probe the role of borrower transactions 
costs as a credit-rationing mechanism and to demonstrate how these costs contribute 
to explaining the lack of small borrowers at formal credit institutions and the 
structure of the rural credit market. The dissertation will show that transactions 
cost~ for borrowers from formal institutions are large, resulting in very high 
effective rates of interest for small formal sector loans. It will be argued that the 
policy of imposing interest rate ceilings, the lack of experience in dealing with 
information on borrowers, and the lack of a sound legal system not only give rise to 
formal lenders' heavy emphasis on collateral requirements and their concentration 
on production-oriented loans, but also lead to the shifting of transactions costs from 
lending institutions to borrowers as a substitute .rationing mechanism. As a result, 
borrowers seeking small loans prefer to obtain them from informal lenders, who 
charge a higher rate of interest but impose lower transactions costs; by contrast, 
borrowers seeking larger loans may prefer to deal with formal lenders, whose 
interest rates are low enough to offset the high transactions costs of borrowing from 
them. 
Data used in Jhe dissertation are obtained from a sampi,!l survey of 150 rural 
households carried out by the author in 1996 in a typical area of the Red River delta 
in northern Vietnam-namely, Binhluc district, Namha province. A stratified two-
stage sampling method was designed for the survey. Questions for the survey aimed 
to obtain information on the cost of credit from alternative sources, the existence of 
credit rationing, and various characteristics of borrowers. The data obtained from 
the survey are used to investigate the magnitude and determinants of borrower 
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transactions costs, the determinants of credit applications, and formal sector credit 
rationing. 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of 
formal credit institutions and farm households. This framework is set up such that it 
can incorporate the realities of the environment in which formal credit institutions 
are operating and fann households are making decisions. A basic model explaining 
the behaviour of fonnal lenders is reviewed briefly and is then extended to reflect 
the context in which formal lenders in Vietnam operate. The behaviour of 
borrowers is examined in a model in which both interest rates and transactions costs 
are taken into account. 
The purpose of Chapter 3 ts to review rural credit conditions and their 
evolution in recent years in Vietnam. Issues related to the structure of the rural 
credit market, and its characteristics in terms of government, SBV, and VBA 
policies regarding the allocation of credit, interest rates, loan use, borrower 
coverage, performance etc, are analysed. The review of credit conditions provides a 
basis for the hypothesis that the rural credit market is segmented with respect to 
collateral requirements, loan use and loan size. 
Chapter 4 describes the survey area-Binhluc district, Namha province-
and discusses the design, representativeness, and credit characteristics of the 
sample. The primary data used in the analysis of borrower transactions costs, the 
determinants of credit applications, and of formal sector credit rationing are 
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collected from j 996 surveys of rural households, the district VBA branch, village 
and commune leaders, and representatives of the women's unions and farmers' 
associations in villages and communes in the area. A preliminary examination of 
lender and household credit data to show that the credit market is composed of 
several distinct submarkets, which provide credit contracts with significantly 
different terms and conditions, ranging from low interest rate formal sector loans 
with strict collateral requirements for production activities, to high interest rate 
loans without collateral from moneylenders and traders for a variety of purposes, is 
undertaken. This chapter also suggests that while formal sector borrowers incur 
high transactions costs, informal lending is, in general, flexible, expeditious and 
convenient, permitting very low borrower transactions costs. This results in a dual 
financial market: small borrowers go to informal lenders who charge higher interest 
rates but impose lower transactions costs on the borrower, while large borrowers go 
to formal lenders with low interest rates which offset the higher borrower 
transactions costs. Such a segmented credit market indicates that there is quite 
limited competition between lenders in the different submarkets. 
Chapter 5 reviews the concept of borrower transactions costs, quantifies 
borrower transactions costs, conducts a comparison between the effective cost of 
borrowing from the formal sector and various segments of the informal s~ctor, then 
examines the determinants of formal sector borrower transactions costs. This 
chapter attempts to show that borrower transactions costs are not constant for all 
participants. Small borrowers incur higher transactions costs for a given unit ofloan 
than do large borrowers. An implication from this analysis is that small borrowers 
will rationally choose to borrow from informal sources rather than from the formal 
l3 
sector. The determinants of formal borrower transactions.costs are also examined in 
this chapter by using a simultaneous equation system. 
Chapter 6 presents an analytical framework to examine the determinants of 
credit applications, and of formal sector credit rationing, using probit regressions. 
This chapter formally tests the hypothesis that small borrowers seek loans from 
informal sources, while formal sector borrowers apply for larger loans. The probit 
estimations are undertaken to examine the statistical significance of the variable 
concerning the loan amount applied for, among other variables, in the equations 
explaining the credit applications from four distinct sources of credit. This chapter 
also presents an analysis of the determinants of loan rationing by the formal sector. 
Chapter 7 summarises the main contents and findings of the study, and 
discusses some policy implications drawn from it. 
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Chapter 2 
A MODEL OF THE RURAL CREDIT MARKET 
This chapter sets out a theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of 
formal credit institutions and farm households in Vietnam. The object is to present a 
framework that incorporates the realities of the environment in which formal credit 
institutions are operating and farm households are making decisions. The first 
section discusses the behaviour of formal lenders. A basic model is briefly reviewed 
and then extended to reflect the context in which formal lenders in Vietnam are 
operating. The second section examines the behaviour of borrowers and presents a 
model in which borrowers take into account both interest rates and transactions 
costs in considering from whom they will borrow. 
2.1 Supply of Credit and Formal Lender Behaviour 
2.1.l A Basic Model of Supply of Credit 
A variety of theoretical models attempts to explain the behaviour of formal 
credit institutions in developed economies. These can be classified in a number of 
ways. One approach suggested by Santomero (1984) is to classify the models based 
on the main functions of tbe formal financial institutions (FFis). Another approach 
was suggested by Baltensperger (1980) who classified these models into ''partial 
models' and 'complete models'. Given the assumption that the total size of the 
baak's portfolio is exogenously determined, the 'partial models' try to optimise the 
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allocation of this given portfolio. The 'complete models' on the other hand attempt 
to explain the joint determination not only of the structure of assets and liabilities 
and their interaction, but also the total scale of the bank's portfolio in maximising 
profits. 
Unfortunately, these models are not very useful in explaining the behaviour 
of FFis in developing countries, especially in rural areas. Hoff and Stiglitz (1990: 
235) argued that rural financial markets, especially in developing countries where 
market imperfections and government intervention prevail, do not seem to work as 
classical competitive markets are supposed to work. These factors should therefore 
be taken into account in modeling the behaviour of FFis in the rural sector in 
developing countries. Particular attention will be paid here to government 
intervention in the form of interest rate ceilings. 
The model of credit supply presented here follo>vs the basic model suggested by 
Gonzales-Vega (l 976, 1984). The supply of credit can be derived from the marginal 
cost of lending. The costs oflending can be classified into four categories: (a) cost 
of funds; (b) cost of administration and operation; (c) risk-reducing transactions 
costs; and ( d) the cost of default losses. 
The cost of funds (CF) can be determined as follows. Given different 
" . 
investment opportunities, the bank will be willing to lend if it can expect to at least 
cover all its costs, including the opportunity cost of loanable funds. The opportunity 
cost of loanable funds, which can be estimated from the expected marginal rate of 
return to the bank from alternative uses ofloanable funds (Gonzales-Vega, 1976), is 
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often assumed to,be constant (OP). Hence, the cost of loanable funds for any given 
loan size (L) is determined as1 
CF= OP.L (2.1) 
Costs of administration and operation (A) include all costs relating to 
initiating, recording, handling, and collecting a loan. Costs of administration and 
operation are assumed to be independent of the loan size, so the average cost of 
administration and operation (AA) will decrease as the loan size increases. 
Risk-reducing transactions costs (R) consist of expenditures attributable to 
screening and monitoring the loan, and all activities related to the reduction of 
possible loss from default. These expenditures are designed to reduce the 
probability of default, or to reduce losses if defaults occur, so the expected loss 
from default is a function of risk-reduction outlays. The greater the outlay on risk 
reduction, the less the expected default losses for a given loan. However, the greater 
the riskiness of the loan, the more risk reducing activities will be needed to reduce 
the same expected loss. It is reasonable to assume that marginal returns to 
expenditure on risk reduction are diminishing-i.e., a small amount of effort 
initially yields a large reduction in default losses, but increasingly greater effort is 
required to obtain the same reduction. 
Default costs (D) refer to the expected loss to the lender if the borrower 
defaults. When a loan size L is in default, the actual default cost is calculated as (I 
+ AA + OP + ARR)L, where ARR is the average risk-reducing transactions costs. 
The bank can estimate the rate of default DR given its past experience plus 
information obtained from its risk-reducing activities. The rate of default normally 
1 Assume for simplicity that loanable funds are supplied at zero cost to the lending entity 
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increases as the porrower's debt-asset ratio increases, An estimate of the default 
cost known as the 'risk premium' and defined as RP = (__!!!!__)(I +AA + OP +ARR) 
I-DR . 
is added to the price of the loan, Hence, the default costs can be expressed as 
D=RP.L (2,2) 
The total transactions ·cost of lending (ITC) is defined as the sum of the 
administration and operation costs (A), risk-reducing transactions costs (R), and 
expected default costs (D): 
TTC~A +R +D (2.3.l) 
The sum (R + D) can be referred to as the risk-related costs (RD). Hence, 
TTC=A +RD (2.3.2) 
Since there is a trade-off between R and D, the lender would select an optimum2 
combination of the two components of risk-related costs. Transactions costs of 
lending can be expressed as a function of the loan size: 
TTC =A+ RD(L) = g(L) 
The marginal transactions costs is: g (£) = RIJ (L) 
(2.3.3) 
(2.3.4) 
Other things are being equal, the two components of risk-related costs (RD) will 
increase with the loan size, hence RIJ (L) > 0. 
Since the marginal returns from risk-reduction activities diminish, the marginal 
transactions costs of lending will rise, and RI1' ( L) > O . 
The total cost of the lending (CL) function is then defined as 
CL = OP.L + TTC = f{L) (2.4) 
Marginal cost A1C is 
MC= j'(L)= OP+ RIJ(L) (2.5) 
The first order condition for profit maximisation indicates that the supply function S 
can be detem1ined by setting the nominal lending rate (r) equal to 1vJC: 
2 The optimum combination of the two components of risk-related costs is that which minimises total 
risk-related costs for a given loan size. 
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r= OP+ RD(L) (2.6) 
and solving for L = S. As a result 
S= S(r) (2.7) S>O 
The supply curve is then represented by the upward sloping segment of the 
marginal cost of lending at, and above the minimum average variable cost of 
lending (r ~average variable cost).3 This cost function is represented in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 
Supply Curve for a Lender and the Market 
Cost(%) MC 
OP+ ARD 
Interest rate(%) SS 
r, 
OP+AA 
OP 
DD 
Loan size Total loan 
BANK MARKET 
If the market supply curve is represented by SS and the market demand is 
represented by the curve DD,4 then the equilibrium interest rate will be r1. The total 
equilibrium volume of loans will be S1 and the bank will lend the amount L1. If, 
however, the lending rate is subject to a ceiling-say-r2, then the bank will lend 
3 Average variable cost oflending (AVC) is AVC = OP+ ARD, where ARD is the average risk-
RD 
related cost, ARD = - . 
L 
4 The market supply curve will be the horizontal sum of the supply curves of each lender in the 
market. 
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the amount L2 and total loans will be only S2. While the total of loanable funds in 
the market is at S2 ; the market demand is at D2,; thus non-interest rationing "'ill 
occur. How a formal lender uses the non-interest rationing mechanism to clear the 
market at S2 is examined below. 
2.1.2 Rationing in the Presence of Ceilings on Loan Interest Rates 
Traditional economic theory did not differentiate financial markets from 
other markets or interest rates from other prices. It indicated that non-price rationing 
was considered as a temporary condition away from the equilibrium path. The 
persistence of credit-rationing, however, required a new theory of the credit-
rationing process. In order to explain ration.mg processes in an imperfect· 
environment, a number of approaches can be used to model lender behaviour. 
Hodgman (1962) made the first attempt to develop an equilibrium theory of credit 
rationing based on the assumption that the default risk was a function of Joan size. 
He argued that no increase in interest rate could compensate lenders for the 
increased default risk if the loan is beyond a critical size, which is the borrowers' 
weaith .. Thus, the most profitable strategy for ]&nders was to set a credit limit. 
However, Hodgman's formulation has some limitations (Braverman and Guasch, 
1986: 1258). First, it cannot explain the fact that some borrowers obtain loans while 
others, seemingly identical, do not. Second, the ·interaction between lender 
behaviour and borrower demand does not appear in the model. Finally, it does not 
take account of competition among lenders. 
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Jaffee and Modigliani (1"969, 1976) set up an extended model which explicitly 
took into account the interaction between lender behaviour, borrower demand, and 
borrower default. Their analysis was limited to a pure monopoly framework with 
the monopolist facing an exogenous ceiling on interest rates. This may be an 
appropriate approach, however, for developing countries where there is often only 
one lending institution in the area, operating in an environment of interest rate 
ceilings. Within this framework, it can be shovm that a formal credit institution can 
increase its expected profits by rationing some clients. 
As pointed out by Braverman and Guasch (1986: 1258) 'most of the early 
literature ignored the effects of information asymmetries prevalent in credit 
markets', and with the advent of the economics of information, various studies on 
adverse selection and moral hazard incentive problems in credit markets have been 
developed. A number of credit rationing equilibrium models dealing with the 
incentive problem that arises in asymmetrical information frameworks have been 
studied. Jaffee and Russell (1976) using a two-period Fisherian consumption 
framework with two types of borrowers-' honest' and 'dishonest'-set up a model 
of credit rationing, which indicated that the optimal credit rationing policy depends 
on the proportion of honest borrowers because of the adverse selection problem. 
Keeton (1979) argued for the rationality of rationing if the risk of default increased 
with the size of the loan or if there was a moral hazard problem. His analysis 
explicitly recognises the fact that borrowers change project risks when the terms of 
the contract change. The Stiglitz and Weiss model (!981) discussed changes in the 
risk of the borro\ving population associated with variations in the interest rate and a 
fixed loan size. They argued that lenders realise that high interest rates and large 
loans are relatively attractive to.risky borrowers, and their model tries to handle this 
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adverse selection problem. The moral hazard problem is also introduced in this 
model. On the one hand, increases in the interest rate raise the return from 
successful loans but, on the other hand, they increase the probability of default The 
net result is that increases in the interest rate may lead to a decrease in the expected 
returns to lenders. 
In short, even in the absence of interest rate restrictions, the imperfections 
am:\. costs that exist in the rural credit markets of developing countries may justify 
credit rationing by profit-oriented lenders. However, as in other developing 
countries, a key feature of the rural credit market in Vietnam is the existence of 
formal credit institutions \>vi.th interest rate ceilings, which also result in credit 
rationing as indicated above. The traditional analysis of the impact of interest rate 
ceilings shows that at the ceiling Joan rate, resource mobilisation by the controlled 
institutions decreases, and therefore their total volume of lending declines. As a 
result, the demand for loans by all or some potential borrowers is totally or partially 
unsatisfied. Although the conventional model also points out that the rationing 
processes will have an unfavourable impact on small farmers because of the high 
risks and costs associated with lending to them, it fails to explain how the smaller 
amounts of credit are rationed out among borrower classes. Thus, the conventional 
~ 
analysis sheds little light on the impact of interest rate ceilings on the allocation of 
resources and on the distribution of income (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984: 79). 
Suppose there is more than one risk-group of borrowers and the lenders can 
differentiate among them in terms of the expected marginal transactions costs of 
lending associated with each group. Then, in a market with no interest rate 
restrictions, the lenders will charge higher interest rates to the borrowers in the 
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higher risk-groups. For example, if there are two risk-groups of borrowers, then the 
lenders will charge borrowers in the higher risk-group an interest rate that is higher 
than that charged to the other borrowers. It~ however, the interest rate is fixed at any 
point below the market clearing rate for the high risk-group, then the borrowers in 
that group will be rationed by the lenders as shown below. 
Assume that borrowers can be divided into two risk-classes, where Risk· 
Class I comprises high risk-borrowers and low risk-borrowers belong to Risk-Class 
2. Assume also that the lender is a profit-maximiser. The two risk-classes of 
borrowers are then represented by the different marginal transactions costs of 
lending such that the marginal transactions costs of lending to Risk-Class l will be 
greater than the marginal transactions costs of lending to Risk-Class 2: 
g1' > g,' (from Equation 2.3.4) for the same loan size.5 The marginal cost of lending 
to Borrower Class 1 is, therefore, higher than that to Borrower Class 2: J;' > J; • 
(Equation 2.5) for the same loan size. As a result, if the market demands for credit 
by the two groups are the same, then the market interest rate for Group 1 \Viii be 
higher than that for Group 2-i.e., r, > r,. 
The total cost function (CL) can be expressed as 
CL=OP(L1 +L,)+g,(L,)+g,(L,) 
The marginal costs oflending to the two classes of borrowers are 
MC, =OP+g,'(L,) 
MC, =OP+ '(12 ) 
5 Subscripts 1 and 2 represent Risk-Classes I and 2, respectively. 
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The optimum loan sizes for each group can be determined by setting the marginal 
costs of lending equal to the interest rates charged to the two classes of borrowers 1 
and 2, respectively: 
If there is an inten:st rate ceiling set below r,, then it can be shown that the lender 
will reduce loans to the High-Risk Class l borrowers depending on how high the 
ceiling is set For simplicity, suppose that the ceiling r* is set at r2 -i.e., below the 
rate for Risk-Class I (r2 < r,). Since g,' < g,' andg" > O, the decline of g,' involves 
the decrease of loan size L, to the optimum loan size L * to Class 1 borrowers. 
r* = r2 = OP+g,'(L*) 
As a result, Class l borrowers will bear the effect of rationing. The reduction in 
loan size will fall on Class l borrowers-i.e., L1 decreases to L *. 
We have: (r,-r*)= g1'(L,)-g1'(L*) 
If (r, -r*)>O, then g/(L,)>g1'(L*). From g">O, we have: L, >L*, then L, 
decreases to L *. 
It can be seen that if r* is set lower-i.e., ( r, - r *) increases, then ( L, - L *) also 
increases. The optimum loan size L *, therefore, decreases and the rationing is more 
tightened. 
A natural question to raise is how a formal lender with a ceiling on loan 
interest rates rations credit among high-risk borrowers. In Vietnam, high-risk 
borrowers can be rationed mostly through the lender's requirement of collateral for 
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loans, and the restriction of loans to production activities only. The most popular 
forms of collateral for formal sector loans in the rural credit market in Vietnam are 
homesteads and land use rights. The fact that formal loans are disbursed for up to 80 
percent of the value of collateral could help formal lenders eliminate default losses 
(World Bank, 1995a: 126).6 However, in the absence of proper ownership 
documentation and a sound legal system, foreclosing collateral is costly and even 
almost impossible, as a result such collateral may be useless in cases of default. 
Thus, in addition to requiring collateral for loans, formal lenders in Vietnam also 
give priority to production loans in the expectation that loans for production 
activities are less risky and carry tangible returns as compared to loans for 
consumption. 
By requiring potential borrowers to submit physical collateral and a variety 
of data reflecting financial projections or feasibility studies for production loans, the 
formal sector credit delivery system becomes complicated, and involves high 
borrower transactions costs. 7 Through such procedures in selecting/screening 
potential borrowers, formal lenders can also shift part of their normal transactions 
costs onto borrowers. 3 The role of borrower transactions costs in explaining 
borrowing behaviour will be examined in the next section. 
6 The value of the collateral is defined at the time of loan application 
7 The complicated credit delivery scheme in the formal sector will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
' The formal credit delivery system requires borrowers to spend time and money to finish all 
procedures and visit the lender rather than vice versa. Of course, the level of transferability of 
transactions costs between borrowers and lenders has a limit, and lenders' transactions costs cannot 
be nil (lzumida, 1996: 44) 
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2.2 Behaviour of Borrowers and the Demand for Credit 
2.2.l A Basic Model of Demand for Credit 
The demand for credit by a farmer will be determined by his initial 
endowment, production, access to and cost of alternative sources of credit, and his 
attitude toward risk. The initial endovvment comprises human and physical capital, 
land, experience, technology, a11d is, for simplicity, assumed to remain constant 
during the period of production. Variable inputs include labour, seeds, feniliser, 
pesticides, fuel etc. Except for household Jabour, variable inputs will be zero unless 
stored. However, the farmer can increase his use of variable inputs with external 
ftmds. 
Assume that the purpose of the farmer's borrowing is to provide working 
capital, and that there is a conventional production function (Q) for the farmer 
subject to diminishing marginal productivity of all inputs: 
Q = fl.F, V); F - fixed inputs; V - variable inputs; 
Assume that the farmer's credit cost function (C) is 
C = c(L) 
where L - amount demanded, and 
A1C= c'(L); c'>O 
where MC - marginal cost 
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(2.8) 
(2.9) 
(2. 10) 
If we measure the cost of variable inputs in money terms, then the marginal rate of 
return (MRR) to credit would equal the marginal value product of the variable 
inputs less the marginal cost of variable inputs. A profit-maximising farmer would 
demand credit to the point that equates the expected marginal rate of return on the 
credit used to the marginal cost of credit.9 Given the diminishing marginal 
productivity of the variable inputs, the marginal rate of return to credit also exhibits 
diminishing returns. Thus the demand curve for credit will be dovmward sloping 
with respect to the marginal cost of credit as depicted in Figure 2.2. 
2.2.2 Ceiling Interest Rate and Borrower Transactions Costs 
In Vietnam with a regulated financial market, the interest rate ceilings 
imposed by the SBV prevent interest rates from IJ'!OVing to market equilibrium rates. 
This results in an excess demand for credit (Q,Qd) at the ceiling rate of r c (Figure 
2.2). The lower the imposed ceiling on r relative to the market rate r" the greater 
will be the excess demand for credit. 
At the regulated rate r °' while lenders are \'Yilling to lend Q,, potential 
borrowers would be 'l'iilling to pay a higher rate r' for this limited amount of funds. 
As a result, borrowers 1>111 continue to seek credit equivalent to Q, as long as their 
transaction costs are less than or equal to the margin t' r< • 
9 This will be derived in Section 2.2.3. 
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Figure 2.2 
Ceiling Interest Rate and Borrower Transactions Costs 
Cost of Credit 
r 
r, 
Qs Qe Qd 
s 
D 
Amount demanded 
or supplied 
2.2.3 Borrower Transactions Costs and Demand for Rural Credit 
An extension of the two-period Fisherian model to explain the behaviour of 
farmer-borrower is the so-called MeKinnon model (1973). McKinnon argues that 
because of indivisibilities in investments and limited resource endowments, the 
farmer has to borrow from external sources so that he can free himself from reliance 
on interior technology. This will generate benefits both to farmer- borrowers, who 
have better production opportunities, and to savers, who can gain by receiving 
higher interest rates. 
The implication ofMcKinnon's model is that a high interest rate policy will 
favour the transfer of resources from less productive to more productive 
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entrepreneurs. It is, however, noteworthy that this model does not explicitly take . 
into account the fact that, apart from the nominal interest cost, fanners also have to 
incur transactions costs to obtain loans. That is, what concerns farmers is not the 
interest cost alone, but the total borrowing cost, which includes the nominal interest 
rate plus transactions costs. There may exist cases, therefore, where the investment 
in new technology seems attractive enough at the nominal interest rate but the 
transactions costs make it unprofitable. 
A model that captures the reality that fanner-borrowers concern themselves 
with the total borrowing costs is suggested by Ladman (1984). The model is briefly 
as follows: 
The profit equation of the fanner-borrower is given by 
tr= R - (rL + BTC) (2.11) 
Where: is profit 
R is revenue net of costs of the resources purchased with 
borrowed funds, but not net of total borrowing costs 
ETC is borrower transactions costs. 
Equation (2.11) can be revvTitten: 
where: 
tr= L [AR - (r + ABTC)] or 
11:= L (AR· AC) (2.12) 
is average revenue 
A BTC = BCT is the average borrower transactions costs, and 
L 
AC= r + ABTC is the average total borrowing costs. 
From Equation (2. 11 ), the profit maximising conditionis 
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dn: dR 
-· - = O or - r = O or AfRR = r 
dl dL 
where AfRR = c1R is marginal rate of return. 
dL 
TI1is is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The demand for credit consists of the values 
of the marginal rate of return resulting from the resources employed using 
successive loan units. Given the interest rate r, the average total borrowing costs 
curve approaches the line that cuts the vertical at r. To maximise profit, the farmer 
has to borrow L* and his profit is L*(AR - AC). The figure shows that T1 is the 
borrowing threshold below which the borrower would not borrow from a lender. 
When r is given while ABTC increases, the AC curve would shift upwards. This has 
two results. Firstly, it reduces the optimal profit of the borrower. Secondly, it 
increases the borrowing threshold. This means that a farmer facing higher 
transactions costs has to have a higher minimum loan size. 
Borrower transactions costs have at least three impacts on the decision to 
borrow and profitability (Ladman, 1984: 109). First, larger borrower transactions 
costs mean higher total borrowing costs and less profits for borrowers, ceteris 
paribus. Second, v.ith a given loan rate and borrower transactions costs, there is a 
minimum loan size below which the borrower would not be willing to borrow from 
a lender. This borrowing threshold (T1) is the level where average total borrowing 
costs are equal to average revenue. For any given loan rate, the larger the borrower 
transactions costs, the higher the borrowing threshold. Third, the out-of-pocket 
costs threshold is part of Ti, and represents the amount of outlay the farmer must 
make in applying for a loan and before receiving the loan. A farmer who did 
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Figure 2.3 
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not have the out-of-pocket costs threshold would not be able to borrow from the 
lender. Even a farmer who did have the out-of-pocket costs threshold funds but 
faced a probability that the Joan application would be rejected (and thus risked 
losing the funds for nothing) might not want to attempt to borrow. It is worth noting 
that compared to repeat and large borrowers, first-time and small borrowers would 
have a greater possibility of falling below the two thresholds. 
2.2.4 Market Structure 
Ladman (1984) extended this model to capture the case of one borrower and 
two lenders so that the borrower can have a choice of credit source. It is assumed 
that the farmer-borrower has two choices of lenders, namely a formal credit 
institution with a low nominal interest rate but high transactions costs for the 
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farmer, and an informal moneylender who charges a high interest rate but, in 
contrast, requires low transactions costs of the farmer. Suppose given the nominal 
loan rate and transactions costs of each lender, the amount demanded from the 
formal credit institution is Le, while the amount demanded from the informal 
moneylender is L; and at L0, the farmer would be indifferent between the formal 
credit institution and the informal moneylender (Figure 2.4). If the loan size 
requirement is above L0 , then the farmer prefers to borrow from the formal 
institution and vice versa. The thresholds of borrowing from the formal institution 
and the informal moneylender are 1~· and T;, respectively. Any farmer who wants to 
borrow an amount between T; and Tc will prefer to source funds from the informal 
moneylender. 
One of the main implications from Ladman' s model is that offering cheap 
credit does not necessarily induce farmers to borrow from f01mal credit institutions. 
Depending on the total cost of borrowing from the alternative sources of credit, 
farmer-borrowers will decide their loan sizes. Borrowers seeking small loans Viill 
often prefer to work with lenders who charge a higher rate of interest but impose 
low transactions costs. In contrast, borrowers seeking larger loans may prefer to 
deal with lenders who charge lower interest rates but impose larger transactions 
costs. This explains why despite the prevalence of cheap credit schemes in many 
developing countries, farmers still borrow from informal moneylenders whenever 
their amounts demanded are less than £0 and why several types of credit institutions 
can operate side by side, even though they charge quite different rates of interest. 
Lenders who impose high transactions costs will focus on larger Joans, whereas 
those with low costs will tend to make smaller loans. McLeod (1991: 195) also 
argued that saying small firms. often lack access to institutional credit is quite 
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misleading, and that it is more meaningful to argue that institutional lenders to some 
extent 'lack access to' --or cannot compete in the financing of small firms. 
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Given this behaviour, rural credit markets in many developing countries are 
segmented. In the case of nvo lenders, the segment associated with lower borrower 
transactions costs but higher rates of interest and smaller loans is dominated by the 
informal portion of the market. The second segment associated with higher 
borrower transactions costs but lower rates of interest and larger loans corresponds 
to the formal portion of the market. As pointed out by Ladman (1984: 112), 
partitioning of the aggregate demand for loans \:\o'ill occur at a loan size, at which 
farmers are indifferent benveen the two _lenders-Le., where across all farmers the 
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effective cost of borrowing from both lenders is equal. The mandates, regulations, 
and operating procedures of each lender will detem1ine borrower transactions costs 
and the interest rates of formal lenders. On the other hand, the competitive 
environment will detem1ine the interest rates of the infom1al lender. Changes in 
market share will depend on changes in borrower transactions costs and/or in loan 
rates of either lender. If the loan rate and/or borrower transactions costs rise for one 
lender, some borrowers will seek their credit from the other lender, and this will _ 
change the partition accordingly, ceteris paribus. 
In summary, ceiling interest rates are an important determinant in 
structuring credit markets. When formal institutions are forced to charge 
concessionary loan rates and thus face an excess demand for credit, mechanisms to 
substitute for interest rates to perform the rationing function are needed by them. 
According to Adams and Vogel (1986: 482), increased collateral requirements and 
reallocation of transactions costs to borrowers are often used as a substitute 
rationing mechanism. When borrower transactions costs are raised as a result of this 
rationing process, some potential borrowers, mainly small borrowers will go to 
other lenders, or go without credit, and the structure of the market will be changed. 
As evidenced in Brazil (Nehman, 1973), Bangladesh {Ahmed, 1982), Bolivia 
{Ladman, 1984), and the Philippines (Abiad et al., 1988) large borrower 
transactions costs from formal lenders cause many small and new borrowers to seek 
loans from informal moneylenders. Adams and Nehman (1979) examined how 
borrowing behaviour is affected by total borrowing costs, including both 
transactions costs and interest payments. They present evidence from several 
countries shov.'ing how borrower transactions costs lead to high total borrowing 
costs from many FFis. They concluded that relatively large borrower transactions 
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costs discourage the rural poor from borrowing from these sources. Whether this 
has also been the experience of Vietnam is an interesting issue and will be 
examined in the following chapters. The next chapter will begin the review of 
empirical results dealing with the main characteristics of the rural credit market in 
Vietnam. 
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Chapter3 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET IN 
VIETNAl\il 
After the war ended in 1975, the Vietnamese economy followed closely the 
centrally-planned model. By the mid-1980s, this model had begun to reveal its 
failure, and due to the drying up of aid from the former Soviet Union and other 
Eastern Europe socialist countries, Vietnam fell in a serious socio-economic crisis 
with inflation rate soaring up to around 400 percent in 1988, stagnated real GDP per 
capita growih of below 2 percent, and widespread hunger with overall poverty rate 
of above 70 percent . 
Before the implementation of a senes of reforms in agriculture, the 
cooperatives were responsible for production decisions; input and output markets 
were strictly controlled by the government; working capital and investment were 
financed with the resources of the cooperatives or with loans from rural financial 
institutions. The rural banking system acted essentially as a channel for transferring 
credit from the SBV to the cooperatives according to planned allocations, and for 
mobilising savings in rural credit cooperatives and households-then transferring a 
major share of these to the SBV. Since the cooperatives managed production and 
investment activities, they also handled borrowing. Lending to households was 
limited. Farmers arranged financing for investment only for their private plots, 
residentiai construction and ceremonial events such as weddings and funerals, in 
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part through their own savings and in part through informal borrowing, mainly from 
relatives and friends. Other types of informal lenders were strictly repressed. 
Agricultural policy reform began in 1981 '.vith the introduction of the 
product contract system, in which fann production was undertaken jointly by 
cooperatives and households. Under this system, input markets were still fully 
controlled, while output markets were only partly controlled; farm households could 
retain any output beyond the contract level, which they were allowed to sell in the 
free market. The most important change, however, was the introduction of the 
household responsibility system in April 1988, characterised by the allocation of 
land under long-term leases to farm households, and liberalisation of the input and 
output markets, thus transferring farm management and the decision-making 
authority from the cooperatives to individual households. The reforms were further 
enhanced bv the implementation of a new Land Law in June 1993, under which 
' ' 
households were granted land use rights that could be exchanged, transferred, 
inherited, leased and mortgaged. 1 
The incentives for rural households generated by these reforms have resulted 
in a significant increase in agricultural productivity, output and rural income 
(Nguyen, 1995: 1). Rice output grovlth rates in the periods 1981-88, 1988-92, and 
1992-94 were 2.05% p.a., 5.02% p.a., and 4.30% p.a., respectively, while rice yields 
grew at 3.23% p.a., 3.14% p.a. and 3.35% p.a., respectively. From a country 
characterised by food shortage, and having to import rice up until 1988, Vietnam 
had become the second largest rice exporter in the world by 1995. Rural income 
increased by 135 percent during the period 1989-92. 
' Details of agricultural reforms and their impact can be seen in the Appendix. 
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These reforms have changed the nature of economic activity in the rural 
sector radically. Output and factor markets, especially the rural credit market have 
developed rapidly. With the new system of organisation for agricultural production 
and the more favourable output market, demand for rural credit services has 
expanded. On the one hand, households must now arrange financing independently 
for production, investment, consumption and residential construction, as a result 
their demand for credit increases. On the other hand, with higher cash incomes from 
farm and non-farm activities, many households have a surplus of cash, which 
provides more opportunities for savings mobilisation and intermediation in the 
financial markets, 
The purpose of this chapter is to review rural credit conditions and their 
evolution in recent years, Issues related to the structure of the rural credit market in 
Vietnam and its characteristics in terms of government, SBV, and VBA policies 
regarding the allocation of credit, interest rates, loan use, borrower coverage, and 
performance are analysed, 
3.1 Rural Financial Markets 
The structure . of Jhe rural financial markets has undergone substantial 
change in the last few years. Prior to the adoption of fiscal and monetary reforms 
and the restoration of household farming in 1988, monetary and financial 
developments were determined by the financing needs of the goverrunent and state 
enterprises, Rural credit was supplied by SBV branches throughout the country to 
communes, cooperatives and state farms according to planned allocations. 
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Households received a minor proportion (less than 1 percent) of bank credit to the 
rural sector (Juillard, 1994: 1). 
Since 1989, the government has undertaken a wide range of financial and 
agricultural reforms and, as a result, the structure of the rural financial market in 
Vietnam has changed significantly. A new system of rural credit delivery with more 
diversified financing institutions is emerging from the old state bank structure. 
Figure 3.1 presents a simplified framework of the rural financial markets. 
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Available funds are used for various purposes. The reason for distinguishing 
production and non-production activities is to. provide a better picture of the 
segmentation of the market. As pointed out in various studies (World Bank, I 995a 
and 1996; UNDP and UNICEF, 1996; SPC and GSO, 1994), while formal credit 
institutions usually focus on production loans, farm household credit needs for non-
production activities are satisfied by the informal sector. 
There are three ways by which rural households can finance their activities. 
The first is self-financing-i.e., households use their own funds to finance their 
activities. In developing countries where markets are characterised by 
'fragmentation' as pointed out by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), households 
are more likely to engage in self-financing. Inadequate financial services, 
macroeconomic instability, lack of collateral are reasons why they are either forced 
to engage in self-financing or they make this choice after considering alternative 
possibilities. Before the financial sector reforms, private savings in rural Vietnam 
were held in three principal forms: gold, US dollars and rice (Seibel, 1992: 91 ). 
Bank saving was of negligible importance because of inconvenience and negative 
retums.2 In the absence of efficient financial intermediaries, therefore, rural 
households preferred to keep their savings in forms other than VD3 deposits, and 
. they relied heavily on self-financing. Financial refonns, particularly interest rate 
adjustments which brought positive real returns to savers, have contributed to the 
significant change in the pattern of household savings portfolios since 1989. The 
strongest impact of financial sector reforms can be found in a substantial flow of 
2 Bank saving \Vas inconvenient because withdravval of savings was difficuit1 and an explanation of 
the intended use offunds was required. Bank saving was also highly unattractive because of negative 
real interest rates. For example, an inflation rate of nearly 500 percent in 1986 in Vietnam reduced 
the value of savings by about four-fifths within a year. 
3 Vietnamese Dong 
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savings into the financial system. During the ten-month period following the 
reforms, March 1989-January 1990, deposits in the Investment and Construction 
Bank of Vietnam and the VBA grew at 335 percent p.a., with household deposits 
growing at 630 percent p.a. (Seibel, 1992: 92). However, the potential is still far 
from being exhausted. In a rural finance survey undertaken by Cao and Dao (J 992: 
6 I) in four provinces, only 57 percent of households claimed savings and 
investment in the preceding year, while 41 percent stat~d that they kept their 
savings at home. Remedying the remaining weaknesses and shortcomings of the 
present system of savings mobilisation will have an even stronger impact on 
domestic resource mobilisation, permitting an expanded role for intermediaries of 
the financial system. 
The second source of funds is the informal credit market. Although 
information on the informal market is scanty, r~cent studies (Tran et al., 1992; 
Seibel, 1992; SPC and GSO, 1994) have revealed the fact that the informal sector 
does the bulk of household level financial intermediation. The literature on informal 
credit markets demonstrates that the composition and operations of informal lenders 
have been changing through time. Previously, informal credit markets were 
suppressed. The recent financial liberalisation has, however, contributed to a 
resurgence of informal credit markets. Various recent studies have compared 
nominal interest rates charged by formal and informal lenders and found that 
interest rates charged by moneylenders are two or three times higher than the rates 
charged by the VBA (World Bank, 1995a: 73). As pointed out by Seibel (1992: 74), 
however, interest rates charged by moneylenders appear to be virtually identical to 
the rate that the VBA would charge if it were to apply sound commercial criteria. It 
is also worth noting that what concerns the farmers is the total cost of borrow"ing, of 
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which the nominal interest rate is only a part. It is vvidely perceived that while 
formal markets are more likely to place the major burden of transactions costs on 
borrowers, particularly ·when an interest rate ceiling is imposed, most transactions 
costs in the informal market are incurred by the lender. Hence, knowledge of the 
total costs of borrowing from the formal and informal markets should clarify policy 
issues concerning both formal and informal lending. 
The third source of funds is the formal credit market, which is dominated by 
the VBA. However, other financial institutions, namely PCFs and RSBs are fast 
becoming important in rural areas, especially after the Law of Banking, Credit 
Cooperatives and Finance Companies was introduced in 1990. By 1992-93, the 
VLSS found that 27 percent of rural credit was being provided by fomial lenders, 
leaving 73 percent being provided by informal channels involving friends, relatives 
and moneylenders. 
The shape and character of the rural credit market are to a large extent 
conditioned by the monetary and credit policies of the SBV, such as its interest rate 
ceiling and credit targeting policies. It is important, therefore, to examine the 
performance of rural financial institutions as conduits for SBV funds, and al.so the 
behaviour of formal financial institutions as intermediators. 
3.2 Formal Financial Institutions 
The basic structure of the formal credit market in rural. Vietnam is similar to 
that of many developing countries. There is a specialised state-owned agricultural 
bank-the VBA-and a network of PCFs and RSBs. 
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3.2.1. T.hc Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and the Vietnam Bank for the 
Poor 
3.2.I.1 The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture 
The VBA was established in July, 1988 by restructuring a former 
department of the SBV, the Agricultural Development Bank of Vietnam, which was 
created to provide credit to state farms and cooperatives.4 It has operated under the 
Law of Banking, Credit Cooperatives and Finance Companies since 1990. The 
VBA's charter was expanded to include credit provision to farm households and to 
emerging private rural enterprises in 1992. 5 The VBA is a government-owned 
financial institution whose loan interest rates are regulated by the SBV. However, 
the VBA selects its 0¥.11 investment and economic activities. 
Unlike some other developing countries. and centrally-planned transition 
economies, where rural credit cooperatives are the principal network of credit 
institutions reaching into the countryside, the VBA is now the major source of 
formal sector credit for the agricultural sector and farm households in Vietnam. 
Since February 1995, the VBA has had the largest network of any bank in the 
country, with 2,564 branches and transaction offices, averaging one banking facility 
per four communes. There are currently 20,000 staff, including 1,870 managers, 
7,185 credit officers, and 1,022 business operations personnel in 1995. In 20 out of 
53 provinces in Vietnam, the VBA is the only formal lending institution (World 
Bank, 1996: 10 and 53). 
4 Its present establishment has resulted from the government's decision No. 400 dated November 
14th, 1990. 
' This was promulgated by the SBV November 1 !th, 1992 (Decision No. 250 QD). 
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Sources of funds 
The VBA's loanable funds are obtained mainly from two sources: the SBV 
and self-mobilisation (savings mobilisation). Loans from the SBV to the VBA are 
primarily through refinancing and rediscounting soft loans for responding to natural 
disasters and epidemics, and for purchasing import commodities, such as rice and 
coffee. The VBA also participates in joint-venture banks and borrows from 
international financial institutions. Funds available to the VBA have grown 
significantly since 1990 (Table 3.1). From relying mainly on the SBV for funds (80 
percent of the total) in 1990, the VBA's self-mobilised funds have increased 
significantly, from 20 percent in 1990 to 77 percent in 1994. 
Interest rates paid on demand and savings deposits generally follow SBV 
guidelines, but the VBA has become increasingly dependent on project·linked 
'deposit substitutes'. These substitute funding arrangements take various forms, 
including bonds and promissory notes. The VBA increased its dependence on 
deposit substitutes from 0.1 percent of total non-equity funds at the end of 1991 to 
4.7 percent at the end of 1992, and to 19 percent as of September 1994. At the end 
of September 1994, outstanding deposit substitutes represented approximately 41 
percent of total deposit substitutes of all the deposit-takints banks in Vietnam 
(World Bank, 1995a: 65). 
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Table 3.1 
VBA Funding (percent) 
I Year-End 1990 1991 1992 1993• 1994 
I 
I I Loans from the SBV 80 73 70 28 23 
I Self-Mobilised Funds 20 27 30 52 77 
L_ 
Note a: Figures in source document do not sun1 to ! 00 percent 
Source: World Bank (1996: 53). 
Lending activities 
Providing credit to farm households was not a government priority until 
1992. Before that time, rural households had been.recognised by the government as 
autonomous production units, and had been allotted land and forest. As a result, 
their demand for business credit increased enormously. After implementing a pilot 
test in 1990, the VBA issued 'Lending regulations for short-term, medium-term 
loans to farm households' (No.53/NHJ\'N) in 1991. The VBA is now an extensive 
rural branch banking system which serves primarily as a direct lender, but also 
lends indirectly through 'economic units' such as non-governmental organisations 
(women's unions, farmers' associations etc.) and other rural financial institutions 
such as the RSBs and PCFs. Thus the VBA has a strong influence on the rural credit 
system. Recently an increase in outreach to the rural population by the VBA has 
been achieved through the use of joint-liability groups. These are formed either by 
VBA staff directly or through service organisations such as non-governmental 
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organisations (NGOs). In 1995, about 157,000 groups were established (World 
Bank, 1996: 54). 
The reorientation of the VBA' s portfolio toward rural households and small 
businesses is reflected in Table 3.2. Loans granted reached VD 9,186 billion in 
1994. The growth rate for VBA loans for the period 1990-94 was 49 percent p.a. 
Lending to SOEs grew at only 8 percent p.a., while the corresponding figure for 
non-SOEs was 157 percent p.a. The proportion of lending to non-SOEs increased 
from 4 percent of the loan portfolio in 1990 to 76 percent in 1994. Notwithstanding 
the rapid gro\v1h in its lending to rural households, the VBA has also managed to 
maintain high repayment rates. In 1994, the rate was 95 percent (ADB, 1995: 10). 
·within the five years 1990-94, the VBA also demonstrated that lending to farm 
households on the basis of commercial banking criteria is financially viable. Having 
lost VD 82 billion in 1990, the bank made a profit ,of VD 24 billion in 1994. Taking 
into account the transitional nature of the economy and the VBA's brief history in 
lending directly to the household sector, this result is impressive. 
Although the VBA is a universal bank with authority to lend to various 
· sectors, in practice it remains a highly specialised agricultural bank, with a loan 
portfolio dominated by short-term production loans. Estimates of the distribution of 
short-term formal sector credit through the VBA in 1993 suggest that roan funds 
were distributed as follows: approximately 45 percent to crops (including 
vegetables and industrial crops such as tea and coffee); 20 percent to Ii vestock 
(including pigs, chickens, cows etc.); 20 percent to other farm enterprises (e.g. fruit 
gardens and fisheries); and 15 percent to other economic activities (e.g. trading, 
small-scale processing, handicrafts etc.) (World Bank, 1995a: 63). 
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Table 3.2 
VBA's Loan Portfolio by Sectors 
Year-End 11990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Aver. 
grmvth 
rate(%) 
Loan Portfolio (VD billion) 1,524 2,393 3,213 5,139 9,186 48.92 
SO Es 1,461 2,148 1,782 1,580 2,166 8.19 
Non-SOEs 63 245 1,431 3,559 7,020* 156.68 
Share ofNon-SOEs (%) 4.1 8.6 35.8 60.3 76.4 n.a 
Profit (Loss) (VD billion) (82) (52} 2.7 24.0 n.a 
*VD 5,766 billion or62.7 percent of total loans were to rural households. 
n.a indicates not applicable . 
.. indicates not available 
Source: World Bank (1996: 54) and author's calculations. 
Interest rate 
Financial sector reforms, especially the upward adjustment in nominal 
interest rates and the linking of nominal interest rates to the inflation rates, have 
permitted interest rates for deposits and loans to be positive in real tenns since 
1989, except during 1990-91.6 Table 3.3 shows the major changes in the interest 
rates during the period 1989-94. During the early stages of the transition in 1989-92 
the SBV introduced maximum lending rates differentiated according to sector. 
Deposit rates were also differentiated by type and holder of deposits. In 1993 the 
6 Monthly changes in the inflation rate and deposit interest rates during !988-95 are contained in the 
Appendix. 
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SBV moved away from imposing sector-specific lending rates and instead, 
introduced different rates for financing fixed assets and working capital. 
The SBV's current interest rate policy sets ceilings on lending rates, but 
with no directly imposed floor for deposit rates. There is, however, a maximum of 
0.35 percent per month on the spread between deposit and lending rates, which 
implies a minimum for deposit rates given lending rates subject to the maximum. 
The SBV argues that a miilirnum for deposit rates encourages commercial banks to 
attract savings, while a maximum lending rate provides some restraint on risky 
lending practices (World Bank, 1996). 
There are two problems v.ith the rural loan interest rate structure. First, it is 
widely perceived that the maximum spread between lending and deposit rates fixed 
at 0.35 percent per month provides inadequate net interest income to sustain most 
commercial banks. 7 This is particularly true for ·rural banks due to geographical 
constraints, poor transport and communications infrastructure in rural areas, 
especially in remote and mountainous regions, and low staff productivity.8 Factors 
which contribute to low average employee productivity include the exclusive use of 
cash in loan transactions, the use of manual record keeping systems, and 
employees' lack of experience in dealing with new clients. In these circumstances, 
the work of field loan officers who are mainly based in the district towns is severely 
restricted. As a result, the VBA's presence at the commune and village levels 
involves high transactions costs. The second major issue is the inverted rate term 
' See for example UNDP and UNICEF (1996) and Creusot et al. (1998). 
8 Data for 1993 showed that there were 95 household loans per bank employee as compared to 272, 
117, 376, and I 10 in the Badan Kredit Kecamatan, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desas in 
Indonesia, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand, and the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh, respectively (author's calculation from Yaron (!994)). 
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Table 3.3 
Selected Interest Rates, 1989-94 (Percent per month; end of period) 
n.a indicates not applicable. 
Source: World Bank (!995a: 27). 
strncture for loans. Although medium- and long-term lending rates were raised as of 
December, 1994, tbey are still slightly lower than short-term lending rates. In 
January 1996, for example, tbe ceiling on interest rates for short-term loans was set 
at 1.75 percent per month while that for medium and long-term loans was set at l.7 
percent per month. As a result of the inverted term structure, the bank cannot offer 
competitive deposit interest rates that could facilitate increased long-term savings. 
This distorts the allocation of scarce financial resources toward medium- and long-
/ 
49 
term lending. Clearly the rates on medium and long-term loans do not reflect 
different maturities or credit risk premiums properly, and simply act as a barrier to 
more effective intermediation in the rural credit market. 
Outreach 
The nwnber of households which borrowed from the VBA during 1992-95 
is shov.'11 in Figure 3 .2. From almost one million rural households in 1992, the 
nwnber rose rapidly to seven million in_ 1995. 
The proportion of rural households reached by the VBA can be seen in 
Figure 3.3. The proportion was 9 percent in 1992 increasing to about 20 percent in 
1993, and to more than 30 percent in 1994. The VBA has substantially increased its 
outreach due to its large network of branches, recently augmented by the 
establishment of sub-district transaction offices and mobile banking teams to visit 
villages. The use of joint-liability groups has ,also contributed further to the 
expansion of its coverage.9 
However, it is clear that the present demand for VBA loans is high because 
the Joan rate is substantially less than rates offered by informal lenders. Heavy 
reliance on collateral and the focus on loans for production purposes are overriding 
features of the VBA's lending policy in performing a non-interest rate rationing 
function. The 1989 SBV Resolution stated that 'cooperatives, business groups, 
private households, individuals and joint ventures benveen individuals involved in 
production and services and state servants engaged in family businesses must offer 
9 In 1993, the VBA introduced the Credit Operation Manual No 499/A stipulating the limit in terms 
ofrelief on loans to individuals without collateral through joint-liability groups. Loans of up to VD 
500 thousand made through joint-liability groups generally do not require collateraL 
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Figure 3.2 
Number of Households Which Borrowed from the VBA (millions households) 
o-.~~~~~~~~~~·~·~~~--< 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
Source: VBA annual reports (1994, 1995, and I 996). 
Figure 3.3 
VBA and Other Lenders' Shares of Farm Household Market (percent) 
1992 1993 
Source: World Bank (1995a; 1996). 
1994 
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collateral assets whenever applying for a loan from banks' (World Bank, l 995a: 
55). The predominant types of collateral in the formal sector rural credit market are 
homesteads, and land use rights. !O The Land Law and subsequent implementation 
decrees promulgated in I 993 formed the basis of the establishment of management 
of land by specifying rights and obligations of users. Land-use rights may be 
transferred, mortgaged, rented, exchanged, or inherited, although some discretion is 
left to local authorities to recognise a number of these rights. Land users are given 
land use certificates. While international experience shows mixed results regarding 
the impact of land titling on efficiency and equity, the issuance of land use 
certificates in Vietnam appears to be a promising factor reinforcing perceived 
security of tenure among households (UNDP and UNICEF, 1996). With the land 
use certificates serving as an acceptable form of collateral, farm households gain 
. access to formal sector loans. The SBV Resolution of 1989 also stipulates that the 
loan amount should not exceed 80 percent of the value of the asset pledged at the 
time of loan application. In principle, "'ith this limitation the VBA could completely 
eliminate losses due to default. However, non-unified legislation on collateral, 
unambiguous rules and related decrees, which are often frustrated by inconsistent 
local decisions in the case of enforcement and liquidation of collateral make 
confiscation of collateral by formal lenders sometimes impossible or time-
consuming and costiy.11 Faced with such difficulties in contract enforcement and 
10 In Vietnam, the government owns land, with the cultivator having use rights for 10-15 years for 
annual crops and longer for tree crops, rather than outright ownership. Farmers can use land use 
rights as legal collateral for formal loans. 
"The SBV's' Regulation on Assets as Collateral in Borrowing from Banks' was issued in 1989 in 
the absence of a law on collateral, and indicated that a lender should request the 'legal authority' to 
liquidate the asset and recover the principal and interest of loans in default. However, it is unclear 
who is the 'legal authority' referred to (World Bank, 1995a: 56). In addition, the rights to mortgage 
and sell are interpreted quite differently from region to region. For example, the transfer of land use 
rights is restricted in son1e communes, 
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liquidation of collateral, together with excess demand created by the ceiling on 
lending rates, a further response of the VBA has been to focus on production loans 
only. The VBA perceives that production loans carry tangible returns; thus they are 
more likely to be repaid than non-production loans. Credit needs for non-production 
activities are, therefore, satisfied informally. Furthermore, the lengthy and complex 
approval procedures for VBA loans which involve high borrower transactions costs 
per unit of loan also mean that any pressing demand for credit and small loans are 
met by the informal sector. It is estimated that three out of four eligible applicants 
leave the VBA without obtaining a loan (ADB, 1995: 8). 
Among the rural population, the poor has the weakest access to formal 
sector credit. Although the recent reforms have contributed to grov.ih, poverty 
remains a major challenge. Data from the VLSS indicate that about 51 percent of 
the population live in poverty and that 90 percent of the poor are in the rural sector. 
The incidence of poverty is about 57 percent in rural areas (World Bank, 1995b: 
12). While the national annual per capita income is US$220, the figure for rural 
households is only about US$86-less than half-and the per capita income of 
households in the lowest quintile is only about US$45. Poor households, which 
comprise the bulk of the rural population, are constrained by small non-production 
loans to smooth consumption and lack etf collateral. -Although land reform in 
Vietnam aims at reaching the right balance of efficiency and equity, landlessness is 
still a serious problem, particularly in the Mekong Delta where most land use rights 
certificates have been issued, and where many households (10 percent or more) 
have become landless after selling these rights to larger farmers. Many farmers in 
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the north have become landless because they failed to pay taices (UNDP and 
UNICEF, 1996: 46). 
In addition to the lack of adequate collateral, poor households' access to 
formal sector credit has also been limited by low education, geographical isolation, 
and poor communication facilities resulting in a reliance on informal lenders and 
limited self-finance. VBA officers estimate that the proportion of poor households 
actually served by the VBA was significantly lower than therr proportion in the 
rural population: only 10 percent of its loan volume went to poor households, which 
made up about 40 percent of the total (World Bank, 1995a: 65). 
3.2.J.2 The Vietnam Bank for the Poor 
Established in 1995, the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) was created 
partly in response to the concentration of the VBA on non-poor farmers with 
adequate collateral, and more generally to enhance the provision of financial 
services to the poor. 12 It aims to reduce poverty by providing the main somce of low 
interest loans for the rural poor, and is an important part of the Government's 
Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction program0 The VBP's objective is to 
mobilise funds to lend exclusively to the poor. Because it offers cheap credit, the 
VBP is discomaged from mobilising its own funds by promoting rural savings thus 
12 The VBP was established by Government Decree No.525/Tlg of August 3 l, 1995. and began 
operations on January l, 1996. 
"Also in the framework of the Government's Hunger Eradication and Poveny Reduction program, 
some special credit programs based on the Council of Minister's decisions 120/HDBT, 327/HDBT 
in l 992 to create employment and policies for the use of bare land, denuded hills, forests, alluvial 
flats, and water bodies were launched. The main characteristics of these programs are to provide 
some target borrowers with preferential rates. 
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has always been .dependent on the SBV and the VBA for discounted funds. During 
the initial phase, the VBP receives funds from the VBA's Fund for Preferential 
Loans to Poor Households as well as poverty alleviation funds from government 
and external sources. The VBP currently uses the existing infrastructure and 
personnel of the VBA at the district and commune levels. Loans from the VBP are 
collateral-free, with maturities up to three years. They are generally limited to the 
equivalent of VD 1 million, and are only for setting up production or service 
businesses. 
The level of outreach of the VBP in its first year of operation was 
impressive. An initial portfolio of loans was transferred to it from the VBA, but this 
soon doubled and after just one year of operation VBP loans totaled US$120 
million-somewhat less than 15 percent of VBA's lending (lJNDP and UNICEF, 
1996: 66). Vlhile the cost of lending to the poor appears to be higher than to the 
non-poor, the VBP's interest rate policy is inconsistent with its stated objective of 
maintaining the value of its capital and covering the cost of operations. In the third 
quarter of 1996, the lending rate was only 1.0 percent per month, while the 
comparable VBA rate was I. 7 percent per month. It has been estimated that the 
VBP's annual cost of operations will be equivalent to about 10 percent of the value 
of the loan por.tfolio, and that at least another 4 percent needs to be retained to cover 
bad debts (UNDP and UNICEF, 1996: 67). It is clear that inadequate allowance for 
administration costs in the provision of microfinance is more severe for the VBP 
than for the VBA. Under these conditions, the VBP will require substantial and 
continued subsidisation to remain viable. While the objectives and rationale for this 
type of bank are well founded (Benjamin, 1994; Foundation for Development 
Cooperation, 1995; Yaron, 1994), several aspects of the institutional fran1ework 
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need to be designed carefully to reflect best practice in banking for the poor to 
avoid the risk of distorting the financial markets, and to create a market-friendly 
role for the government. The VBP currently acts as a mechanism for income 
redistribution, but in doing so it distorts the credit market. The VBP, therefore, 
faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it operates as a channel for preferential loans to 
the rural poor, as directed by the government. On the other, it aims to meet its 
financial autonomy objective. In practice, however, it has to sacrifice 'the latter. 
\Vithout financial support from the government and international donors, the VBP is 
unlikely to become financially sustainable. 
Since demand for rural credit is much higher than the amount available 
through the VBA, the emergence of several alternative private financial institutions 
was encouraged by the SBV during 1992-93. During these two years, tl1e network 
of former rural credit cooperatives which had collapsed was replaced by private 
rural shareholding banks and popular credit funds. 14 
3.2.2 Other Formal Financial Institutions 
3.2.2.1 Rural Shareholding Banks 
Even prior to the passage of the National Law on Banks, Cooperative Credit 
Institutions and Financial Establishments in 1990, there were 15 commercial 
shareholding banks operating in both rural and urban areas. Most of the existing 
rural shareholding banks (RSBs) have gradually taken the place of the fonner rural 
"' Rural credit cooperatives were organised in North Vietnam in 1956 and in the South in 1976. 
\\/bile 7,500 rural credit cooperatives existed in I 990, only about 64 remained in operation in 1994. 
The number declined sharply because they were largely unregulated and acted as informal 
institutions. As a result of 'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard' they lost funds, and most of them 
collapsed during 1990-94 (World Bank, 1995a: 72). 
56 
credit cooperatives in rural areas. They are located mainly in the south, and 44 had 
been licensed by 1995 (UNDP and UNICEF, 1996: 67). A RSB typically has about 
50-60 shareholders, a few of whom have large holdings. All shareholders are local 
people who have close and/or family relationships with each other. They are usually 
rich or well-off. 
Operating funds of RSBs are derived from chartered equity, deposit 
mob~lisation and borrovvings. As evidenced in a case study of five RSBs chartered 
equity amounted to 18.6 percent of total funds, deposits 38.5 percent, and 
borrol'<fogs, 42.9 percent (Dao and Nguyen, 1993: 18). Another study indicates that 
large proportions (50-80 percent) of rural bank flmds are obtained directly from the 
VBA (\Vorld Bank, l995a: 71). The RSBs on-lend these funds to rural households 
at higher interest rates, and in many cases operate as VBA service centres. The 
dependence of the RSBs on the VBA for funds also means that they do not 
effectively compete with the VBA. Although the RSB interest rate on deposits is 
0.5 or 1 percent higher than that at the local VBA, the RSBs still face the ceiling (on 
loan rates) imposed by the SBV, so their capacity in savings mobilisation is still 
weak Primary savers, who represent a relatively small clientele of the RSBs, are 
traders. Other people with savings would rather lend through the informal market, 
which offers higher interest rates. In addition, the RSBs are still viewed as fairly 
risky. It appears that they do not have equal access with the VBA to the SBV loans 
and insurance. 
In general, the largest portion of loans from RSBs flows to farm households 
in their service areas. Although there is no restriction on loan use, the RSBs 
prioritise their loans for investment by the private sector, with the bulk-70 
percent-allocated to production, such as rice crop intensification, land-leveling, 
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and the development of fruit gardens (Dao and Nguyen, 1993: 20). Credit to rural 
traders and others accounts for a relatively small proportion of total lending. The 
RSBs report that they meet 10-30 percent of the estimated credit needs in their area, 
which is similar to the percentages quoted by the VBA district branches (\Vorld 
Bank, !995a: 71). As with the VBA, rural bank loans carry short maturities (3-6 
months). 
In contrast to the Joan portfolios reported by the VBA district and province -
offices, where the poor represent a minor borrower category, the proportion of 
funds loaned to the poor by the RSBs significantly exceeds the proportion of poor 
households in the district where they operate. In the service areas of RSBs 
interviewed, poor households received 60 percent of the loan volume, while they 
constituted only 30 percent of households (World Bank, 1995a: 65). The policy of 
waiving collateral on small loans is an important factor explaining the RSBs' 
stronger emphasis on lending to the rural poor. 
The initial performance of the RSBs has been quite impressive. The 
repayment rate from a survey of five rnral banks was remarkably high at 98 percent 
(Dao and Nguyen, 1993: 20). Most defaults are the result of crop damage. 
3.2.2.2 Popular Credit Funds 
The history of credit and trading cooperatives in rural Vietnam before 1992 
was one of clear failure, although there were some instances of successful private 
initiatives in credit cooperatives with the help ofNGOs (Cao and Dao, 1992). Since 
the VBA was unable to fill the vacuum left by the failure of the former rnra! credit 
cooperatives, in addition to the establishment of RSBs, a pilot project of the SBV to 
.· 
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increase small farmers' access to formal sector credit was conducted during 1993, 
based on Popular (or Peoples') Credit Funds. These are commune-based rural credit 
institutions, and are modeled after the Caisse Populaire system in Quebec, Canada. 
This system consists of a set of regional credit funds at the provincial level, built 
around a central credit fund. The central fund, which receives 40 percent of its 
capital from the SBV and the balance from shares issued to the local and regional 
units, has the responsibility of safeguarding regional and local credit funds. The 
regional funds are in charge of examining and supervising the operation of local 
funds and allocating capital to the latter. 
As voluntary membership economic units, each local credit fund has at least 
12 founders. PCFs have been now approved in 34 out of 50 provinces. Table 3.4 
shows the growth of PCFs from March, 1994 to May, 1995 in terms of number of 
PCFs, PCF members, and borrowing and lending positions. With the approval for 
PCFs in July, 1993, the number of PCFs rose to 153 in March, 1994, and to 207 at 
the end of May, 1995. Geographical coverage increased from 14 provinces 
comprising 78 districts to 34 provinces. The number of members increased nearly 
five-fold during this period (World bank, 1996: 52). 
PCFs have two kinds of share capital: permanent shares and qualification 
shares. Permanent shares, which are of much higher value than qualification shares, 
are purchased by the founders and receive dividends. Qualification shares have a 
minimum nominal value of VD 30 thousand and earn no interest. Deposits are 
accepted from both non-members and members. A strong feature of PCFs as rural 
financial institutions is the increasing share of deposit funding of loans. Deposits 
accounted for about 64 percent of loans outstanding in March, 1994, but for 88 
percent by May, 1995. 
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Although the PCFs maintain high lending positions the scope of their 
financing operations is still quite limited, as the volume of funds managed is 
relatively small. 15 Loan interest rates although depending on deposit rates are still 
subject to the ceilings imposed by the SBV. However, a spread of0.5 to 0.7 percent 
per month between the two is accepted, and the SBV states that the spread can be as 
high as l percent over the PCF average cost of funds (World Bank, 1996: 52). 
Although there is no restriction on loan use, PCFs often provide short-term 
credit in the form of working capital loans for crop production and livestock raising. 
Deposits are not a prerequisite for receiving a loan, but a farmer must buy a 
qualification share in the fund. The typical Joan size varies from VD 250 thousand 
to VD 1 million, and the smallest loan reported has been just VD 50 thousand 
(\Vorld Bank, 1995a: 70). 
Despite the fact that the interest rates on loans from PCFs are a little higher 
than those charged by the VBA, PCF loans are attractive to farmers. The system is 
characterised by commune-level units, and its operations focus on providing access 
to financial services for small rural borrowers and savers. Thus, it has closer 
contacts with small farmers than the VBA does. In rural Vietnam, characterised 
by poor infrastructure, 16 simplifying loan procedures (thus reducing the time 
re.quired to apply for loans), and shortening the distance between the borrowers' 
homes and the lenders are likely to improve access for the rural poor. 
15 Loans outstanding in 1994 of the VBA and PCFs were VD 9, l 86 and VD l 4 biHion, respectively 
as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.4. 
16 The road density of Vietnam is only 0.03 km/square km, compared with ratios of O. l5 for 
Thailand and 0.52 for the Philippines. As much as 90 percent of local roads are unpaved (World 
Bank, 1996: 4), 
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Table 3.4 
The Growth of PCFs: March 1994-May 1995 
March, 1994 May, 1995 
Number of PCFs 153 207 
PCF members 12,000 65,268 
Capital (VD billion) 4.8 15.7 
-
Deposits (VD billion) 9 108.7 
Outstanding loans (VD billion) 14 123.3 
Deposits/Outstanding loans (%) 64.3 88.2 
Source: World Bank (1996: 52) and author's calculations. 
As the system of PCFs expands, and as a result the range of financial services is 
widened, access for borrowers and savers ·will be improved, and savings 
mobilisation and loan repayment will be emphasised. 
3.3 The Informal Financial Market 
An enormous expansion of formal sector credit has been injected into the 
rural sector through a vast number of institutional settings of the VBA network, the 
RSBs and the PCFs. Although the formal financial institutions have experienced 
remarkable increases both in total amount of credit disbursed and in number of 
borrowers, they have not been able to catch up with the growth in credit demand in 
the rural sector. The estimation from the VBA shows that the formal sector credit 
system met about 30 percent of its credit requirement in 1994 (World Bank, 1996: 
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54). Furthermore, since formal lenders do not provide a comprehensive range of 
rural financial services, informal lenders are found to play a very important role in 
rural areas. 
In Vietnam the planning model was implemented only partially, and a 
repressed market economy always coexisted with the planned economy (Fforde and 
Vylder, 1988). An informal financial market was part of this repressed economy. 
Financial liberalisation since 1989 has contributed to a flourishing of informal 
financial markets. 
The coexistence of the formal and informal sector means that they specialise 
in providing different products in the rural financial market. While formal 
institutions restrict their loans to investment purposes and insist on physical 
collateral, consumption loans, and loans where collateral is unavailable are served 
by informal lenders. In addition, the lengthy approvals procedures for formal sector 
loans also mean that loans needed immediately are satisfied infom1ally. Hence, in 
this context the choice of borrowing between formal and informal credit sources is 
not available. 
Although scanty, available information on informal credit indicates that the 
informal sector provides the bulk of rural financial intermediation. In a survey 
undertaken by . the~ Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry covering seven 
provinces in 1990, between 68 and 94 percent of farm households received credit 
from informal sources during the preceding year (Seibel, 1992: 72). In another 
survey carried out in 1991 in four provinces, Cao and Dao (1992: 19) estimated 
that, on average, 45.8 percent of farm households borrowed from informal sources. 
The VLSS also provides evidence of the reliance of mral households on the 
informal market: about 73 percent of total loans of households were obtained from 
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informal sources in 1992-93, of which moneylenders accounted for 33 percent, 
while friends and relatives accounted for 40 percent. 
Nation-wide, it is impossible to measure precisely the total volume of rural 
credit, and the share of the formal and informal sector over time since data on 
informal lending are incomplete. Except for the VLSS, which indicated that 
informal lending comprised 73 percent of the total value of loans obtained by 
farmers in 1992-93, no study on rural flnance has produced a figure for the total 
amount of nation-wide informal credit. However, conversations with VBA staff 
revealed that although informal credit played a very important role during the early 
years of financial reform, its share has clearly fallen--especially in financing 
production activities-since the VBA's reorientation of lending to individual 
households in 1991. 
In the context of rural Vietnam, there are four major types of participation in 
informal finance: mutual lending among family members, relatives, friends and 
neighbours; rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) or Hui; 
moneylenders; and traders. The operation of particular informal lenders can be 
described briefly as follows: 
Relatives, friends and neighbours lend to each other at negotiated rates, 
which may be low (neighbours) or in many cases (relatives and close friends) zero. 
Instead, granted labour or grants as implicit interest payment are common practices. 
The purpose of loans obtained from relatives, friends and neighbours include 
repairing or building houses, children's schooling and emergency consumption 
(such as medical treatment, funerals), but they are rarely for the purchase of inputs 
for production. House construction is the primary purpose of informal non-
commercial loans, and relatives tend to be the preferred source for housing loans 
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(World Bank, l 995a: 73). Loans may be in cash, but are mostly in kind, in the form 
of paddy, gold. Loans for building are often in gold and for longer terms (1-2 
years). Loans in cash are for shorter terms (three, six or nine months). Repayments 
are easily rescheduled if necessary, and collateral is mostly not required. Relatives, 
friends and neighbours are the most favourable sources of credit for rural 
households since their loans carry low interest rates and have flexible repayment 
schemes. 
Hui is one type of ROSCA set up voluntarily by members, and . the 
organisations are not formally registered. These associations are formed in order to 
enable members to help each other financially. Members are often relatives, close 
friends and neighbours. Savings are collected weekly or monthly, and loans are 
given with or without interest. The so called non-commercial ROSCAs or self-help 
groups (SHGs) have existed for many years .. Recently, this type of SHGs has 
developed with the supervision of NGOs and formal credit institutions, and it is 
often linked with the local formal credit institution or local authority to reduce 
transactions costs and enhance peer monitoring loans among groups. The World 
Bank and other international donors have also pushed for channeling funds to SHGs 
through NGOs such as the women's unions, the farmers' associations (UNDP, 
1996). Another type of ROSCAs called commercial Hui involving bidding for the 
savings collected each round, is now more popular. Membership is extended to 
include non-neighbours in villages/communes. Savings mobilised may be in the 
form of cash, rice or gold, and each member can draw on the pool of savings 
collected weekly or monthly on a rotating basis. Interest rates are charged by the 
member who gets the loan through bidding, hence they are closed to the market. 
The number of members and the amount of money a Hui gets depend to some 
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extent on the need and resources of those who participate. Although there is no data 
available as to the total volume of these saving and credit activities, it is believed 
that almost all merchants and small entrepreneurs participate in Hui (World Banlc, 
1995a: 78). 
In the absence of an effective formal financial system, and the lack of funds 
from relatives and friends, the existence of moneylenders is understandable. 
Moneylenders had been strictly repressed, but have ~ecome prominent since the 
financial reforms in 1989. Experience shows that where access to the formal 
financial sector is limited and loanable funds are scarce, the moneylenders' 
monopolistic power is strong and the interest rates they charge can be very high. In 
contrast, where access to the formal sector is improved, the difference between the 
rates charged by moneylenders and the formal sector may only reflect the costs and 
risks of the segmented markets (UNDP and UNICEF, 1996: 69-70). There are signs 
that the interest rates charged by moneylenders have fallen in recent years because 
of lower inflation rates and the growth of formal sector loans with lower interest 
rates. During 1990-92, the average rate was 6-7 percent per month, and the 
maximum recorded was 25 percent per month (Seibel, 1992: 74). Rates in 1995-96 
were 3.5-5 percent on average, and the maximum was about 10 percent (lJNDP and 
UNICEF, 1996: 71-2). 
Moneylender loans seem to be the most flexible loans available to rural 
borrowers. Terms and conditions of loans from moneylenders are very diverse, and 
loans can be provided in a timely manner. In general, lenders pay little or no 
attention to the use of loans. No collateral is needed, and they routinely allow roll-
overs and loan rescheduling. Moneylenders can also provide loans to non-local 
borrowers if the latter are willing to pawn their possessions, such as gold, 
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motorbikes, and bikes. Loans from moneylenders are characterised by their small 
size, and can be used to satisfy all needs ignored by the formal sector. 
The traders-lenders have mostly made their appearance since the financial 
reform in 1989, and often lend by selling farm inputs on credit. Loans are repaid by 
delivery of crop products following the harvest, on the basis of predetermined 
prices. Lending rates charged by traders have also been falling recently. In 1990-92, 
farmers had to pay rates as high as 10 percent per month (Tran et al., 1992: 61), but 
now the common rate is 6 percent (UNDP and lJNICEF, 1996: 71). In many 
communes, cooperatives now play the role of such traders, but the different feature 
is that they have easier access to formal financial and trading markets. 
The VLSS indicates that although there is considerable variation, short-term 
informal rates are usually about two or three times higher than the level of 
comparable formal rates. \Vith the expansion pf the formal credit institutions in 
recent years, a narrov,ing of the interest rate differentials between formal and 
informal loans, particularly with loans for production activities is observed (Tran 
and Nguyen, 1998: 37). Selected interest rates from various sources calculated from 
the VLSS are shown in Table 3.5. 
It is noteworthy that the common complaint about 'usurious' moneylenders 
and traders appears not to be based ()n appropriate calculations. Interest rates 
charged by moneylenders and traders on small short-term loans are often converted 
into a medium- or long-term rate and may over-estimate the actual charge. If the 
loan is small and if the effective interest rate (encompassing transactions costs as 
well as the nominal lending rate) is taken into account, it is often more efficient to 
borrow from a moneylender than from a formal source. A number of recent studies 
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have also revealed that small borrowers prefer to borrow from informal sources 
rather than from the formal sector (Tran and Nguyen, 1998: 43). 
Table 3.5 
Average Interest Rates by Lender and Types of Household in Rural Vietnam, 
1993 (percent per month) 
Type of lender Farm household Non-farm household All households 
Moneylender 5.8 9.8 6.7 
Relatives 2.4 4.5 2.7 
Private individuals 2.5 7.3 4.0 
Private Banks 4.7 10.0 3.8 
Government Banks 2.7 2.8 2.8 
Cooperatives I 2.6 2.9 2.5 ' 
I Others 2.8 " 2.3 
' Average I 3.3 7.4 4.0 i 
Source: UNDP and UNICEF (1996: 70) 
3.3 Summary 
I 
The years since agricultural and financial sector reforms have seen an 
enormous amount of credit injected into the rural sector through an evolving system 
of formal financial institutions. From the brief examination of the rural credit 
market following the reforms, it is clear that increased outreach of the formal sector 
in recent years has contributed to a corresponding decline of the informal credit 
market (World Bank, 1996; UNDP and lINICEF, 1996). This seems to suggest that 
formal and informal lenders are competitors in the rural credit market. However, 
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given the ceiling on formal interest rates and the excess demand for formal sector 
credit resulting from this, formal lenders are forced to rely on interest rate 
substitutes to ration credit. Under the circumstances of a weak legal framework 
during the transition, a lack of information on new clients, and a lack of experience 
in dealing \vith such information when formal lenders shift their loan portfolio 
towards rural households, formal lenders are observed to concentrate both on 
_production loans and collateral (World Bank, 1995a and 1996; U.NDP and 
li'NICEF, 1996). 
Requiring collateral for loans and focussing on production loans, on the one 
hand, exclude those farmers without collateral and those who seek non-production 
loans. On the other hand, this provides formal lenders with a credit delivery system 
through which they can sort out, screen potential borrowers, and reallocate part of 
their normal transactions costs to borrowers .. This credit delivery system thus 
involves high borrower transactions costs, which impinge most heavily on small 
borrowers. It is, therefore, hypothesized that borrowers seeking small loans will 
prefer to work with informal lenders who charge a higher rate of interest but impose 
low transactions costs, and in contrast, borrowers seeking larger loans prefer to deal 
with formal lenders who charge lower interest rates but impose larger transactions 
costs. These considerations provide the basis for the hypothesis that the rural credit 
market is segmented into various sub-markets in which, quite possibly, formal and 
informal lenders might be performing complementary roles. The segmentation 
derives from the requirement and the type of collateral offered, the use of loans, the 
level of interest rates and borrower transactions costs, and the size of loans. The 
follov11ing chapters will discuss these issues further based on data from a rural 
household survey undertaken by the author in a district in Vietnam. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
Table A.3.1 
Major Features of Agricultural Reforms and their Impacts* 
Before 1981 I 1981-88 I After 1988 I Work-based CS 
i 
Product-based CS I Household 
i Responsibility CS 
Agricultural Collectivised Partly decollectivised I Fully decollectivised production 
I I Land Under cooperative_ Allotted to individual 
' 
Long-term lease to 
' control; restricted farm households; I individual farm access to land insecured tenure households 
Fann decision Made by planning Made by planning Made by individual 
department and without consideration farm households 
centralised of market forces 
Farm operations Done by cooperatives Jointly done by Made by individual 
coo1;1erative and farm households 
households 
Farm income Based on work time Based on work time Total output after 
spent in cooperatives and amount of output paying land tax and 
beyond contract level other contribution to 
local funds 
Input and output Strictly controlled by Partly controlled by Fully liberalised 
government; low government; fully 
output price; untimely controlled input 
supply of inputs 
I 
supply; partly 
controlled output 
market 
Impacts I No incentive i Partial incentive Full incentive i I I I I 
Level of self-
I 
Food shortage; I Food shortage in 1987-1 Self-sufficient in ricj 
sufficiency in imported rice exported rice 
rice 
I 88 
* CS : Contract system 
Source: Nguyen (1995: 15) 
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Figure A.3.1 
Monthly Inflation and Deposit Interest Rates 
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Cbapter4 
SAMPLE SURVEY 
This chapter describes the survey area, discusses the design, 
representativeness, and credit characteristics of the sample. The data used in the 
analysis of borrower transactions costs, the determinants of credit applications, and 
of formal sector credit rationing were collected from surveys of rural households, 
the district VBA, village and commune leaders, and representatives of women's 
unions and farmers' associations in villages and communes conducted in 1996 in 
the Binhluc district, Namha province. 
4.1 Description of Binh/uc District 
Namha province is considered as representative of socioeconomic and 
physical environments in the Red River Delta in the north of Vietnam (Figure 4.1). 
More than 90 percent of the population in the province Jives in rural areas and earns 
a living from various kinds of agricultural production (Namha Province Statistical 
'Bureau, 1996). The rainfall, temperature and soi! in the province allow two crops in 
a year. Binhluc district, a low-lying area in the northwest of Namha province 
located approximately twenty kilometres northwest of Namdinh city, was selected 
for the survey (Figure 4.2). In Binhluc district, farm households account for 97 
percent of total households (Binhluc District Statistical Office, 1996). 
7! 
Figure 4.1 
Map of Vietnam and Namha Province 
. ;i\ HANOI 
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Figure 4.2 
J\:Iap of Namha Province and Binhlnc District 
BINHLUC 
Farmers in the. district used to grow only one crop a year, but with the recently 
improved irrigation system, two crop seasons are now feasible, as in other areas in 
the Delta. The Chaugiang river originates from the Red river, flowing from west to 
east, marking the northern border with Lynhan district. Another smaller river-the 
Sat-runs through the district, linking the Day and the Chaugiang rivers. The 
annual average temperature is 243°C and the annual average rainfall is 1,884 
millimetres. 
The transportation system has changed rapidly due to the province's 
increased spending on road maintenance and construction in recent years. There is a 
twenty kilometre highway running from the west to the east through Binhmy tO\vn. 
The so-called 'united' railway from Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City, which has two 
stops in the district, runs parallel to the highway. In 1994, there were a total of 25 
kilometres of paved inter-district roads, and po kilometres of unpaved inter-
village/commune roads (Binhluc District Statistics Office, 1995). 
The irrigation system has also been improved in recent years. The district 
has 187 pumping stations, and irrigating channel stretching 215 kilometres (Binhluc 
District Statistics Office, 1996). And by 1996, most villages and communes in the 
district has access to electricity. 
Table 4.1 shows the al!ocation of land in the district across various crops. 
The main crop is rice, which is double-cropped and accounts for 59 percent of total · 
land (and 88 percent of cultivated land). Cassava, tomatoes, and sweet potatoes are 
the principal non-rice annual crops, occupying 8 percent of total land. Land for 
perennial crops such as oranges and bananas represents 5 percent of the total. In 
addition to the cropland distributed by the cooperatives, tendered land (mainly land 
used for fishponds), accounting for 4 percent of the total, is distributed by bidding 
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for its management in a specified period of time. The household responsibility 
system began to be implemented in Binhluc in 1988, and in 1993 land use right 
certificates began to be issued, which provided an incentive for rural households to 
invest more in land, especially land for perennial crops. 
Table 4.1 
Binhluc District Land Allocation 
Area (ha) Percent of total 
Total land 19,947 100.00 
Cultivated 14,290 71.64 
Annual crops 13,275 66.55 
Rice 11,685 58.58 
Other 1,590 7.97 
Perennial crops 1,015 5.09 
Water surface 886 4.44 
Private 1,154 5.79 
Other 3,617 18.13 
Source: Namha Province Statistical Bureau (1995: 138-41). 
The population ofBinhluc district in mid-1994 was 192,042, which included 
89,364 labourers. Rural reforms began in 1981, then in 1988 land began to be 
allocated under long-term leases to farm households; input and output markets 
began to be liberalised, and farm management and the decision-making authority 
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were transferred from the cooperatives to individual households. This resulted in a 
reallocation of rural labour among various agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities. With the government permitting the establishment of private enterprises 
providing transportation services for goods and people, processing agricultural 
products, repairing bicycles, motorcycles, small tractors etc., and with the easing of 
restrictions on labour mobility, labourers have had more opportunities and greater 
freedom to travel in search of new jobs, especially non-agricultural ones. Although 
there has been a perceived increase in such jobs, the rural workforce was still 
dominated by agricultural labourers (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 
Binhluc District Labour Distribution, 1994* 
~ Number oflabourers Percent 
I Total 89,364 100.00 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Agriculture 87,420 
Industry and handicrafts 149 
Trading 102 
Services 103 ' i 
Other 1,590 I 
*Labour here refers to the population aged 15-55 [or female and 15-60 for male 
Source: Namha Province Statistical Bureau (1995: 143). 
97.82 
0.17 
0.11 
0.12 
1.78 
The average income per household in 1994 was VD 560 thousand, ranging 
from VD 170 thousand to VD 3,500 thousand (Binhluc District Statistical Office, 
1995). The main source of income is from rice growing. Vegetables are primarily 
produced for home consumption. Sweet potatoes are partly produced for own use 
and partly for sale, while fruit i,s commonly sold. 
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Animal. husbandry is the second main source of income. Pigs, chickens, 
ducks, and fish are most commonly produced. Most households raise two or three 
pigs and a dozen chickens a year, and they sell their livestock products on the 
market. 
4.2 Lenders in the Area 
The essential difference between formal and informal lenders is that the 
former operate under the regulation of the SBV while the latter do not. Under this 
classification, the formal institutions in the district consist of the district VBA and 
two PCFs and informal lenders comprise relatives and friends, traders, 
moneylenders, and ROSCAs. Traders who operate by dealing in input and output 
markets include private dealers and cooperatives, 
4.2.1 Formal Lenders 
In the formal credit market, the most important source of credit is the district 
VBA. Although there are two PCFs operating in Binhrny town and Ngoclu 
commune, the scope of their financial operations is still quite limited, since the 
volume of funds managed is relatively small in comparison with that of the VBA. 
Established in 1991, the district VBA has a head office in Binhrny town and 
is in charge of providing credit within several categories 10 28 communes in the 
district. There are also two transaction offices whose main functions are to mobilise 
savings and disburse loans below VD I million. Loans greater than VD 1 million 
are disbursed at the head office. 
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Savings mobilisation still plays a minor role as a source of funds for the 
district VBA, accounting for 29 percent and 23 percent of total loans outstanding in 
1993 and 1994, respectively (Binhluc District VBA Branch, 1995). Table 4.3 details 
the bank's loan portfolio during 1993-94. 
Table4.3 
Loan Portfolio of the Binhluc District VBA (VD million) 
I 1993 1994 -
' Loan Percent Loan Percent 
outstanding outstanding 
Total loans 11,251 100.00 19,019 100.00 
' Medium-term ! 1,142 10.15 4,419 23.23 
State farms and cooperatives 116 1.03 59 0.31 
Households 1,026 9.12 4,360 22.92 
Short-term I 0,109 89.85 14,600 76.77 
State farms and cooperatives 1,103 9.80 775 4.07 
Households 9,006 80.05 13,825 72.70 
Source: Binhluc District VBA Branch (1995). 
Medium-term loans increased more rapidly than short-term loans during 
1993-94 mostly due to the increase of funds from a World Bank project that focused 
on providing loans with maturities of one to three years. In 1993, while lending to 
state farms and cooperatives represented 1.0 and 9.8 percent of medium- and short-
term loans outstanding, the amounts for households were 9.1 and 80.0 percent, 
respectively. The year 1994 saw a further shift of lending to the household sector-
medium and short-term lending to state farms and cooperatives accounted for 0.3 
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and 4.1 percent, respectively, while households accounted for 22.9 and 73.0 per-
cent of the medium and short-term loan portfolios. Overdue loans at the end of 1994 
accounted for 1.48 percent of total loans outstanding. 1 The bank is faced with some 
practical difficulties in dealing with defaulters since foreclosure of the borrowers' 
assets requires the cooperation of the bank, the people's committees and legal 
authorities at communes, which is typically costly and time consuming to the bank.2 
There are various credit delivery schemes, characterised by differences in 
terms of interest rates charged, loan purpose, target clients etc.3 The 'normal' 
scheme provides mainly short-term loans for production activities, not 
distinguishing non-agricultural from agricultural purposes, financed by savings 
mobilisation and by the province VBA. The interest rates in this normal scheme, 
which range from 1. 75 percent to 2.8 percent per month, are subject to a ceiling set 
by the State Bank of Vietnam.4 There are also '.targeting schemes' that use funds 
from foreign donors and from the government. One program using funds from the 
World Bank project provides mostly medium-term loans for agricultural activities, 
with an interest rate of 1.6 percent per month. Another program operating on the 
basis of SHGs delivers credit for production activities using funds from group 
savings and the Dutch Rabobank. Interest rates are the same as for the normal 
scheme. A third scheme, using funds from the _go\!ernment, provides loans to poor 
1 Overdue Joans are subject to interest rates, which are 50 percent higher than nonnal rates. In 1994 
the largest overdue loans were from two cooperatives in the district. 
1 Conversations with bank staff show that only a few legal cases were brought against househoids 
when defaulting, and none for cooperatives and state farms. 
' The government argues that differentiating interest rates is a way to achieve social objectives and 
the district VBA has a number of special funds from the government and foreign donors to lend with 
preferential interest rates. 
4 During the period May 1995 to May 1996, the ceiling on interest rates for short-term loans was 
reduced from 2.8 percent to l.75 percent per month: 
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farmers for production activities, with an interest rate of about 1.5 percent per 
month. 
The average deposit rate as calculated by the bank in 1994 was 1.53 percent, 
while the average lending rate was 2.52 percent. The difference between these rates 
generated a profit for the bank of VD 388 million. The average monthly salary of 
the bank staff in 1994 was VD 594 thousand which was comparable v1ith other 
public servants' salaries in the district. 
4.2.2 Informal Lenders 
The scope and characteristics of informal credit transactions in the area have 
not been covered in the literature. It is widely perceived, however, that before 1989 
there were very few informal transactions, and. that most of these were between 
relatives, friends and neighbours. This is understandable, since informal lending by 
professional moneylenders and traders was strictly suppressed in the past, and 
households did not have much need for loans for investment. With the 
establishment of the household as an autonomous production unit, the demand for 
credit for production activities increased, and informal lenders re-emerged to fill the 
vacuum left by formal lenders. Although the informal credit market in the district 
was characterised by a diverse set of lenders, conversations with bank staff, 
members of people's committees and women's unions in communes showed that 
informal lenders can be grouped into some categories: relatives and friends, 
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moneylenders, traders, ROSCAs, and others.5 Since there are very few landless 
farmers, the role of landlords and tenancy markets in providing interlinked credit is 
negligible. During the three years 1992-94, •,vith eased restrictions on establishing 
small businesses, the number of traders in the region increased significantly, and 
they began to compete strongly with many cooperatives in communes in supplying 
fertilisers and pesticides. There are only a few professional moneylenders in the 
distriet, who are often traders, small shopkeepers or relatively wealthy farmers. 
Informal loan transactions are mostly undertaken in the local market or at the 
lender's place of business. 
4.3 Sample Design 
A household sample survey was conducted to examine and explain the role 
of borrower transactions costs in the rural credit market. Like other districts in 
Vietnam, Binhluc is divided administratively into towns and communes. Both are 
farther divided into villages. Tbere are 28 communes and one tov,,n (Binhmy) in the 
district. A total of 150 households in Binhmy and two of the communes, Mythuan 
and Binhnghia (representing different conditions in tem1s of production and 
business activities, and transportation facilities), were selec'ted to conduct the 
sample survey (Figure 4.3). 
' Others include lenders who do not come under mentioned categories, and whose identities were not 
specified clearly. For example, we came across one type oflender that is difficult to classify as either 
informal or formal. These are the cooperatives. Their operations are much the same as those of 
traders-advancing inputs (seeds, fertilisers) to their members and being repaid in amounts of farm 
outputs at harvest time. Since these groups are not regulated by the government or the SBV, they 
have been classified here as informal and categori~ed as others. 
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Figure 4.3 
Map of Binhluc District and Location of the Survey Area 
.. h h. $ Bin ng ia 
Scale 1: 100,000 
' 
' 
' 
'I 
i' 
Chaugiang river. 
• Mythuan 
Railway 
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A stratified two-stage sampling method (Cochran, 1977) was designed for 
the survey. A total of 150 households were interviewed and divided equally so that 
we had information on 75 bank borrowers and on another 75 non-bank borrowers 
who had not taken loans from the bank. In the first stage, the 150 households 
interviewed in each commune were distributed according to town/communes with 
a distribution proportional to the number of households in each tov.n/communes. 
In the second_ stage, the number of households interviewed in each village in 
town/communes was determined again proportionately to the number of 
households in each village. Villages formed the primary unit in town!communes 
selected. Each primary unit was divided into secondary units of household. 
The names of borrowers who had taken bank loans in each village could be 
obtained from the bank. Subtracting these from the population in the village gave 
us the list of those who had not taken loans from the bank. The list of bank 
borrowers in the village was selected such that it reflected various schemes of 
VBA loan delivery. The list of non-bank borrowers in the village was selected at 
random. Table 4.4 summarises the size of the sample undertaken in selected 
town/communes. 
The questionnaire used to obtain information about the demand for credit, 
the existence of being credit constrained, characteristics of loan contrnct;; such as 
amounts borrowed, costs of borrowing from different sources, time taken to obtain 
loans, and other information about the borrowers is sho'hn in the Appendix. 
In order to reduce the likelihood of inaccurate recall by the interviewee, 
questions were limited to activities within the previous year. Since most farmers 
borrow from the bank infrequently (usually only once or twice a year), the 
probability of forgetting the interest rate charged and transactions costs is minimal. 
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Table 4.4 
Size of Sample in Selected Town/Communes 
Town/Commune Size of sample (Number of households) 
Binhmy 28 
Mythuan 46 
Binhnghia 76 
···---- ·-·-
150 
In addition, some information obtained from borrowers was able to be double· 
checked against that obtained from the bank. The survey was conducted during the 
period from the first week of June 1996 to the end of August 1996. The reference 
period was the year from June 1995. 
Since many bank borrowers may not have wished to disclose information 
about amounts spent on bribes or other payments to officials of the bank when 
obtaining a loan, respondents were asked simply to report total cash transactions 
expenditures in connection with the loan, excluding interest payments. In this case, 
care vlas taken in explaining carefully and in detail to respondents about what 
should be included in these cash transactions expenditures, such as application fees, 
travel expenses, food and entertainment expenses, bribes etc. 
The total time actually forgone in conneetion with a loan by a borrower can 
be defined by the number of days needed to be spent away from work. Care was 
also taken here to distinguish this from the waiting time which counts from the time 
the loan is initially applied to the time the loan is actually obtained. A problem that 
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anses in determining the opportunity cost of this time is ·how to calculate the 
prevailing market rate for labour at different times of the year. Fortunately, the 
survey shows that most agricultural loans are taken about three months before the 
harvest period. 
As a result of the small sample size, it is necessary to accept relatively high 
variances in the sample estimates. Another problem needing to be considered is that 
of systematic over-reporting or under-reporting. This problem often arises in 
surveys in which the enumerators are perceived as officials of the government 
(Ahmed, 1982: 85). However, this may be overcome by using students as the 
investigators and explaining that the purpose of the survey is academic only. 
4.4 Characteristics of the Sample 
The sample sizes of farm households in the various locations and their 
production and socioeconomic characteristics are presented in Table 4.5. 
Binhmy town, where the bank is located, is situated on a highway and a 
railway station. This allows members of some households to seek additional sources 
of income off the farm, either through employment in the township or by operating 
small-scale non-agricultural businesses such as bicycle and motor cycle repair 
shops, bars, restaurants and grocery shops. Non-farm household heads in the sample 
accounted for 21.4 percent, and farm household heads having second jobs, mainly 
off-farm, 53.6 percent. In Mythuan commune, which is located eight kilometres 
from the bank, the soil type and rainfall pattern dictate that the main crop is rice. 
Since the same highway runs through the commune as in Binhmy, farmers in 
Mythuan also have opportunities to earn non-farm income by trading fruit, 
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processed food. and rice, but the number of farm household heads who have second 
jobs here is much less than in Binhmy. 
Next to the Chaugiang river, ten kilometres away from the bank, is 
Binhnghia commune where, although the average farm size is half that of Mythuan, 
the better soil allows farmers to grow corn, tomatoes and sweet potatoes, in addition 
to two main rice crops. The cropping intensity in Binhnghia, measured by the 
number of months land is used in a year, is 12/12. That is, land is fully utilised, 
which is not the case in the other two communes. The small river offers farmers the 
opportunity to raise fish as a source of income. In addition, the traditional 
professions such as noodle processing and silk production can provide extra income 
during quieter farming periods. This explains the high number (56.6 percent) of 
Binhnghia farm household heads who have second jobs. 
In the three town/communes, rice is th~ most important crop and a major 
source of income. Crop yields across the three communes are nearly the same. The 
age of household heads and the size of households are not significantly different in 
the three communes, while household heads in Binhmy and Binhnghia have slightly 
more schooling than in Mythuan. 
It is also of interest to compare the sample data with those for the district as 
a whole. According ..to district records, non-farm households at the end of 1994 
accounted for 2.71 percent, which was less than the percentage of 5.33 in the 
sampled households (Binhluc District Statistical Ot1ice, 1995). The possible 
explanation for this discrepancy is that during 1995 and early 1996, the number of 
non-farm households, especially in Binhmy town, increased significantly. Many 
households leased their cultivable land and switched from farming to more 
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Table 4.5 
Characteristics of Sample Households by Location* 
Item 
, Sample size (Number of Households): 
Non-farm household heads 
Farm household heads having a second job 
Farm size (sao') 
Productivity of paddy growing (kg/sao-crop) 
Cropping intensity {monthsiyear) 
Age of household head {years) 
Schooling of household head (years) 
Size of households 
Dependency ratio(%) 
Gender ratio(%) 
• parenthesis indicates percentage 
' l sao ~. 360 square meters 
- indicates zero 
Binhmy 
28 
6 
(21.43) 
15 
(53.57) 
5.44 
156 
10 
48.59 
8.00 
4.89 
12.66 
39.28 
Mythuan Binhnghia 
46 76 
2 
(-) (2.63) 
8 43 
(17.39) (56.57) 
9.01 5.69 
150 158 
10 12 
43.39 45.04 
6.71 7.73 
4.73 4.33 
19.21 18.97 
43.48 44.73 
Sample 
150 
8 
(5.33) 
66 
(44) 
6.66 
155.17 
l l.01 
45.18 
7.47 
4.56 
!7.86 
43.33 
profitable non-farm activities, such as food-processing enterprises, motor and 
bicycle repair shops, and transporting people and goods. 
The average farm size per household in the district is 7.53 sao compared to 
6.66 sao in the sampled households. The explanation for the smaller farm size in the 
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sample is that c.ultivated land per household is lower in Binhnghia and Binhmy than · 
the district average . 
The final noticeable difference is the average household size. The district 
statistics indicate that the average household size was 3.93 persons, less than the 
average 4. 56 persons in the sample. This could be the result of a difference in the 
definitions of a 'household' between the survey and the district registrar. The 
survey identified a household as having one identified household head and included 
all members residing in the household for at least three months. According to this 
definition, households in which three generations were residing together were not 
uncommon. However, this type of household was often split into two households 
when compiling the official data, according to the district registrar. 
4.5 Credit Activities 
Credit activities of sample households by borrowing status and source are 
presented in Table 4.6. The proportion of household heads that did not take any loan 
ranged from 6.5 percent in Mythuan to 13.2 percent in Binhnghia. By comparison, 
in a survey of 33 7 households undertaken in four provinces in 1995 in Vietnam, 
non-borrowers accounted for 24.9 percent on average, ranging from 7.3 to 40.5 
percent (DAI, 1995: 4). In China, surveys in 1987-88 in three counties indicated 
that from 21.5 to 78.5 percent were non-borrowers (Feder el al., 1989: 514). The 
share of non-borrowers is similar in Binhmy and Mythuan, whereas it is higher in 
Binhnghia. Household heads who did not borrow were asked the reasons for not 
borrowing. There were two main reasons: the availability of sufficient resources 
from O\\m savings, and the existence of credit binding constraints, especially for 
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formal sector er.edit. Some household heads applied for credit but were rejected, 
while others did not apply, perceiving a high probability of being rejected. The most 
common reason for not borrowing in Binhnghia was 'no need to borrow' due to the 
smoother cash flow of farm households which had higher crop intensity, and the 
prevalence of small off-farm business and non-farm activities in this commune. 
Smaller farm sizes and less seasonal and more stable eash incomes from such 
activities, as compared to rice cropping activities, dimin!shed the demand for credit 
by Binhnghia households. This is confirmed not only by the incidence of borrowers 
status, but also the average number of transactions per household, which is smaller 
in Binhnghia than in Mythuan and Binhmy. 
There were marked differences among the sample in the distribution of 
credit activities by source. Only 3.6 percent of Binhmy households borrowed 
exclusively from the formal market compared to_l0.9 percent in Mythuan, and 26.3 
percent in Binhnghia. 
Half borrowers in Binhmy took loans from both the formal and informal 
markets, as compared to 32.6 percent in Mythuan, and only 10.S percent in 
Binhnghia. The fact that many households in Binhmy sought loans from both the 
formal and informal sectors implies the possibility of formal sector credit rationing. 
Farmers in Binhmy, although having smaller farms, had more favourable.conditions 
for larger scale off-farm activities requiring much capital. Their large demand for 
capital encouraged Binhmy farmers to seek loans from the formal sector. However, 
their demand for formal sector credit is constrained by lack of physical collateral. 
As can be seen below, the terms and conditions of loans from relatives and friends 
are most favourable, but the small share of borrowing from these sources indicates 
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Table 4.6 
Credit Activities 
Items Binluny Mythuan Binhnghia 
---
Non-borrowers (percent) 7.14 6.52 13.16 
Borrowers from the formal market only 
(percent) 3.57 10.87 26.32 I Borrowers from the informal market only 
39.286 50.00 50.00 
1 
(percent) 
of vvhich relatives and friend only 
(percent) 5.57 6.52 14.47 
Borrowers from both furmal and informal 
markets (percent) 50.01 32.61 10.52 
Number of credit transactions* 67 87 91 
Average number of credit transactions per 
household. 2.57 2.04 1.37 
Average loan sizes (VD thousands) per 
transaction 4,140 1,850 2,540 
I. Formal 7,970 3,960 4,820 
VBA 10,430 3,960 4,820 
PCF 2,080 - -
IL Informal 3,010 1,090 910 
Relatives 950 2,480 l ,150 ' 
Friends 3,020 l,000 1,090 
Traders 200 440 320 
Moneylenders 4,970 l,520 960 
ROSCAs 1,070 750 620 
. 
Others 290~ 510 -
- indicates zero; *or number of loans disbursed 
' A total of 150 households were interviewed and divided equally so that we have information on 75 
VBA borrowers and on another 75 non-VBA borrowers. However, in Binhmy besides the VBA, 
there is a PCF working as a formal institution; hence the number of borrowers who took loans only 
from the informal sector here is less than 50 percent. 
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that rationing exists not only with formal sector lenders but also in the case of 
relatives and friends. 
It is also clear that household borrowing from the formal sector is larger in 
terms of the amount of credit per transaction. In addition, small borrowers 
frequently borrow from informal lenders. Most small borrowers in the study area 
are those who have little cultivable land, and grow only rice. It is very hard for them 
to raise productivity substantially given limited land of poor qual_ity. Lacking the 
capacity to diversify cropping, and hence their sources of income, small farmers 
often face a higher risk of income volatility than larger farmers. Their demand for 
credit is mostly small, and for purposes such as buying fertiliser, pesticide, and 
other inputs for rice growing. Such loans normally average less than VD 1,000 
thousand for one crop. This finding is also confirmed by a recent study by Tran and 
Nguyen (1998: 41). 
Table 4.7 characterises credit contracts by source for the three locations 
taken together. 7 The average amount of formal sector credit per transaction is VD 
5,250 thousand, nearly double the average loan size from moneylenders, and much 
larger than from foe other sources. This figure is very close to that reported in a 
study by DAI (1995: 9) indicating that the average loan size from the VBA was VD 
5,458 thousand. 
Loanable funds of the bank in the district come from different sources and at 
different rates, and lending is also undertaken in various schemes with interest rates 
subject to the maximum set by the SBV, ranging from l .5 percent to 2.8 percent per 
7 Since terms and conditions for loans from relatives and friends are similar, these two sources are 
added together. This is also the ease with loans from ROSCAs and other sources in Table 4.6, Others 
now include also ROSCAs throughout the thesis unless otherwise specified, 
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month, and averaging 2.1 percent per month. Various interest rates can also be 
observed in the informal market. Small loans from relatives and friends for a short-
term and for emergency needs such as illness and funerals carry no interest, while a 
very low rate of 1 percent can be found if Joans are in or in terms of gold and for 
purposes such as business or residential construction. Moneylenders in the study 
area charged rates ranging from 3 percent to 6 percent, depending on how a 
_borrower's potential to repay is evaluated and on the interaction between supply and 
demand. Traders in the area operate by giving advances in-kind (fertiliser, pesticide, 
other inputs, and rice) on the basis of promises to repay with farm products or cash 
at harvest time, either at a price negotiated in advance or at the market price 
prevailing at harvest time. Loans from traders are often undertaken two or three 
months before harvest, when cash income is very little. This provides a more likely 
explanation of why interest rates charged by ~aders are highest among informal 
lenders. The rates of ROSCAs and cooperatives that provide inputs and receive 
products after harvest are higher than formal sector rates, but lower than the rates 
charged by moneylenders and traders. 
Borrower transactions costs, defined as all kinds of expense incurred by 
borrowers other than interest, are measured here as a percentage of the loan 
amount. s While borrower transactions costs are of negligioble importance for loans 
from moneylenders, traders and others, they account for 1.65 percent on average of 
formal sector loan amounts. Lo<h'lS from relatives and friends also carry an 
8 Borro,ver transactions costs comprise travel costs, application feesl expenditure on food1 tea and 
cigarettes to entertain bank staff, possible bribes, and the opportunity cost of time. These are 
examined in detail in the next chapter, 
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Table4.7 
Characteristics of Credit Contracts by Source 
Items Formal Relatives Money- Traders Others 
sector and lenders 
friends 
11/urnber of credit transactions 78 52 56 17 42 
Average amouni (VD thousand) I s,2so l,690 2,770 350 530 
Monthly interest rate (percent)" ' 2.11 0.38 4.14 4.89 3.77 I (1.5-2.8) (0-1.5) (3--0) (4-6) (2-4) 
Transactions costs ratio (percent) 1.650- 1.!21 0.004 0.053 0.004 I (.3-10.5) . (0-7.5) (0--0.13) (0-l.3) (O-l.5) 
Collateral requirements (percent),· 100 21.42 76.47 76.19 
Land and homestead I :8.7 Promissory note 19.64 76.47 76.19 
Others 1:3 l.78 Nnne JOO 78.58 23.53 23.81 
Purpose (percent): 
Agricultural production 100.00 l l.54 23.21 82.35 80.95 
Consumption 15.38 17.85 16.75 11.91 
Construction 30.79 1.78 2.38 
Social (marriages, funerals) 9.62 7.14 2.38 
Health 11.54 10.71 
Others 21.l3 39.31 2.38 
Forms of credit (percent): 
Cash 100.00 32.69 92.85 19.05 
In-kind 
Gold 51.92 
Inputs 1.92 82.35 76.19 
Others 1- 13.47 7.15 17.65 4.76 Loan term(percent): 
Short (12 months or less) 188.46 75.00 100.00 100.00 !00.00 
Medium (13-36 months) 11.54 11.53 
Unspecified 
I ~2.31 J 3.47 Regularity of contract(percent): Prior contract 17.31 73.21 64.71 • 69.05 
• 
First time ' 57.69 82.69 26.79 35.29 30.95 
, Fungiblli(y of credit (percent) ! 21.79 5.77 1.79 
a: parentheses indicate the range of interest rates and borrower transactions costs ratios. respectively. 
- indicates zero 
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intermediate level of transactions costs-1.12 percent. It is worth noting that 
although interest-free loans from friends and relatives are often perceived as an 
important feature of the rural credit market in transitional economies like Vietnam 
and China,9 other kinds of payment in the form of labour service, reciprocity, and 
gifts are common. This provides an explanation for the high borrower transactions 
costs with loans from relatives and friends as compared to other informal sources. 
Formal sector loans are subject to strict collateral requirements. Homesteads 
and land use rights are the most common form of collateral for formal sector loans. 
It was found in the survey that the bank in fact relied on the value of collateral 
rather than forecasts of the profitability of the project when evaluating the risk of 
loss on any given loan. This fact can be explained by several reasons. First, the bank 
staff lack knowledge and expertise in evaluating the projects' profitability. Second, 
most bank staff know that they are required by internal regulations to visit and 
evaluate the projects before loans are delivered, but they are sometimes constrained 
from doing so by the poor transportation system. Formal lenders' monitoring of the 
use ofloans, which is often taken in the form of regular visits to project sites is even 
more rare. 10 The emphasis of the bank. on screening loan applicants rather than 
monitoring the use of loans suggests that adverse selection rather than moral hazard 
is the primary problem facing the bank. The difficulty that the bank.has-in obtaining· 
infomlation about borrowers and loan use and lack of experience in dealing with 
9 The VLSS indicated that in rural areas, this interest-free lender category made up 40 percent of all 
money lent (SPC and GSO, 1994: 22). In a survey of two provinces in China, Feder et al. (1989: 
514) reported that the percentage of informal transactions which were interest-free accounted for 
from 68 percent to I 00 percent. 
10 Poor roads and lack of adequate transportation make it difficult for bank staff to go on field trips-
which is the only way to get information on loan use. One bank official reported that he was in 
charge of monitoring 200 borrowers, and could visit only five or six borrowers a day. 
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such information explain why it relies on collaterised borrowers while informal 
lenders do not No collateral is required for loans from relatives and friends. 
However, it should be noted that relatives and friends can rely on reputation as an 
important factor in enforcing credit contracts, because loss of reputation through 
opportunistic behaviour will constrain future borrowing opportunities. 
Moneylenders were found to use collateral for 2 l.4 percent of total transactions to 
extend loans to new clients, mainly in the form of promissory notesn 
Traders advance various kinds of inputs, even to non-local residents, for 
periods of 3-4 months and 76.5 percent of such transactions are secured with 
promissory notes. In a few cases, a third party guarantee is used. As mentioned 
earlier, the role of cooperatives in rural areas in providing extension services and 
inputs in advance is not uncommon. In such cases, collateral in the form of 
promissory notes is essential. When physical collateral is considered in securing a 
loan, there is only one loan from the moneylender in the sample, which is 
collaterised in physical terms, and all loans in the informal sector use collateral 
substitutes. In screening prospective borrowers, while the bank tends to focus on 
collateral, informal lenders of various types mentioned above rely mainly on 
personal knowledge of the character and family history of borrowers. As compared 
to fopna! sector lenders, informal lenders in the survey area have more advantages 
in terms of borrower proximity and personal ties for countering adverse selection 
and moral hazard. In the rural credit market, the need to personalise ties to minimise 
information asymmetry is crucial for informal lenders. Moneylenders and traders 
were commonly found to develop these personal ties when extending their activities 
" Thls type of collateral is still consldered ll!egal in Vietnam, and there is no official sanctlon for 
these arrangements. 
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to other localiti.es. Their new clients, although normally having promissory notes as 
collateral, are often introduced by a person known by the lenders, who typically can 
only give a verbal guarantee. 
Since applicants from ROSCAs are in general homogeneous, loan screening 
is done according to the commitment of the application to the association's goal at 
the time of setting up the association. Cooperatives screen loans essentially through 
assessing the prospective borrowers' character and repayment history. 
Y otopoulos and Froio (1991) suggest that informal lenders have better 
repayment records than do formal sector lenders mainly because they regularly 
monitor the uses to which their loans are put by visiting the project sites. It was, 
however, found in our survey that this type of monitoring was rather minimal even 
for loans from moneylenders and traders. The reason is that loans from 
moneylenders and traders are for a variety of u~es; thus there is very little need to 
visit project sites regularly. Furthermore, when lending is localised, the need for 
project visits is reduced, and even in the case of lending in other localities, the need 
for monitoring is low because moneylenders know the person who introduced the 
borrower to them. This is also evidenced in some Sub-saharan countries (Nissanke 
and Aryeetey, 1995; Aryeetey, 1996). 
Since the VBA concentrates on production loans, all non-production loan • 
requirements are satisfied in the informal market. However, it is observed that 
production loans are also the characteristic of traders and cooperatives. Loans from 
traders and cooperatives are small and in-kind (inputs). Borrowers seek production 
loans from traders and moneylenders when they need small amounts and/or for a 
very short time. A few borrowers have to rely on moneylenders for large loans 
because they currently have outstanding debts with the bank and/or lack adequate 
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collateral; hence they are not eligible for formal sector loans. The-fact that most 
loans from relatives and friends are for residential construction is consistent \vith 
the VLSS (SPC and GSO, 1994). Limited competition in providing consumption 
loans between formal and informal lenders is quite possible to explain the high 
divergence of interest rates in the study area. 
Unlike other developing countries (Yadav et al., 1992; Feder et al., 1989) 
where formal sector credit has been provided mostly inkind, all formal sector loans, 
and the overwhelming majority of moneylender loans in this survey, were in cash. 
Since the majority of loans from relatives and friends is for construction, which 
requires a large outlay and for a longer time, Joans in gold from these sources 
comprise 51.9 percent of the total. 
A prevailing feature in the rural credit markets of less-developed countries is 
the predominance of short-term credit (Feder et <;l., 198!): 517). This is also the case 
with our study. While in the informal market, relatives and friends are the only 
source of medium-term and unspecified loans, tl formal sector medium-term loans 
account for only 11.5 percent and no long-te1m loans for more than 36 month were 
observed. This is understandable because the bank lacks funds for medium- and 
long-term loans. 
Although the bank's declared policy is to provide production loans, 
fungibility exists with formal sector credit and 21.8 percent of total transactions 
were found to have been used for other purposes. Although in an 'everybody-is-
watching-everybody' community like rural Vietnam where farmers face difficulty 
in diverting institutional credit to purposes such as construction or social events, it 
12 Such loans, which typically take place among relatives and friends can be rolled over from time to 
time, depending on the borrower's ability to pay. 
97 
is not easy to d~tect whether a borrower uses part of an institutional loan for day-to-
day consumption or for repayment of another debt For loans from relatives and 
friends, any such diversion is more likely to be noticed, and so this was observed in 
only 5.8 percent of transactions. 
4.6 Summary 
From the preliminary examination of lender and household credit data, the 
main finding of this chapter is that the credit market is segmented. It is apparent that 
the market is composed of several distinct submarkets, which include a formal 
sector and various segments of an informal sector. These submarkets provide credit 
contracts v,ith significantly different terms and conditions, ranging from low 
interest rate formal sector loans with strict collateral requirements for production 
activities to high interest rate loans without collateral from moneylenders and 
traders for a variety of purposes. The data show that loans with term less than 12 
months dominate the sample and the only lenders in the survey that provide 
medium-term loans, albeit on a very limited scale, are formal sector lenders, 
relatives and friends. Such a segmented credit market indicates there is quite limited 
competition among different submarkets. The differences in interest rates, collateral 
requirements, acceptable loan purposes, and loan maturities are understandable. 
While formal sector interest rates are regulated by the SBV, informal rates are 
determined entirely by market forces. Given regulated, below-market interest rates 
and lack of experience in dealing with information relating to new clients, formal 
lenders faced with excess demand ration out many potential borrowers by 
concentrating only on production loans and imposing requirements for physical 
collateral. As a result, all non-production Joans are satisfied by the informal sector. 
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Although the transactions costs results calculated from the sample are-
sensitive to some assumptions, 13 it has been found that formal sector borrowers 
incur higher transactions costs. By contrast, informal lending is, in general, flexible, 
expeditious and convenient, which permits very low borrower transactions costs. As 
shown in the theoretical model by Ladman (1984) in Chapter 2, when borrower 
transactions costs are taken into account, large borrowers will rationally seek loans 
from the formal sector, while small borrowers will prefer to obtain loans from 
informal sources. As a result, the segmentation of the rural credit market also 
derives from the amount of the loan applied for_ Although formal sector lenders in 
the study area focused on production loans, it has been found that the majority of 
small loans for production activities were provided by traders and other informal 
sources. While formal lenders specialise in providing production loans, they are 
unable to compete with traders and other informal lenders in providing small 
production loans. The issue of borrower transactions costs and the role of these 
costs among other factors in explaining the determinants of credit applications and 
formal sector credit rationing in a segmented market will be examined further in the 
following chapters. 
13 The assumptions include the fact that the 'social capital creation' required by the Bank in group 
lending has not been included in the estimation of transactions costs; the likely overvaluation of 
workdays lost in applying for a formal sector loan when it is assigned unskilled daily wage rate 
while the costs associated with borrowing from an informal sector moneylender are easily 
understated because little or no value is given to the time spent 'after hours'_ 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
Sample questionaire14 
A. For households: 
I. Town/commune: 
2. Village: 
3. Household: 
B. Profile of the household's head and the household: 
1. Age: 
2. Sex: 
3. Main occupation: 
4. Other occupation: 
5. Level of education (in number of schooling years):1 5 
6. Do you know that there are fomml lenders (VBA/PCF) operating in the 
locality? 
7. Do you understand the lending regulations of formal lenders? 
8. Size of cultivated land holdings (excluding homestead): 
a) owned and operated (sao): 
b) owned but operated by others (sao ): 
14 This questionnaire is adapted from Ahmed ( 1982). 
" This is derived by combining the data in the highest level qualifacations attained and years of 
school. For example, if a person reported that he/she finished two years in a vocational school and 
his/her highest grade completed was I 0, then his/her years of schooling is 12. 
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c) not owned but operated on a share-cropping basis (sao ): 
9. Number of members in the household: 
10. Number of dependants in the household: 16 
C. Information on Credit: 
1. If you require credit (cash/in-kind), when do you need it most (specify): 
a) Harvest time: 
b) Inter-harvest time: 
c) Land preparation time: 
d) Other: 
2. Have you obtained any credit (cash/in-kind) since June, 1995? 
YES D NOD 
IfNO, skip to Section D. 
3. If YES, for each source of credit that you borrowed from, answer the 
following questions below (specified in Table A.4.1): 
a) Name the different sources of credit that you borrowed from 
(VBA, PCFs, relatives, friends, moneylenders, traders, others etc.). 
For each source of credit, answer the following questions: 
b) If you borrowed 'in-kind'; state the type of commodity or service 
you borrowed; and for d) and e) state the market value in VD. 
c) What is the purpose of the loan you stated to the lender? 
d) What is the amount of the loan that you initially requested? 
e) What is the amount of the loan that you finally received? 
16 Dependents are defined as those under 15 or above 65 years of age. 
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f) When did you initially inquire about getting the loan? 
g) When did you finally receive the loan? 
h) Have you ever taken any loans from the lender before? How 
many loans? 
i) How far is the lender's office (or home in the case of informal 
lenders) from your home? 
j) Did you need any collateral in applying for the loan? 
YES 0 NO::; 
IfNO skip to 1). 
k) If YES, what type of collateral was required by the lender: 
* Home and homestead 
* Land use right certificate 
* Other asset certificate 
* Others 
1) Did you get the loan: 
* directly from the lender?. 
* through a group or other institutional arrangement (through 
women's unions, farmers' associations etc.)?. 
m) What use did you make of the loan? 
n) Do you have any position in the commune/village ? 
o) Do you have any close relation with bank staff? 
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Table A.4.1. Information on Credit 
Source (a) 
Commodity or service (b) 
Purpose of loan stated ( c) 
Amount of loan requested ( d) 
Amount of loan received ( e) 
Date of inquiry ( f) 
Date of receipt (g) 
No. of previous loans (h) 
Distance (i) 
Type of collateral (k) 
How to get credit (1) 
Actual use of credit (m) 
Position in village/commune (n) 
Close relation with bank staff ( o) 
4. For each source of credit that you borrowed from,-answer the following 
questions in Table A.4.2 at the end of the questions below: 
a) If you had to pay back the loan in-kind, state the commodity or 
service paid back or due. 
b) What was the market value of the commodity or service you paid 
back? 
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c) If you paid back in cash, how much was the interest payment? (if 
the loan has not matured yet, state the total interest payment due). 
d) How much did you spend initially as an application fee? 
e) Beside any application fee, how much did you spend in order to 
fill out the forms and be eligible for the loan? ( Including payments 
to an agent, if any, travel costs and /or other costs in connection 
with the loan, any other entertainment and bribes to expedite the 
loan. You do not have to ,categorise the payments, just state the total 
expenditure) 
f) How many days did you spend away from your normal work in 
connection with the loan? (This will include only work-days missed 
in connection with the loan. Do not include those days that you 
would not have been gainfully e.mployed and you did not spend in 
connection with the loan). 
* Time for travelling to and from the lender's place. 
* Time at lender's premises. 
* Time to finish all procedures in connection with the loan. 
g) How many trips did you make to the lender in connection with 
the loan? 
h) For each work-day missed in connection with the loan, did you 
employ someone to replace you and at what rate? If you did not 
employ anyone, what would be the best estimate of your daily 
income forgone? 
i) What is the maturity of the loan? 
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Table A.4.2: Costs of Borrowing 
Source 
Commodity or service (a) 
' 
Market value of commodity or service (b) 
Total interest cost ( c) 
Application fee ( d) 
Travel and misc. entertainment expenses (e) 
No. of work-days missed (f) 
No. of trips (g) 
Opportunity cost of each work-day (h) 
Maturity of the loan (i) 
5. For those transactions which were not \:Vith formal lenders: 
a) Why did you not obtain the loan from formal lenders? 
* Applied for formal loan but rejected. 
* Did not apply for formal loan because of perceiving a strong 
probability of being rejected. 
* Did not apply for fonnal loan because did not want. 
b) What is the most important factor that led you to borrow from the 
informal sources? Briefly explain. 
D. For those who did not borrow from June 1995. 
l. Why did you not obtain credit from formal sector lenders? 
a) Did not apply because no need for credit. 
b) Applied but rejected. 
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c) Did not apply because perceiving a strong likelihood of being 
rejected. 
2. How did you finance your production/business activities from June 
1995? 
E. For all households: Assets held by the household 
State the major assets that belong to the household in Table A.4.3 
Table A.4.3 Assets Held by the Household 
Asset Estimated market value 
Cultivated land 
Buffaloes and Cows 
Plough 
Irrigation pump 
Bicycle· 
Motorcycle 
Television 
Video recorder 
Radio-cassette 
Homestead 
Other 
Total estimated market value: 
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Chapter 5 
DETER.t'1INANTS OF BORROWER 
TRANSACTIONS COSTS 
Based on the overview of the rural credit market and the preliminary 
examination of the rural household survey in Binhluc district reported in Chapters 3 
and 4, it is apparent that although a significantly increasing amount of formal sector 
credit has been injected in recent years into the rural sector, where farm households 
dominate, little of such credit has been found to reach small farmers, who represent 
a major share of the rural population. This chapter approaches the issue by applying 
the concept of borrower transactions costs. It is hypothesised that the formal sector, 
facing excess demand created by the ceiling on interest rates, has rationed credit by 
implementing a credit delivery system through which it can screen, sort out, and 
shift some of its normal transactions costs to potential borrowers. 1 This system has 
thus involved high borrower transactions costs which make the effective cost of 
borrowing from the formal sector for small loans actually higher than that from the 
informal market. Consequently, loans provided through the formal sector primarily 
reach farmers with large demand for credit, and informal lenders are still very active 
in providing small loans. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The concept of borrower 
transactions costs is discussed in Section 5. l. Section 5.2 quantifies borrower 
1 The bank could simply use a lottery system to allocate available funds and eliminate excess 
demand. But this method cannot reduce the lender's risk as some high-risk borrowers might win in 
the lottery while some very !ow-risk applicants may miss out. 
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transactions costs from the survey data. Section 5.3 compares the effective cost of 
borrowing from the formal sector and various segments of the informal sector. The 
determinants of borrower transactions costs are examined in Section 5 A. 
5.1 The Concept of Borrower Transactions Costs 
Transactions costs play an important role in credit allocation and the 
structure of the rural financial market, as shown in past studies (for example, 
Ahmed (1982), Ladman (1984), Cuevas (1984), Cuevas and Graham (l984a, 
1984b, 1985), Abiad et al. {1988), Pnhazhendhi (1995)). 
Transactions costs are the costs incurred in a transaction other than the cost 
of the goods, and services themselves. Since it is difficult to get information on 
prices, quantities, qualities of goods and services transacted in the market, it should 
be assumed that market transaction is costly. Broadly speaking, transactions costs 
may include search costs, selection costs, contract negotiations costs, monitoring 
costs involved in the execution of projects or financial performance, and any 
residual costs associated "'ith the settlement of broken or amended contracts. More 
specifically, transactions costs can be defined as those costs incurred in formalising 
and executing contracts (Graham et al., 1996: 82). 
Transactions costs in the financial market refer to the resources required to 
transfer one unit of funds between participants (borrowers and lenders). According 
to Cuevas (1984), transactions costs are a measure of 'friction' in the functioning of 
financial markets. There are specific reasons why financial transactions generate 
significant transactions costs. First, the essence of financial transactions lies in the 
characteristic that they are completed only when the borrower finally discharges the 
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loan, and consequently financial transactions involve uncertainty. In the process of 
finding suitable borrowers, lenders have to collect and analyse information to assess 
the capacity and willingness of borrowers to repay the loans. At the same time, 
borrowers searching for appropriate lenders have to demonstrate their 
creditworthiness. These reasons are especially important in the rural financial 
markets of developing countries, where information on creditworthiness of 
customers is restricted and costly. Second, participants in financial transactions 
have to negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract, and monitor its 
execution. It is therefore irrelevant to assume in financial transactions that interest is 
the only cost The level of transactions costs among participants is influenced by the 
efficiency of financial markets, which in turn depends on financial regulations, 
internal efficiency of banks and other financial intermediaries, and the interaction of 
the demand and supply of credit (Puhazhendhi, 1995: 4). 
Transaciions costs are incurred by both borrowers and lenders. For the 
lender these include the expense of mobilising funds for on-lending, the cost of 
collecting information about potential borrowers, and the cost of extending, 
maintaining and collecting loans. Borrower transactions costs, which are the main 
concern of this thesis, include all non-interest expenses that borrowers have to pay 
in dealing with loans. These include the following: 
(I) Loan charges beyond interest payments, such as application and servlce 
fees, and the closing cost payable to the lender. The lender may also impose 
borrower transactions costs by deducting interest charges in advance. 
(2) In many cases borrowers may be forced to negotiate with someone (an 
extension agent, a local official or leader, or a consigner) outside the formal lending 
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agency before a loan application is formally reviewed, and payments are involved 
in these arrangements. Gifts and bribes may be involved in some cases. 
(3) Finally, a very important component of transactions cost is the 
borrower's time and travel expenses involved in the loan transaction. Borrowers are 
often required to visit the formal lender a number of times to negotiate the loan and 
make repayments. These visits may involve travelling long distances and long 
periods of waiting. When loan transactions are undertaken in planting and 
harvesting periods, the opportunity cost of the borrower's time is substantial (Adam 
and Nehman, 1979: 167). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, supply side credit programs emphasising 
targeted credit to a marginal clientele at a subsidised interest rate were common. 
However, the transactions costs of credit, especially those for borrowers were not 
commonly discussed and documented. Studies on borrower transactions costs began 
to emerge in the mid-l 980s, including studies by Ahmed in Bangladesh (1982), by 
Cuevas and Graham in Honduras (1984a, 1985), and Abiad et al. (1988) in the 
Philippines. In brief, these results strongly suggest that the net impact of rationed 
credit through subsidised interest rate programs trying to reach small farmers only 
succeeded in raising the transactions costs for the very same class of borrowers who 
were able to access the credit programs. Adams and Ghate (1992) pointed out that 
' in financial transactions, especially those involving small amounts, transactions 
costs may weigh more heavily in borrowers' decisions than interest payments. As 
pointed by Ladman (1984), offering cheap credit does not necessarily induce 
farmers to borrow from formal sector credit institutions. Depending on the total cost 
of borrowing from various sources, which includes transactions costs plus interest 
payments, farmer-borrowers decide from whom they will borrow. Borrowers 
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seeking small loans will often prefer to deal with lenders who charge a higher rate 
of interest but impose low transactions costs. In contrast, borrowers seeking larger 
loans may prefer to work with lenders who charge lower interest rates but impose 
larger transactions costs. 
5.2 Quantification of Borrower Transactions Costs 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, while borrower transactions costs 
comprise 1.65 percent of the loan size from the fom1al sector on average, they are 
negligible for loans from informal sources. This section thus focuses on the 
quantification of borrower transactions costs in the formal sector. As mentioned 
earlier, since formal sector lending rates in the study area are subject to ceilings 
below the market clearing rate, the bank cannot charge for bearing extra risk or hire 
extra personnel to conduct additional risk-reducing activities, and so has to devise 
ways to ration the excess demand while still selecting the lower-risk borrowers from 
among all applicants. One of the rationing mechanisms adopted by the bank is to 
implement a complex delivery system through which it can sort out and screen 
potential borrowers.2 
At least four kinds of borrower transactions costs are observed, which 
include the following: 
2 The procedure for borrowing from the bank can be summarised as follows. When applying for a 
VBA loan, one has to see the bank official in charge in the commune/town and it is not always easy 
to see this official because he has no office in the commune/town, and he is very mobile. After 
seeing the bank official, the applicant has to fill out a paper called 'business production project', and 
an application form. The bank official then conducts an on-site visit to evaluate the feasibility of the 
proposed project. ff it is considered feasible, the applicant is then asked to fill in another form to 
certify his or her asset property right and/or land use right, with at least three signatures from 
authorities at different levels in the village and commune. Finally, the bank official makes an 
appointment at the branch to deliver the Joan. 
11 l 
(I) Loan charges through application fees collected by the lender (over and 
above the interest payments); service fees collected by local officials or leaders in 
the commune and village; and service fees related to collateral certification. 
(2) Travel expenses incurred during dealing with the loan. Most rural 
residents in the study area are very poor, with access only to primitive means of 
transportation and communication. The distance from the borrower's home to the 
bank ranges from 1 to 15 kilometres, averaging 5. 7 kilometres. The most popular 
means of transportation is by bicycle. Furthermore, lack of understanding of the 
lending regulations contributes to the frequency of visits to the bank. The number of 
trips required to complete the loan observed in the survey ranged from 1 to 5, 
averaging 2. Bad roads and poor infrastructure mean that the borrowers have to 
spend a long time to get all the documents completed and signed by the different 
authorities to meet the bank's requirements. 
(3) Costs to attract the bank officials' attention. With the interest rate 
ceiling, the bank perceives itself as doing a favour for borrowers. This results in 
borrowers having to deal with several bureaucracies in order to obtain a loan. 
Expenses in the form of tea, cigarettes, and food are also commonly involved. In 
many cases, borrowers effectively have to pay expenses for the field trip of the bank 
official. In addition, since different lending schemes with different contractual terms 
' 
and conditions are undertaken by the VBA branch,3 rent-seeking in the form of 
implicit or explicit demands for gratuities, gifts and bribes for bank officials are not 
uncommon. Since many borrowers might not disclose the amounts spent on bribes 
3 There is a variety of interest rates because of the VBA poliey of loan targeting. The VBA argues 
that differentiating interest rates by use of loan is a way to achieve the government's social 
objectives, such as lower loan rates for financing fixed assets to encourage longer-term investment in 
agriculture. 
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and gifts, they were asked to report total cash expenditures net of interest payments 
and application fees. Conversations with borrowers revealed that often the bribe is 
proportional to the size of the preferential loan. 
(4) In reality, the most significant transactions cost incurred by borrowers is 
the time involved in the loan transaction. The bank requires a considerable amount 
of documentation in support of loan applications, and there are usually long delays 
between the filing of an application and the rendering of a decision by the bank's 
loan officers.4 Borrowers were asked how long they had to wait from the time they 
first asked for the loan until they received it. The answers ranged from 7 to 35 days. 
It is estimated that for loans below VD I 0 miliion, one week is needed; for loans 
above VD I 0 million, ten days; and for loans above VD 20 million, borrowers have 
to wait one month, as approval from the VBA at the provincial level is needed in 
this case. Delays in getting the loan impose costs on the applicant in terms of 
opportunities forgone. Some applicants have to withdraw from the formal credit 
market if their expected transactions costs are so large that the expected rate of 
return on their investments (net of transactions costs) is less than the interest rate on 
the loan. Other applicants who find that the net rate of return on their investments 
exceeds the interest rate will be willing to incur additional transactions costs in the 
fom1 of gifts or bribes. And there would also be some who would stay in the 
market, even if the cost of borrowing is higher than the rate of return because of the 
sunk cost effect of past transactions costs.5 Interviewees were asked to recall the 
number of days of work actually missed as distinct from the total waiting time in 
4 The survey found that much paperwork and bureaucratic procedures overlapped. In addition, bank 
officials in practice paid little attention to this paperwork. This causes an apparent deadweight loss to 
the society. 
5 For them, the marginal cost of getting the loan is minimal. 
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applying for the loan. In order to determine the opportunity cost of their time 
associated with the loan, the calculation of the cost of eaeh workday lost is 
essential. Questions were given to borrowers to recall their actual payments for 
hiring somebody else during their time away from work or to evaluate the actual 
income forgone because of leaving work when they were attending to the loan. If 
the borrower was unable to report such information, the prevailing market wage rate 
for male workers in the borrower's occupation in the village was often used as the 
cost of each workday lost (Ahmed, 1982: 84). Another problem that arises in 
applying the prevailing market wage rate is that it varies for different periods of the 
year. However, most loans in the survey were taken 3 or 4 months before the 
harvest,-i.e., in the land leveling period. Hence, the land leveling wage rate was 
used in most cases as the rate prevailing in the area in our study. 
Table 5.1 shows the frequency distribution of loans by total transactions 
costs and its two components: cash outlays (application fees, travel and other 
expenses such as entertainment and miscellaneous), and the cost of workdays lost It 
can be seen that about 50 percent of the borrowers incurred cash costs from VD 26-
50 thousand and about 6 percent incurred cash costs between VD 76-100 thousand 
with an average cash cost of about VD 50 thousand for the sample, which 
accounted for 57 percent of total transacdons costs. The two components of cash 
outlays incurred by borrowers in the process of applying for and receiving their 
loans were fees, and travel and other expenses, which accounted for more than 19 
percent, and 38 percent of total transactions costs, respectively. In terms of the 
opportunity cost of lost work time, about 90 percent of borrowers incurred costs 
from VD 26-50 thousand and about 7 percent incurred costs from VD 51-75 
thousand, and the average cost for the sample was around VD 36 thousand, 
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Table 5.1 
Distribution of Loans by Transactions Costs of Borrowing from Formal 
Institutions (number of cases)* 
Amount Application ·Travel and Cash outlays Cost of 
(VD fees other workdays 
thousand) expenses lost 
(I) (2) (3) = (1 )+(2) (4) 
0- 25 69 33 8 12 
(88.46) (42.31) (10.25) (15.38) 
26-50 9 36 40 70 
(11.54) (46.15) (51.28) (89.74) 
51-75 . 6 23 6 
. (7.69) (29.49) (7.69) 
76-100 . 3 5 -
. (3.85) (6.41) -
101-125 . - 2 -
- -
(2.56) -
Above 125 - - - . 
- -
-
. 
Average** 17.01 32.76 49.77 36.64 
(19.64) (37.82) (57.46) (42.54) 
* Figures in parentheses indicate percentages. 
••Figures in this row indicate the amount in VD thousand on the sample averages. 
- indicates zero. 
ll5 
Total 
transactions 
costs 
(5) = (3)+( 4) 
-
-
3 
(3.85) 
27 
(34.62) 
31 
(39.74) 
10 
(12.82) 
7 
(8.97) 
86.41 
(100) ' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
which accounted for 42 percent of total transactions costs. Of the opportunity cost 
of time, about 2 l percent was due to time travelling to and from the bank; 29 
percent was due to time spent in the bank premises, and the remaining 50 percent 
was due to time spent to carry out all procedures required by the bank. 6 The 
distribution of loans by total transactions costs shows that about 74 percent of all 
borrowers had costs from VD 51-100 thousand and about 9 percent incurred costs 
in excess of VD 125 thousand. On average, the prospective borrower from the 
formal sector had to pay VD 86.41 thousand in addition to interest charges. 
Moreover, the borrower had to be willing to risk this amount of out-of-pocket and 
time costs before knowing whether or not the loan application would be accepted. 
In practice, however, it is noted that borrowers were usually informed of the 
probable decision at an early stage of negotiations, so the risk cost was not as high 
as it might appear. The table also indicates that prospective borrowers from the 
formal sector also had to have on hand about VD SO thousand for out-of-pocket 
costs (out-of-pocket threshold). Those who did not have this amount available had 
to forego the formal market. 
Since there has been no previous study of transactions costs in the rural 
credit market in Vietnam, borrower transactions costs estimates from the study are 
compared with those found in other countries. Table 5.2 presents a comparison of 
components of borrower transactions costs from our survey with those in selected 
other countries. Four studies in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 1982), Bolivia (Ladman, 
1984), the Philippines (Abiad et al., 1988), and ours in the case of Vietnam 
involved field surveys at the farm level, and documented the explicit (cash outlays) 
and implicit (cost of workdays lost) non-interest costs incurred by borrowers in the 
6 These figures are not presented in Table 5.1. 
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process of securing and repaying their loans. Borrowers in the Philippines incurred 
much heavier cash outlays than the cost of workdays lost-81.l and 18.9 percent of 
total borrower transactions costs, respectively. These figures were very similar in 
the case of Bangladesh. The data for Vietnam and Bolivia show that the proportions 
of cash outlays and costs of workdays lost in borrower transactions costs are 
somewhere between those ofBangladeshand the Philippines. 
Table 5.2 
Components of Borrower Transactions Costs in Selected Countries (percent) 
Country Cash outlays Cost of workdays~ 
Bangladesh 51.7 48.3 
Bolivia 69.7 30.3 
Philippines 81.1 18.9 
Vietnam 57.5 42.5 
Sources: Abiad et al. (1988: 13); Ahmed (1982: 133); Ladman (1984: 115); and author's survey. 
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Table 5.3 presents a breakdown of the average transactions costs of 
borrowing from the formal sector by loan size. It can be seen that although total 
transactions costs are higher for larger loan sizes, they are lower per unit of dong 
borrowed.7 
Table 5.3 
Average Borrower Transactions Costs from the Formal Sector (VD thousand)* 
Loan size (VD Number of Cash outlays Cost of Totar Ratio of 
thousand) cases workdays. transactions transactions 
lost costs costs to loan 
size (percent) 
Lowest through 500 2 31.00 12.50 43.50 9.67 
(2.56) 
501-1,000 5 28.00 28.00 56.00 6.22 
(6.41) 
1,00 l-2,500 17 37.35 37.06 74.41 4.03 
(21.79) 
2,501-5,000 36 55.67 37.24 91.35 2.!0 
(46.15) 
5,001-10,000 14 55.17 40.00 107.57 l.26 
(17.95} 
10,001-20,000 2 53.70 45.00 142.50 0.71 
(2.56) 
20,001- through 2 71.43 60.00 145.00 0.43 
j highest (2.56) 
Sample average 78 49.77 36.64 86.41 1.65 
* Figures in parentheses indicate per<:entages. 
7 Most borrower transactions costs are basically the same irrespective of the loan size, and thus 
constitute a 'fixed cost' (There are, of course, some items such as stamp duty, service fees which 
increase as the loan size increases). Thus we cannot assume that when the loan size doubles, 
borrower transactions costs will double. Consequently, borrower transactions costs per dong 
borrowed will fall as loan size increases. 
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When we view transactions costs as a proportion of the loan amount received, the 
general pattern in the last column of the table supports the hypothesis that 
transactions costs reflect economies of scale. Small borrowers are therefore 
penalised by a 'tax' on borrowing at rates proportionally greater than those paid by 
larger borrowers. While transactions costs use up quite a large portion of the loan 
proceeds-about 9.7 percent for loans under VD 500 thousand, they use up only 
0.43 percent for loans above VD 20 million. 
Next, we compare the incidence of transactions costs as a percentage of the 
loan amount and as a proportion of the interest rate charged, as estimated on the 
basis of our survey, with those in selected countries. Abiad et al. (1988) 
summarised the findings of several studies on the incidence of borrower 
transactions costs in various countries, which are presented in Table 5.4. 
The results for Vietnam, based on the findings of this study are shown in the 
last column of the table. Excluding the case of Bangladesh because of its extreme 
values, 8 the other six exhibit transactions costs which, as a percentage of loan 
amount, range from a low of 1.2 percent for Peru to 5.2 percent for Panama. The 
same tendency can also be observed when transactions costs are measured as a 
proportion of interest rates, with the maximum 46.4 percent in Panama and the 
minimum 4 percent in Peru. If the Philippines figure is considered to be midway 
'As pointed out by Abiad et al. (1988: 31), the unusual values of transactions costs both as a 
proportion of loan amount and of interest rate is attributed to the unusually small loan size 
characteristic of the survey and relatively low nominal interest rate in Bangladesh in comparison 
with those recorded in the Latin America, the Philippine studies and our survey in the case of 
Vietnam. For example, the average loan size and the explicit interest rate in the Bangladesh case are 
US$130 and 12 per cent p.a., respectively while the comparable figures in our study in the case of 
Vietnam are about US$500 and 25.2 per cent p.a. 
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within this range, transactions costs in Vietnam inferred from our study are closer to 
those in the lower half of the range. 
Table 5.4 
Comparison of Borrower Transactions Costs for Selected Countries* 
Bang!a- Ecuador Honduras Panama Peru Philippi· Viet-
de sh nes nam 
Transactions costs as 
percentage of loan 
amount 
Sample average 21.7 2.8 3.0 5.2 1.2 3. l l.65 
Small loans 29.4 5.3 5.9 5.7 3.9 4.2 9.67 
Transactions costs as 
percentage of 
interest rate 
Sample average 180.8 22.9 23.l 46.4 4.0 !7.4** 6.45 
Small loans 245.0 47.7 45.4 50.9 13.0 25.0 38.37 
* In the table small loans in the case of Vietnam include all loans in the first group of loan size in 
Table 5.3. 
•• The figure is adjusted to cover the whole period encompassed by the study, prior to and after 
deregulation of interest rates. This is not the same as the figures provided by Abiad et al. (1988: 31). 
Source: Abiad et al. (1988: 31) and author's survey. 
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In all countries, the level of transactions costs on small borrower Joans is 
two or three times higher than that for the sample average. Although transactions 
costs from our study are a little higher than only those in Peru based on the sample 
average, comparison of transactions costs for small loans should shed much light on 
the burden of implicit charges on small borrowers. This shows that transactions 
costs for small loans as a percentage of the loan amount from our study are far 
higher than those in other countries, except Bangladesh. Moreover, transactions 
costs in our study were equivalent to about 38 percent of the explicit interest rates, 
which is higher than the figures for Peru and the Philippines. 
Table 5.5 shows borrower transactions costs from formal lenders and 
various informal sources ofloans. 
Table 5.5 
Average Borrower Transactions Costs for Formal and Informal Sources 
(VD thousand) 
Sources Application Travel Cash Cost of Total Ratio of 
fees and other outlays workdays transactions transactions 
expenses lost costs costs to loan 
(percent) 
(I) (2) (3)=(1)+ (4) (5)~(3)+ 
{2) (4) 
' F onnal lenders 17.01 32.76 49.77 36.64 86.64 1.65 
Relatives and 
friends 14.11 14.11 4.81 18.92 1.12 
Moneylenders 0.11 0.11 0.004 
i 
Traders 
I 
0.19 0.19 0.053 
Other 0.02 0.02 0.004 I 
- indicates zero. 
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The transactions costs from moneylenders, traders and other sources are very low, 
and comprise a negligible proportion of the loan size. Informal lenders require no 
application fees; travel and other expenses are very low; and the cost of workdays 
lost is minimal. They utilise local information in screening potential borrowers, and 
perform the loan monitoring at low costs because of their proximity. Informal 
lenders often rely on long-established credit ties and they can increase the 
probability of repayment at lower costs than formal lenders who lack accumulated 
past information on new clients and are distant. It is worth noting also that although 
most loans from relatives and friends carry no interest rate in transitional economies 
like Vietnam and China (Feder et al., 1989: 514), implicit interest payments in the 
form of free labour service, mutual help, and gifts are common, resulting in a higher 
transactions costs ratio for loans from relatives and friends as compared to other 
informal sources. 
5.3 The Effective Interest Rate from Various Sources 
One way to look at the effect of borrower transactions costs on the cost of 
rural credit is to estimate the effective cost of credit to borrowers. Since borrower 
transactions costs are mostly incurred prior to receiving the loan, we assume for 
simplicity here that all transactions costs are incurred prior to, and at the time bf 
obtaining the loan. As a result, these costs should be deducted from the loan to 
arrive at the net value of the loan received. The effective interest paid by borrowers 
v,ill be measured as the difference between the total repayment that is due at the end 
of maturity of the loan and net amount borrowed. The effective rate (e) on the net 
loan received is then 
!22 
e =(l~r)( L /• -·1 
L-TC 
r is the nominal interest rate 
n is loan term (periods) 
e is effective interest rate (percent per period) 
(5.1) 
TI1is effective rate reflects the rate of interest per period on the increment of 
funds available to the borrower. 
Table 5.6 shows average effective monthly rates of interest for different loan 
sizes in the formal market and in various segments of the informal market. 
Table 5.6 
Effective l\1onthly Interest Rates from Various Sources by Loan Sizes (percent 
per month) 
Average I F orn1al sector Moneylenders Traders Others Relatives 
size of I and friends 
loan I I (VD thousand) 
I 
Up to 500 I 5.08 (2) 4.33(2!) 4.99(16) 4.19 {33) 0.82 (14) 501-1,000 4.09 (5) 4.21 (7) 4.50 (1) 3.94 (8) 0.90 (14) 
• 
1,001-2,500 I 2.87 (17) 4.04 (14) 2.lO(l) 0.43 (15) 
2,501-5,000 
I 
2.50 (36) 4.63 (13) !.78(1) 
5,001- 10,000 2.13 (14) 3.00 (l) 0.18 (\) 
10,001-20,000 I l.96 (2) 
20,001- though I 
highest 2.06 (2) 
Sample average 2.66 (78) 4.29 (56) 4.96 (17) 4.09 (42) 0.72 (45)* 
Figurers in parentheses indicate the number of transactions. 
* The number is different from that in Table 4.7 in Chapter 4 because of 7 loans for which maturity 
was unkno\vn. 
• indicates zero. 
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In most cases, the average effective rate decreases as the size of the loan increases, 
especially in the case of the formal market. For the smallest borrowers it is as high 
as 5.08 percent per month, and for the largest borrowers it is as low as about 2.06 
percent. Comparing effective rates in the two markets, we can see that in the formal 
market, the average effective rate for the sample is 2.66 percent per month, which is 
lower than the rate in all other segments of the informal market, except for the rate 
for relatives and friends. However, for loans below VD 500 thousand, the effective 
rate is higher in the formal market (except for relatives and friends), while for larger 
loans (above VD 500 thousand), the effective rate is lower than in most segments of 
the informal market. Partitioning of the demand will occur at a loan volume where 
farmers are indifferent among different lenders-i.e., where the effective cost of 
borrowing from alternative sources is equal. In the study area, the calculation of 
effective rates of interest indicates that partitioning of the credit market will occur at 
a loan size between VD 500 thousand and VD 1 million. Changes in partitioning of 
the market will depend on changes in borrower transactions costs and/or in the 
lending rates of each lender. If borrower transactions costs in the formal sector were 
reduced, partitioning of the market would occur at a smaller loan size, and more 
small borrowers would seek credit from the formal sector, ceteris paribus. 
5.4 Determinants of Borrower Transactions Costs 
At least three studies have examined the determinants of borrower 
transactions costs: the study in Bangladesh by Ahmed (1982), the study in the 
Philippines by Abiad et al. (1988), and the Puhazhendhi study for India (1995). 
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Ahmed estimated the determinants of borrower transactions costs in Bangladesh 
using a single equation, in which loan amount is an explanatory variable. However, 
as pointed out by Cuevas and Graham (1985), transactions costs should also be 
considered by borrowers as part of the total loan price, hence the appropriate model 
is a system of simultaneous equations in which transactions costs and loan amount 
are endogenous variables. Abiad et al. (1988) and Puhaz.hendhi (1995) tested this 
approach in the Philippines and India, respectively. The system of simultaneous 
equations is also applied in our case to estimate the determinants of borrower 
transactions costs. 
The borrower transactions costs are hypothesised to be determined by the 
following factors: 
1) Since multiple lending rate schemes are implemented by the bank in the 
study area, nominal interest rates are considered to be an important factor that 
affects transactions costs incurred by borrowers. The lower the interest rate, the 
greater the benefit of obtaining the loan, hence the more the borrower will be 
willing to pay. Gifts and bribes are typically proportional to the amount of the 
preferential loan. In addition, since the procedures used to determine who is eligible 
for preferential loans are more complicated than those in delivering normal loans, 
the time taken in obtaining such loans will be longer, and the opportunity cost of 
workdays lost and other related expense will be greater. 
2) Although the cost of completing the loan application is not essentially 
dependent on the loan amount applied for, some parts of transactions costs do 
differ. The larger the loan amount applied for, the more stamp duty and fees the 
borrower has to pay. Also, in case of large loans, the bank tends to be more careful. 
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It often requires borrowers to provide additional documents. As a result, the time 
and other costs borrowers will have to incur are greater. 
3) Borrower transactions costs are also influenced by factors that 
characterise borrowers themselves, such as prior credit relationships with the bank 
and their influence on bank personnel. Borrowers who have prior credit 
relationships are expected to incur lower transactions costs than those who do not, 
since they understand better the bank's requirements. It is also expected that for 
repeat borrow<:rs the bank might simplify the loan procedure if they have a good 
credit rating. Borrowers who have a close relationship with the bank personnel or 
have a position in the community are able to influence the bank's decision. They are 
expected to use their influence in reducing the time and other costs in obtaining 
loans. 
4) Borrower transactions costs are affected by the institutional arrangements 
involved in the credit delivery system (i.e., individual or group borrowing), and 
5) Finally, the proximity of borrower's residence to the bank is also 
expected to be a factor affecting borrower transactions costs. 
In the light of these considerations, the borrower transactions costs function rs 
specified as foHows: 
lnTC a 0 + P1lnr + P2lnL + T);INFLU + T)1PRE + pARR + µlnD/S (5'.2) 
where: 
TC 
r 
L 
= 
~ 
Borrower transactions costs (VD thousand) 
Nominal interest (percent per month) 
Loan amount applied for (VD thousand) 
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INFLU = Dummy variable for influence9 
INFLU= 1 if the borrower is considered to be influential 
INFLU= 0 if not 
PRE = Dummy variable for a prior relationship with the 
bank 
PRE = 1 if the borrower has a prior relationship with the 
bank 
PRE = 0 if not 
ARR = Dummy variable for the institutional arrangement in 
obtaining the loan 
ARR = I if the borrower obtained the loan as an individual 
ARR = 0 if the borrower obtained the loan through a group 
DIS = Distance of bank from residence (kilometres) 
The loan demand equation is specified on the basis of the hypothesis that the 
demand for credit is determined by various factors: 
1) the cost of borrowing, comprising the interest rate charged and 
transactions costs; 
2) the financial strength of the borrower including the assets of the 
household (home, and other financial assets), and the size of the land recognised by 
land use rightsrn These variables are used as a measure of the household's wealth 
9 Borrowers were asked whether they had a relationship with bank officers or had community 
positions. Since many borrowers may not have wanted to disclose this personal infonnation, we 
double checked these answers by asking other fanners in the community. 
'°In Vietnam, the government owns the land, and farm households are given land use rights rather 
than outright ownership. According to the Land Law promulgated in l 993, however, land use rights 
may be transferred, mortgaged, rented, exchanged, or inherited. 
127 
and resource endowment as well as an indicator of its liquidity requirements for 
production; 
3) the availability and availment of credit from informal sources. 
The loan demand equation is specified as 
lnl = ~+b1lnTC+b2lnr+c1lnASSET+c2lnFARAJ+dJNFOR (5.3) 
where: 
ASSET 
FARM 
INFOR= 
INFOR 
L/\fFOR 
= Value of assets (VD thousand) of the borrower 
= The area ofland, which is recognised by land use 
rights (sao) 
Dummy variable for availment by borrower of credit 
from informal sources 
= l if bank borrower has obtained credit from 
informal sources 
= 0 if not 
The two-stage least squares (TSLS) method is applied to quantify the 
influence of various factors on loan demand and borrower transactions costs, using 
the cross section data from the survey consisting of 75 formal borrowers with 78 
transactions. The parameter estimates and !-statistics are reported in Table 5.7. The 
basic statistics of the variables used in this regression are summarised in Table 
A.5.1 in the Appendix. 
The model passes all diagnostic tests. The F-tests indicate reasonable 
explanatory power of the model for the survey data. Although the coefficients of 
determination (R2) in both equations are low (0.45 and 0.39 in the loan demand and 
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transactions costs equations, respectively), but this is not unusual for studies using 
cross sectional data. 
In the loan demand equation, the following determinants of loan demand are 
found to be statistically significant: 1) transactions costs incurred by the borrower; 
and 2) the value of assets of the borrower. For the borrower, transactions costs are 
up-front costs in terms of out-of-pocket expenses and the cost of time spent in 
obtaining the loan. As these costs increase, the borrower will rationally choose to 
borrow more from the bank, so that the total cost of borrowing per unit of dong 
borrowed declines. The positive sign for the variable ASSET, as expected, shows 
that loan demand is greater for households with more assets. As mentioned earlier, 
physical assets such as homesteads and other assets are the most common collateral 
for formal loans in the study area. The greater is the value of assets available to use 
as collateral, the larger the loan that can be applied for. 
The interest rate charged on loans turns out to have an unexpected sign, 
although this variable is not statistically significant. This result is surprising. A 
possible explanation is the design of the bank's lending activities, according to 
which smaller loans usually involve lower interest rates. The lowest rate in the 
study area applies to loans for the poor. Conversations with poor borrowers 
revealed two reasons for often applying for small loans. First, they are risk-averse, 
and the typical activities financed with formal loans are cropping and animal 
husbandry activities, which do not need much capital. Second, they ask for small 
loans because they perceive there would be a strong chance of being rejected if they 
apply for large loans. 
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Table 5.7 
Estimating the Transactions Costs Function 
I Jointly dependent variables 
Right hand side Loan demand (lnL) Transactions costs 
variables I 
Estimate 
CONST -14.3632+ 
lnL I 
In TC 3.1460~ 
lnr 0.6796 
lnASSET 0.7969# 
lnFARM 0.0088 
JNFOR 0.0052 
INF LU 
PRE 
ARR 
lnDJS 
R2 0.4466 
F 11.6218 
Diagnostic Tests: x2 
Functional Form 0.4896 
Normality 0.4922 
Heteroscedasticity 0.0081 
•significant at the 10 percent level; 
# significant at the 5 percent level; 
+ significant at the l percent level. 
F = F value. 
Number of observations = 78. 
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(lnTC) 
t-value Estimate t-value 
-3.7878 3.301r 5.3777 
0.1888# 2.4356 
4.8096 
1.0507 -0.3613' -1.7595 
2.9161 
0.0427 
0.0288 
0.0220 0.1786 
-0.0342 -0.5683 
0.0343 0.2574 
0.0555 1.2830 
0.3846 
7.3949 
x2 
0.0365 
0.3805 
0.8715 
I 
I 
Although the area of land owned by the borrower (FARl\1) has the expected sign, 
it is not statistically significant. This suggests that formal sector loans are typically 
used for purposes other than buying inputs for cropping activities. This is consistent 
with the VLSS results, which indicated that the majority of loans for farm inputs 
come from private credit sources and cooperatives (World Bank, !995a: 73). 
The use of informal credit (IN~FOR) is not significant in relation to loan demand 
from the formal sector. However, the positive sign of the coefficient implies that 
informal credit is a complement rather than a substitute for formal sector credit. 
Let us turn now to the transactions costs equation. 
All coefficients have the expected signs, except for INFLU. Two of the six 
variables in the transactions costs equation are found to be significant in 
determining the level of transactions costs: the nominal interest rate, and the loan 
amount applied for. The larger the loan amount applied for, the higher is the 
magnitude of transactions costs. In contrast, the lower are the interest rates, the 
higher the transactions costs. Since all the dependent and independent variables are 
measured in logarithms (except the dummy variables), the regression coefficients 
are interpreted as elasticities. It is worth noting that the elasticity of transactions 
costs with respect to the nominal interest rate is calculated here in terms of a one 
percentage point increase or decrease (i.e., at an interest rate of 2 percent, an 
increase of one percentage point involves a 0.02 percent increase). Ceteris paribus, 
a 10 percentage point (0.2 percent) increase in the nominal interest rate from, say 2 
percent, to 2.2 percent reduces transactions costs to borrowers by 3 .6 percent. A I 0 
percent increase in loan amount applied for would increase transactions costs by 1.9 
percent. 
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The variable, !NFLU which has an unexpected sign is not significant in our 
regression. The reason that can explain the unexpected sign and insignificance of 
this variable is those who are regarded as influential receive favours from the bank 
officers mainly in the form of being offered preferential loans with lower interest 
rates. u In exchange for receiving these cheaper loans, borrowers are expected to 
repay bank officers with gifts or gratuities. These costs are likely to offset the 
reduction in transactions costs from using their influence. 
The results show that borrowers who had a prior credit relationship ·with the 
bank did not incur transactions costs significantly lower than those of borrowers 
who did not This would appear to indicate that tl1e bank relies on financial strength 
rather than on accumulated information on borrowers; hence past costs incurred in 
loan applications did not contribute to the reduction of transactions costs for repeat 
borrowers. This would also suggest that the bank lacks experience in making use of 
accumulated past information on borrowers. 
Although variable ARR has a positive sign, indicating that group borrowing 
contributes to the reduction of borrower transactions costs, this relationship is not 
significant The group borrowing scheme in the survey area, which emerged in 
1995, still plays a minor role-<mly about 6 percent of the total loans outstanding in 
1995 were through groups (Binhluc District VBA Branch, 1996). Of the total of78 
transactions with the formal sector in our sample, there were only 8 transactions 
undertaken through groups. Our interviews with group members revealed that 
borrowing through groups, on the one hand, is likely to reduce the time that the 
"An examination of the correlation matrix of the independent variables presented in Table A.5.2 in 
the Appendix shows a low correlation among all variables, except for INF LU and lnr, which has a 
correlation of -0.66. However, conveniional wisdom suggests that such correlation is not too high to 
create the multicolinearity problem. 
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member had to spend with the bank in seeking a loan, but on the other hand, 
required more time to be spent with the group, especially for newly established 
groups. The net result was that group borrowing did not contribute significantly to a 
reduction of the opportunity cost of time for borrowers. Since the cash outlay 
components of borrower transactions costs were nearly the same for both individual 
and group borrowing, total borrower transactions costs in group borrowing schemes 
were not significantly lower than those for individual borrowing. 
Now we compare our results with those for the Philippines and India where 
the simultaneous equations model was also used to estimate the transactions costs 
function. In the case of the Philippines, based on data from a household survey 
consisting of 176 bank borrovving households in six predominantly rural, 
agricultural areas, Abiad et al.(1988: 15) estimate transactions costs and loan 
demand functions using two-stage least squares. The results of the estimations 
reveal two significant factors: the type of bank and the distance to the bank. The 
bank dummy variable is positively related to borrower transactions costs, indicating 
that transactions costs are higher for rural banks than for non-rural banks. 12 The 
coefficient of the distance variable, which is measured in terms of travelling time to 
and from the bank, has a positive sign, indicating that borrowers who live further 
from the bank have significantly higher transactions costs. 
The study by Puhazhendhi (1995: 62) focuses mainly on the quantificatiOn 
of cost-effectiveness of the credit flow through a new channel in which the rural 
poor have better access to the intermediation of NGOs and SH Gs, using a survey of 
" The dummy variable for type of bank is equal to l and 0 for rural and non-rural banks, 
respectively. Non-rural bank includes commercial banks, private development banks, cooperative 
rural banks, land bank cooperatives, the Philippine National Bank, Development Bank of the 
Philippines, 
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150 households. Two variables are significantly related to transactions costs: the 
type of bank (dwnmy) and the NGO/SHG intermediation (dummy). As in the case 
of the Philippines, the results indicate that borrowing through non-rural 
(commercial) banks lowers borrower transactions costs. Due to the intermediation 
of NGOs/SHGs, group lending significantly reduces transactions costs by reducing 
the time spent by individual borrowers at bank premises, together with the 
elimination of cumbersome documentation procedures. 
In our study area, the VBA dominates the formal sector credit market, 13 
hence the bank dummy is not included in the regression. Although group lending 
through SHGs is positively related to transactions costs, indicating that group 
lending contributes to a reduction m transactions costs, the reduction is not 
statistically significant. The lack of a significant relationship between group lending 
and transactions costs raises some doubts as to its effectiveness in reducing 
transactions costs. This might suggest that some barriers to group lending still may 
be preventing its effect in reducing the time incurred by borrowers and eliminating 
cumbersome documentation procedures. Since the nwnber of loans through group 
lending schemes was not sufficiently large, a more conclusive answer to this 
question cannot be provided here. 
It is interesting, however, to observe the significant relationships in our case 
between transactions costs, loan amount applied for and interest rates. The larger is 
the loan amount applied for, the higher the magnitude of transactions costs. In 
contrast, the lower are the interest rates, the higher the transactions costs. These 
13 Among 78 formal sector credit transactions, there were only 3 non~ V'BA transactions, 
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results are also consistent with the findings by Ahmed (1982) in Bangladesh, and 
Cuevas (1984) in Honduras.14 
5.5Summary 
From the examination of data from a household survey, this chapter has 
quantified borrower transactions costs and analysed their role in explaining the 
quantitative structure of the rural credit market. The determinants of borrower 
transactions costs have also been examined. 
The results indicate that in order to pursue a formal sector loan, one has to 
have about VD 50 thousand available for upfront cash outlays. Those who do not 
have enough funds to cover the out-of-pocket threshold will pre-select out of the 
formal sector market. This is an important constraint for the poor in the area in 
obtaining formal Ioans. 15 Borrower transactions costs are a barrier to small borrower 
borrowing from the formal sector. It has been also shown that among borrower 
transactions costs, the cost of work days lost and travel plus other expenses 
(entertainment, gifts etc.) make up the two largest parts (42.5 percent and 37.8 
percent, respectively). 
Borrower transactions costs are found to be an important factor discouraging 
small borrowers from using fonnal sector loans. While these costs make up a 
substantial part of total borrowing costs for the smallest borrowers (9.7 percent of 
the loan size), they play a negligibly important role for the largest borrowers (0.4 
14 A study carried out by Cuevas in Honduras in early 1980s found that a one percent increase in the 
nominal interest rate in a subsidised credit program would lead to 1 per cent decline in borrower 
transactions costs (Graham el al., 1995: 90). 
15 The annual average income per household in Binhiuc district in 1995 was VD 560 thousand 
(Binhluc District Statistical Office, 1996). 
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percent of the loan size). This confinns the findings of a variety of studies in 
developing countries. The effective costs of borrowing, taking into account not only 
the explicit interest rate but transactions costs as well, are calculated and compared 
among different sources of credit One of the main conclusions dravvn is that small 
borrowers \\ill rationally choose to borrow from informal lenders rather than from 
the fonnal sector. The partition of the market occurs at the loan size between VD 
500-1,000 thousand, where the effective cost of borrowing from informal and 
formal markets is the same. If borrower transactions costs from the formal market 
were reduced, the partition of the market would change and more borrowers would 
be willing to borrow from the formal market 
Since our survey was undertaken in a district in the Red River Delta, the 
borrower transactions costs observed are likely to be downwardly biased relative to 
the level of such costs elsewhere in the country. In more remote and mountainous 
areas, borrower transactions costs are expected to be much higher, especially for 
ethnic minorities who are more isolated from the formal sector. Most of them Jive in 
remote areas far away from passable roads, making it difficult for them to get 
access to financial institutions providing credit and savings facilities. Longer 
distances to the bank, poor information flows, lack of awareness and understanding 
loan regulations in the fonnal sector, 16 etc are factors that contribute to higher 
bo1Tower transactions costs. 
The level of borrower transactions costs is determined by two factors: the 
nominal interest rate and the loan amount applied for. The insignificance of the 
" Among 150 household heads interviewed in the survey, two did not even know there was any 
formal lender in the area, and 37 knew but did not understand, or misunderstood, the lending 
regulations of formal lenders. 
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estimate on a prior credit relationship suggests that the bank lacks experiences in 
dealing v.ith information available to repeat borrowers. The lower is the nominal 
interest rate, the higher the borrower transactions costs. Lower nominal interest 
rates in the survey area are often applied for reasons of loan targeting, which occurs 
'lvith funds provided by donors and the government for particular purposes such as 
for a specified crop, for the purchase of machinery, or for poor farmers. Loan 
targeting imposes additional transactions costs on borrowers in complying with the 
particular eligibility requirements. Borrowers who obtained 'cheap' loans incurred 
higher non-interest payments. Some of them could not even afford to cover the cash 
outlay threshold, and had to self-select out of the credit programs targeted at them. 17 
The estimation of the transactions costs function by the TSLS method indicates that 
at the nominal interest rate of 2 percent, a 0.2 percent increase involves a 3.6 
percent decrease in borrower transactions costs. 
It is worth noting that an optimum outcome can be obtained in a segmented 
market where informal lenders have cost advantages over formal lenders in lending 
to small borrowers; it cannot under the ceilings of interest rate. If the bank did not 
face the ceiling on interest rates, the higher interest rates would eliminate or at least 
reduce the excess demand and encourage the bank to simplify the complicated 
procedures for obtaining formal sector loans, and reduce or waive some of the cash 
outlays of the borrower (such as application fees and service fees). These would' be 
expected to contribute to the reduction of travel costs and other opportunity costs. 
17 For example, in lending programs for the poor, village and commune committees cooperate with 
the bank officials to identify eligible borrowers. Several meetings are held in the villages to 
nominate these borrowers then a proposal list is compiled and passed to the bank, which is 
responsible for credit delivery. These procedures require the poor to complete more sets of loan 
application forms, and to pay more up-front costs than for nonnal loans. A woman in the women's 
union in one commune said that a poor farmer, in order to obtain a loan of VD 500 thousand, has to 
pay VD 50 thousand to complete all the documents required (not including the various other costs). 
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Thus the cash outlay threshold of the borrowers would also decline. Consequently, 
the partition of the market would be changed in favour of smaller borrowers. 
138 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
Table A.5.1 
Summary of Statistics of Variables Used in Equations (5.2) and (5.3)* 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max 
In TC 4.4176 0.2897 0.0839 3.7377 5.0434 
lnr 0.7753 0.1782 0.0318 0.4055 1.0296 
lnL 8.2462 0.9526 0.9075 5.9915 11.5129 
INF LU 0.1410 0.3503 0.1227 0 1 
PRE 
I 
0.3590 0.4828 0.2331 0 I 
ARR 0.8974 0.3054 0.0932 0 1 
l 
lnDIS 
I 
1.5832 0.6496 0.4220 0.0000 2.7081 
lnASSET I 10.2450 0.3214 0.1033 9.7981 11.7753 
lnFARAf 1.9163 0.4371 0. 1911 0.6931 2.7726 
INFOR 0.6667 0.4745 0.2251 0 1 
lnTCFIT" 4.4176 0.1888 0.0356 3.8093 4.8234 
lnLFJT" 8.2642 0.6537 0.4273 6.5966 9.7255 
* Number of observations= 78 
a Indicates the fitted value in the first-stage regression of lnTC and lnL on all independent variables in 
Equations 5.2 and 5.3. 
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TableA.5.2 
Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Equation (5.2) 
lnr lnL (lnLFI1) lnDJS JNFLU PRE ARR 
lnr l.00 
lnL{lnLFI1) -0.30 (-0.44 ) 1.00 (l.00) 
lnDIS 0.01 0.16 ( 0.35) 1.00 
LNFLU -0.66 0.39 (0.57) 0.09 1.00 
PRE -0.20 0.23 (0.34) -0.03 0.23 l.00 
ARR -0.22 0.46 (0.68) 0.18 0.14 0.16 1.00 
i 
Table A.5.3 
Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Equation (5.3) 
lnr lnTC (lnTCFI1) lnASSET lnFARi\f INFOR 
lnr 1.00 
lnTC (lnTCFIT) -0.42 (-0.65) 1.00 (1.00) 
lnASSET -0.09 0.16 (0.24) 1.00 
lnFARM -0.05 -0. 13 (-0.15) 0.10 1.00 
INFOR 0.06 -0.12 (-0.19) -0.05 0.07 1.00 I 
i 
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Chapter 6 
DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT APPLICATIONS AND 
FORMAL SECTOR CREDIT RATIONING 
In the previous chapter, borrower transactions costs and their determinants 
were examined. It was shown that the borrower transactions costs of formal lenders 
are not equal among borrowers. Small borrowers incur higher transactions costs per 
dong borrowed than do large borrowers. An implication of this is that small 
borrowers will rationally choose to borrow from informal sources rather than the 
formal sector. This is consistent with the well-known literature supporting the view 
that small farmers are rationed out of the formal eredit market (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1976 and 1984; Ladman, 1984). Using data from the household survey, this chapter 
formally tests the hypothesis that small borrowers seek loans from informal sources, 
while larger borrowers apply for formal sector loans. Probit estimations are 
undertaken to examine the statistical significance of the loan amount applied for, 
among other variables, in the equations explaining the determinants of credit 
applications. The determinants of formal sector credit rationing are also examined. 1 
6. 1 Analytical Framework 
Unlike transactions in ordinary goods, in which the only term of the contract 
1 During fieldwork it was found that interviewees generally had access to informal sources without 
any credit rationing-specifically, from moneylenders and traders. This chapter thus examines only 
the determinants of credit rationing in the formal sector. 
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is price, a combination of variables such as the amount of the loan, purpose of the 
loan, the collateral required, the repayment schedule and the price (the interest rate) 
constitute the terms of a credit contract. It is necessary for borrowers to choose the 
credit source that offers the most attractive combination of contract terms. On the 
other hand, lenders must also decide whether to ration credit demand based on 
information on the borrowers' creditworthiness. \!/hat can be observed in this 
process is the amount borrowed and the existence of credit rationing. Let us define 
Ii· as the decision of a household as to whether to apply for a loan, and J/ as the 
decision of the lender as to whether to ration a loan applicant. Then the indicator 
variables have the following forms; 
/1 = l if the household applies for a loan; = 0 otherwise 
h 1 if the lender rations a loan applicant; = 0 otherwise 
While it is simple to determine whether a household is an applicant from a 
given source of credit, the issue of how it can be classified as being credit-rationed 
or not is much more challenging. There are various empirical approaches to solving 
this problem. Sia! and Carter (1994) suggested estimating the shadow value of 
capital for producers, and comparing this with prevailing market loan rates. 
According to this approach, large gaps between the shadow value of capital and 
prevailing loan rates demonstrate the presence of credit constraints. Unfortunately 
the heterogeneity of production activities both within and across households in the 
survey made it impractical to measure rates of return for each activity, so this 
approach was not feasible here. Kochar (1991) adopted an alternative approach, 
taking loan applications as a signal of demand, and equating no application to no 
demand and no rationing. In this case, the distribution of h can be only specified for 
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the subset of observations 11 l, but not for the subset / 1 = 0, resulting in a 
truncated sample (Maddala, 1983: 281). Using this approach, Kochar (1991) 
estimated credit access for farmers with different wealth in India, and found that 
poorer farmers who did not apply for credit were constrained by the absence of 
investment opportunities, rather than by being rationed in the credit market. This 
approach appears not to be relevant in our study, however, because some non-
applicants from the formal sector perceived that the lenders would reject their 
applications for reasons of inappropriate loan use or inadequate collateral. As a 
result, they self-selected themselves not to apply for credit from the formal sector. 
Thus the more realistic and relevant approach adopted in this study is that suggested 
by Feder et al. (1990), who investigated latent loan demand by asking households 
about their credit market experiences. Using this approach we can define h' over 
the whole sarnple.2 In particular, all applicants for formal sector credit can be 
divided into two groups: constrained and not-constrained. The group of constrained 
applicants includes those for whom the loan amount agreed to is less than that 
applied for, and those whose requests were totally rejected. Non-formal sector 
applicants are also classified as constrained or not-constrained. The reason is that 
there may have been some household heads who wanted to obtain formal sector 
credit but did not apply, since they perceived no chance of receiving credit from the 
formal sector. These non-formal sector applicants are, therefore, classified as 
2 Zeller (1994) used the same approach to examine the determinants of credit rationing in 
Madagascar. He pointed out that when conceptualised as a sequential decision process, participation 
in borrowing can be divided into two stages. At stage one, the household decides whether to apply 
for credit and. at stage two, the tender decides whether to give the applicant all the credit applied for, 
or to partially reduce the credit amount, or to totally reject the applicant's demand. However, his 
model is a joint-decision model rather than a sequential model. 
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constrained. Thus, in order to analyse the outcome of a borrower's participation in 
the credit market, factors affecting his or her demand for credit and the lender's 
rationing need to be separated, and a joint-decision or two-decision model 
(Maddala, 1983: 279) is applied. 
6.2 Determinants of Credit Applications 
In order to analyse statistically the determinants of credit applications from 
various sources of credit, a univariate probit model is specified, with the 
characteristics of the household, the household head and the loan contract as 
independent variables. The model is estimated separately across loans from formal 
sector lenders, relatives and friends, moneylenders, and all other informal sources. 
Separate consideration of the various market segments helps to identify similarities 
and differences between the segments involving the detem1inants of credit 
applications. The equation for estimating the probability of applying for a loan is as 
follows: 
(6.1) 
where: 
HH1-vector of household head's characteristics 
HE1-vector of household's endO\'\Wents 
LL1-vector of loan characteristics 
The vector of household head's characteristics-~HH1-includes age, age 
squared, gender, education and influence. Since older household heads tend to have 
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more human capital and experience, and therefore a wider range of investment 
opportunities, it is hypothesised that they are more likely to apply for credit. 
In rural Vietnamese households, it is widely perceived that the husband is 
more likely to interact with formal lenders, while the wife is more often involved in 
informal credit arrangements. Nevertheless, formal lenders do not discourage 
participation by women, and there are even some credit programs targeting women 
only (Tran et al., 1992). A study by Fong (1994: 16) found that in the majority of 
cases, those receiving formal sector credit were men; some sources estimated that as 
many as 90 percent of all borrowers from the VBA are men. However, Tankha et al. 
(1995: 10) commented that this is likely to change in the near future. Conversations 
with farmers and bank officers in the study area revealed that the gender of the 
household head usually depends on who has the greater financial acumen in the 
family, and that the household's decision to apply for loans, especially from the 
formal sector, is made jointly by the husband and wife. Therefore, the effect of 
gender of the household head on the probability of applying for formal sector credit 
is unknown, a priori. 
It is hypothesised that the number of years of schooling of the household 
head may have a positive effect on loan applications, especially for formal sector 
loans, since schooling augments returns on capital, ceteris paribus and, therefore, 
credit demand (Zeller, 1994: 1903). In a study in Nepal (Yadav et al., 1992: 43'1), 
the coefficients of schooling were negative in the regressions for both moneylenders 
and relatives and friends, indicating that better educated farmers may rely more on 
self-finance and on formal sector credit. In our study area, household heads \\ith 
more years of schooling are more likely to be able to exploit investment 
opportunities for both farm and non-farm activities, and to better understand the 
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loan regulations of the formal sector, and so would be more likely to apply for 
formal sector loans than those less educated. 
Conversations with farmers and bank officers also revealed that those who 
are considered to be influential in the community, such as those who have positions 
of authority (village leaders, commune leaders) or social responsibility (leaders of 
women's unions, farmers' associations), or those who have a close relationship with 
bank officers, can more easily obtain access to formal sector loans, and especially to 
preferred loan schemes. Hence a dummy variable that reflects whether a borrower is 
considered to be influential or not is used as an explanatory variable.3 
The vector of households' endo\vments affecting credit demand-HE1-
includes variables related to amount of land managed (farm size, farm size squared), 
and variables reflecting household size, such as the number of dependants and 
adults. In rural Vietnam, land has been distributed relatively equally, according to 
the amount of land available to the commune and the number of workers in each 
household, to ensure that each family has enough land for subsistence.4 Most of the 
land in the study area is low-lying, and is used mainly for rice growing. Although 
farm size was found to be not statistically significant as a factor affecting loan 
demand among formal sector borrowers, the question as to whether it affects the 
decision to apply for credit from various sources is worth examining. 
' This variable was already detennined for those who borrowed from the formal sector and used in 
estimating borrower transactions costs in Chapter 5. Ir is now extended to capture those who did not 
borrow from the formal sector. 
' Household land holdings are readjusted from time to time, based on changes in household size and 
number of workers. 
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The number of dependants, defined as household members who are under 
fifteen or above sixty-five years of age, is hypothesised to have a positive effect on 
the probability of applying for informal credit, due to the demands for food and 
education, while the number of adults in the household is hypothesised to affect 
positively the opportunity of obtaining credit from the formal sector, since formal 
lenders' production-oriented loans tend to rely on labour provided by adults. 
The vector of loan characteristics-LL1 -includes the loan amount applied 
for and loan purpose. As mentioned earlier, due to high transactions costs, formal 
sector loans are normally large, while small borrowers rationally seek loans from 
informal sources. Thus the hypothesis that the loan amount applied for plays a 
significant role in households' decision as to the source of loans is formally tested 
here. 
Because of formal lenders' concentration on production loans, non-
production loans are obtained mainly in the informal market. The coexistence of 
formal lenders and various other lenders in the informal market suggests the 
importance of loan purpose as an explanatory variable in the credit application 
regression. We distinguish three categories of loan purpose. The first-CATJ-
consists of crop working capital loans only, such as loans to buy fertiliser, seed, 
pesticides etc. With low-lying land, rice is the main crop; the demand for working 
capital for rice growing is typically small, and is met mainly by traders and 
cooperatives in the area. The second category--CAT2-<:omprises loans for fixed 
assets, animal husbandry (mainly pig and cattle raising), fisheries, and non-crop 
activities (including silk production and processing). This type of loan is 
characterised by large size, and is mainly provided by the formal sector. 
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The third category-CAT3-includes all non-production loans, such as for 
normal consumption, education, housing construction, weddings, funerals, and all 
other purposes not included in the first two categories. Relatives, friends and 
moneylenders are the major providers of loans for these purposes. 
Summary definition of variables 
AGE 
AG ESQ 
SEX 
INF LU 
=age of the household head 
=age of the household head squared. This is used to capture non-
linearity in relation to household head's age 
=sex of household head (=I if male;= 0 if female) 
influence ( = 1 if household head has a social responsibility 
in the commune or a close relationship with bank officers; = 0 
otherwise) 
EDU =household head's number of years of schooling 
FARlvf = farm size measured by area of land in sao managed by the 
household 
FARMSQ =farm size squared 
DEP =number of dependants in the household 
ADULT =number of adults in the household, which is the household size 
minus the number of dependants 
L 
CATI 
CAT2 
= loan amount applied for 
= loan purpose category 1 
= loan purpose category 2 
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CAT3 = loan purpose category 3. (This variable is dropped and used as the 
control category.) 
CONST = intercept term, which reflects the case when the household head is 
female, has no influence, and the loan purpose is Category 3. 
A univariate probit model5 (Maddala 1983: 27) is used to estimate the 
determinants of the decision as to where to apply for credit among different sources. 
The results are presented in Table 6. 1. 
Interpretation of Results 
The regressions for the four different sources of credit reject the hypothesis 
that all the slope coefficients in each model are equal to zero, as indicated by the 
likelihood ratio tests in Table 6.1. Relatively high percentages of correct predictions 
(ranging from 79.6 percent to 94.2 percent ) indicate fairly good fits of these 
models. The effect of a change in the independent variable on the probabilities of 
borrowing from different sources is calculated in terms of elasticity or marginal 
effect where appropriate. 6 
' Due to the small sample size, the results from the probit estimation may be different from those 
using logit estimation. However, logit estimations (not reported here) show no difference in terms of 
the significant detemtinants of credit applications. 
6 Tue Appendix shows the likelihood ratio test, marginal effects and elasticities as computed in the 
probit model. 
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Table 6.1 
Estimation Results of Determinants of Credit Applications 
Explanatory Formal sector Relatives and Moneylenders All other informal 
variable friends lenders 
AGE -0.0533 0.1209 0.0352 0.0633 
(-0.6208) (1.274 l) (0.4850) (0.5422) 
AG ESQ 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0006 
(0.6 !69) (-l.2484) (-0.5775) (-0.5367) 
SEX 0.0798 0.0256 0.1445 -0.3868 
(0.3122) (0.1187) (0.7067) (-l.2133) 
EDU 0.0022 0.0063 -0.0243 -0.0526 
(0.0401) (0.1267) (-0.5426) (-0.6681) 
FARM 0.4837' 0.0475 -0.2395 -0.0213 
(2 3945) (0.2586) (-l.5055) (-0.0807) 
[0.3806]' 
FARJ>.fSQ 
-0.0243' -0.0051 0.0125 0.0030 
(-2.0514) (-04724) (1.3734) (0.1991) 
[-2.2837] 
DEP 
-0.2156 0.1506 0.3662' 0.l 177 
(-l.0131) (0.8621) (2.2526) (0.4652) 
{O. 1465) 
ADULT 
-0.0593 0.01 ll 0.0864 0.2378 
(-0.3933) (0.0855) (0.7234) (l.3101) 
INFLU 0.4567 -0.5429 -0.5488 -0.2923 
(0.7089) (-0.8575) (-1.1250) (-0.1731) 
L 0.[419' 0.0063 -0.0181 -0.5139" 
(2.5563) (0.4613) (-0.9021) (-2.1055) 
[0.6358] [-3.6495] 
CATI 0.4116 -l.7386' -5.8486 2.9757+ 
(0. 7097) (-4.0280) (-0.0071) (6.7668) 
CAT2 2.5195+ -l.2424' 0.0085 -0.3528 
(5.8974) (-5.2518) (0.0402) (-0.7851) 
CONST 
-3.0990 -3.3042 -0.8339 -2.7604 
(-1.3410) (-1.5351) (-0.4783) (-!.0517) 
Likelihood ratio 
test 167.97 58.90 38.14 188.33 
Percentage 
predicted 
correctly I 88.07 80.00 79.62 94.23 
7 SHAZA'.V! understands the two variables FARM and FARlv!SQ as being independent of each other; 
hence the elasticity at mean of FAR.Iv! printed out from SHAZAM output is not correct. The elasticity 
at mean of FARA1 in this case should be calculated as: E - (-OP ) FAR.Ai_ where 
ww - cFARM F(X1fJ) 
OP -· ~-
t3FARM = f(X' /J)(fJF«~V + 2/3FAPM' FARM). 
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Number of observations 260. The number of observations here is the number of transactions. 
Many households borrowed from various sources of credit during the study period, so a 
household may appear more than once. Non-b.orrowers are also included in the regression.' 
Numbers in () are asymptotic I-values; 
Numbers in [ ] are elasticities at mean; 
Numbers in { } are marginal effects at mean; 
Dependent variable = 1 if the household applies for credit, = 0 otherwise. 
# significant at the 5 percent level; 
+significant at the l percent leveL 
In the model for the formal sector, four estimated coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at the 95 percent or 99 percent confidence levels, and all have 
the expected sign. First, the larger the farm size, the higher the probability the 
household will apply for formal sector credit. Households with larger farm size 
demand more credit because of the better opportunity to diversify crops (amongst 
rice, corn, potatoes, tomatoes etc.) and to engage in animal husbandry (fish, pigs, 
cows). An increase in farm size therefore raises the absolute amount of credit 
demanded from the formal seetor. When the loan demanded exceeds the level 
where the effective cost of credit between the formal and informal sectors is the 
same (the partition point of the credit market), borrowers will rationally choose to 
borrow from the formal sector. The increase in farm size also increases the 
collateral value of land, thus allowing households to borrow from the formal sector. 
However, it is worth noting that once the loan amount applied for is beyond the 
partition point, so that the household decides to borrow from the formal sector, farm 
' If the examination of choice of credit sources is the focus such that only borrowers are taken into 
account, the number of observations then falls to 245. In this case, the probit regressions of the 
formal sector, relatives and friends, and all other informal lenders lead to no changes in terms of 
statistical significance of estimated parameters. The only change appears in the case of 
moneylenders, in which the confidence interval of DEP fa!Is to about the 85 percent level, while 
FAR."1 turns out to be significantly and negatively related to the probability of applying for loans, 
with a confidence interval of 90 per cent. Results of these regressions are presented in the Appendix. 
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size is no longer a significant factor in determining the loan amount applied for, as 
shown in the formal loan demand estimation in the previous chapter. This indicates 
that the positive relationship between farm size and the loan applied for, and thus 
choice of formal sector credit occur essentially for the small farm size class. The 
insignificant association between farm size and the amount of formal sector loans 
demanded for the larger farm size class cannot be explained by the credit rationing 
associated with the lack of collateral, because land is one of the most suitable types 
of collateral for formal sector loans. This may indicate that larger borrowers make 
the deliberate choice of using formal sector credit for production activities other 
than cropping, which do not necessarily depend on farm size. In particular, if the 
farm size of the household is greater than the mean by l percent, the probability of 
that household's loan corning from the formal sector increases by 0.38 percent.9 
Second, while farm size positively affects the probability of borrowing from 
the formal sector, farm size squared has the opposite effect, implying that the 
positive relationship between farm size and probability of applying for sector 
formal sector loans becomes weaker as farm size increases. 
Third, the hypothesis that large borrowers would rationally seek loans from 
the formal sector is confirmed here by the coefficient on the loan amount applied 
for, which is positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence level. This result 
also implies that small borrowers are effectively rationed out of the formal sector by 
9 While this result again supports the stylised view of farmers with small land holdings being 
rationed out of the formal market commonly found in many developing countries (Ladman, 1984), it 
appears to differ from the case of China. West ( 1991: 88), using a lo git model, indicated that area of 
land managed by the household was not significant, since farmers in the same county were 
relatively homogeneous, and land was not a significant discriminator. However, our survey found 
that in the Binhluc district the average farm size per household in Binhmy and Binhnghia communes 
is only half that ofMythuan commune. 
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the imposition of high transactions costs. The result implies that if the loan amount 
applied for is greater than the mean by 1 percent, the household is 0.64 percent 
more likely to choose a loan from the formal sector. 
Fourth, the intention to use the loan for production activities, but not for 
crop working capital only, has a positive and significant impact on the household's 
decision to borrow from the formal sector. That is, if the loan is classified as 
Category 2, the household is more likely to obtain the loan from the formal sector. 
The model for the determinants of applying for loans from relatives and 
friends reveals two significant predictors: loan Categories l and 2. Both of these 
variables are found to be significantly different from zero at the 99 percent 
confidence level, and have the expected signs. The intention to use loans for 
Category 1 and 2 purposes reduces the probability of a household borrov.ing from 
relatives and friends. This result is consistent v.ith a World Bank report (World 
Bank, l 995a: 73), which states that 'house building was the primary reason for 
informal non-commercial loans, and relatives tended to be the preferred source of 
housing loans'. 
The only predictor of applying for loans from moneylenders that is 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level is the number of 
dependants in the household. The more children the household has, the more 
household's food consumed, and tbe greater the health and education expenses. 
Since formal sector !enders do not provide loans for such uses, the only sources are 
informal lenders. Households with relatively many dependants rely significantly on 
informal moneylenders for loans for such purposes, which are made available for 
durations ranging from a few weeks to two or three months, and witb negligible 
waiting time between loan request and disbursement. Specifically, an increase of 
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one dependant in the household, as compared to the mean, increases the probability 
that the household will apply for credit from moneylenders by 0.15. In contrast with 
the models of reliance on formal sector lenders and on relatives and friends, where 
loan purpose plays a statistically significant role, loan purpose is found to be not 
significant here. This indicates that informal moneylenders provide loans for a 
variety of purposes, including consumption loans, without explicit collateral 
requirements. 10 
Turning to the model for all other informal lenders, it is found that two 
coefficients are statistically significant and have the predicted signs. First, the loan 
amount applied for is significant at the 95 percent confidence level, with a negative 
sign. A one percent increase in the loan amount requested as compared to the mean 
makes it 3.65 percent less likely to have come from such lenders. As mentioned 
earlier, traders and cooperatives operating in the study area mainly finance inputs 
such as fertiliser, pesticides, seeds etc., and receive repayment in farm outputs in 
return at harvest time at pre-determined rates of interest. The loan amount for such 
uses averages only VD 500 thousand. This result again confirms that because of 
high transactions costs, small borrowers choose to avoid formal sector lenders. 
Second, loan purpose Category l is found to be significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level, and has a positive effect on the household's decision to request 
10 The survey found that moneylenders have much more information about the borrower's capacity 
and willingness to repay loans than formal lenders. They knew the sources of income of borrowers, 
and undertook enforcement, such as confiscating fruit, pigs or paddy if borrowers defaulted. Zeller 
(1994: 1905) also indicates, in the case of Madagascar, that '[nformal borrower-lender relationships 
are often based on long-established social ties or business relationships. Honouring these 
relationships is especial!y crucial for vulnerable households, since they do not want to lose access to 
the informal credit and insurance system. [n terms of crises, it can therefore be expected that 
informal loans are repaid first'. 
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loans from traders or cooperatives. This is consistent with the VLSS data, which 
suggest that the majority ofloans for farm inputs come from private credit sources 
and cooperatives. 11 
In all four probit regressions, household head characteristics-namely age, 
age squared, gender, level of education, influence, and the number of adults in the 
household-do not have significant explanatory power. The insignificance of the 
age and gender variables implies that there is no evidence of formal lender 
discrimination against the young or women. It was also expected that three 
variables-level of education, influence of the household head, and number of 
adults in the household-would have a significant positive effect on the decision to 
borrow from the formal sector, because a formal sector credit institution can 
reasonably be expected to extend loans to knowledgeable, influential household 
heads, and households with more workers. These variables are found not to be 
significant determinants of the borrowing decision from any source, however. 
These unexpected results may have several explanations. Most borrowers 
request loans from not one but several sources. The average number of transactions 
per household during the study period was 1.81, and there was one household which 
had as many as eight transactions. The preferred source of loans for rural 
households is relatives and friends, since such loans carry the lowest effective 
interest rates and have flexible repayment requirements. It is reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that households do not choose to borrow from the formal sector or other 
11 The VLSS data suggest that in rural households which rely on credit to cover their purchases of 
seed, 9 per cent of credit comes from private sources, 30 per cent from government sources (VBA), 
and the remainder from cooperatives; for purchasing fertiliser, they obtain l3 per cent from private 
credit sources, 3& per cent from the government, and 49 per cent from the cooperatives; for buying 
pesticides, a nearly identical pattern is observed (World Bank, l 995a:73). 
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informal lenders unless they are unable to borrow from relatives and friends. Then, 
depending on a variety of factors affecting both demand for and supply of credit, 
the household decides, for each transaction, from whom it will borrow. The 
coexistence of various sources of credit in a household's borrowing portfolio 
suggests that household characteristics may be less likely to become statistically 
significant for a given source of credit regression. 
Several possible reasons can be identified for the insignificance of each 
variable. First, the insignificance of EDU in the model for the formal sector 
indicates that educated household heads can rely in part on self-finance and in part 
on various informal sources of credit, not only on formal sector credit. It also may 
be the case that educated farmers facing an investment requiring a large amount of 
credit are rationed by the loan limits imposed by the formal sector; hence they have 
to seek additional loans from other sources. Second, although influential borrowers 
have an advantage in obtaining formal preferential credit, the scale of such credit is 
normally small; hence the estimated coefficient in the formal sector regression is 
not significant. Third, the results also indicate that households with more adults are 
not significantly more likely to apply for credit, especially from the formal sector, 
because such households can in part rely on their o\\'Il labour and self-finance. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the signs of most significant variables in 
the formal sector credit regression are opposite to those in the informal market 
regressions (the loan amount applied for in the formal sector and in all other 
informal lenders regressions; loan purpose Category 2 in the formal sector and in 
the relatives' and friends' regressions). This is the case even within the informal 
sector regressions (loan purpose Category l in the regressions for relatives and 
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friends and all other informal lenders). This suggests that formal institutions and 
various agents of the informal sector are alternative sources of credit. The strong 
substitutability in the loan amount applied for and loan purpose confirms the 
segmentation of the credit market. 
It may be interesting to compare our results for Vietnam with those from 
China. As in China since 1979, Vietnam has been implementing a series of reforms 
in the organisation of agricultural production since 1938 that have radically changed 
the nature of economic activities in the rural sector. The important feature of the 
agricultural reforms in both countries was the introduction of the 'household 
responsibility system', which makes individual households, rather than 
cooperatives, the decision-makers and managers of production and business 
activities. One of the markets that has developed to a significant degree in both 
China and Vietnam following these reforms is the rural credit market. The first 
quantitative study of the determinants of applying for formal sector and informal 
credit in China appears to be that by West (1991). She analysed data from a two-
year (1987-88) farm-household survey in Qingyuan county, Guangdong province, 
using a logit model. The results for 1987 show three significant variables as the 
determinants of choice of credit source between the formal and informal sector: the 
beginning-of-year level of savings deposits, loan purpose, and the household's 
location. From results for 1988, the significant predictors of choice of credit source 
are age of the household head, educational level of the household head, area of 
cultivated land, savings deposits, loan purpose, and the household's location. 
Although the variables included in the models adopted by West differ from 
those used here, the comparison is interesting because West's study covers the 
period in China when formal sector credit conditions were much the same as those 
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presently existing in Vietnam-Le, characterised by ceiling interest rates and a 
fom1al sector policy of focusing on production loans. The main difference lies in the 
structure of the fonnal sector credit market. In China at that time, rural credit 
cooperatives provided the principal network of formal credit institutions that 
reached into the countryside, while in our study most fonnal sector credit was 
obtained from the VBA. Savings deposits held at rural credit cooperatives as a form 
of collateral were the most important predictor of choice of credit source in the case 
of China. The main common conclusion from West's study and the present study is 
that loan purpose is an important variable in determining the choice of applying for 
loans from the fonnal and informal sectors. Since West did not include loan size as 
an explanatory variable, we have no means of comparing the significance of this 
variable in the two countries. 
6.3 Determinants of Formal Sector Credit Rationing 
For the 150 household heads interviewed, 245 transactions are recorded, of 
which 78 transactions were with fonnal lenders. Looking first at these transactions 
with the formal sector, responses to the questions on the amount applied for and the 
amount actually received show that among these transactions, 10 could be 
considered to be constrained, since the amounts of credit actually received were less 
than those applied for; the other 68 transactions were classified as not-constrained. 
The total 167 (= 245-78) non-fonnal sector transactions were classified as fonnal 
sector constrained or not-constrained by asking the borrower why she/he did not 
undertake the transaction in question in the fonnal sector. The typical reasons for 
not doing so included non-production loan use; lack of collateral acceptable to 
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formal lenders; small amount of credit needed; and urgent need for credit. As a 
result, among these 167 transactions, 63 were identified as formal sector 
constrained transactions, either by being rejected or being perceived to be rejected. 
Non-borrowers were also asked why they did not borrow from the formal sector. 
Thirteen of the total 15 non-borrowers revealed that they had no need for credit, and 
so were classified as not-constrained non-borrowers. Two of these 15 non· 
borrowers reported that they wanted to borrow from the formal sector but did not 
apply, perceiving a high chance of rejection, since they still had an outstanding debt 
with the formal sector. These two households then fell into the group of constrained 
non-borrowers. Hence, the total number of transactions considered to be formal 
sector constrained were 75 10+63+2). 
In order to estimate the determinants of being credit constrained, many of 
the variables in the model of credit applications were examined again: the vector of 
household head's characteristics-HH1-affecting the lender's decision (as in 
Equation (6.1)); the vector of household's endowment-HE2-(as in Equation 
(6.1 ), but with an additional variable, which is the ratio of loan amount applied for 
to the value of household liquid assets-LASSET--to proxy for the household's 
ability to repay the loan in the case that future income is less than expected; ability 
to fulfil the collateral requirement-COL; and outstanding debt-LO, of the 
household); vector of loan characteristics LL2 (as in Equation (6.1), but not 
including L). 12 The model can be expressed by the following equation: 
12 Zeller ( 1994) used this model to estimate the determinants of credit rationing by informal lenders 
and formal credit groups in Madagascar. ln the probit regression of being credit constrained, Mill's 
ratio from the model of credit application was included as an additional regressor to correct for 
selection bias in the model of credit application. However, Hecman ( 1979), who was the first to use 
Mill's ratio to correct for selection bias suggested that it was only relevant to put the inverse of 
Mill's ratio calculated from the probit regression in the first-stage as an additional regressor in the 
second-stage OLS regression when attempting to run 01.,S on truncated samples. Hence, we do not 
put Mill's ratio in our regression of being credit constrained. 
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(6.2) 
where: 
HHt - vector of household head characteristics affecting the lender's 
decision, as in Equation ( 6.1 ). 
HE2 - vector of household characteristics affecting the lender's decision, as 
in Equation ( 6.1 ), but also including 
LASSET= L , where ASSET is the value of household assets 
ASSET 
such as homestead, durable goods, livestock, monetary savings etc. 
that could be liquidated in order to repay a loan, and L is the amount 
applied for 
COL= dummy variable ( = 1 if the household has adequate collateral to 
satisfy formal sector lender's loan requirements;= 0 otherwise) 
LO= dummy variable ( = l if the household had an outstanding debt with 
formal sector lender;= 0 othervvise). 
Table 6.2 presents the probit regression results for being credit constrained 
by the formal sector. Again, the likelihood ratio test reported in the regression 
rejects the hypothesis that all the slope coefficients in the model are equal to zero. 
This model also presents a relatively good fit, as reflected in the percentage 
predicted correctly-76.9 percent. Two variables are found to be significantly 
different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level in explaining formal sector 
credit rationing: outstanding debt, and loan use Category 2. 
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Table 6.2 
Determinants of Credit Constraint in the Formal Sector 
Explanatorv variables Estimates 
AGE 0.0126 
AG ESQ -0.0001 
SEX 0.0665 
EDU 0.0728 
FARM -0.1712 
FARMSQ 0.0081 
DEP 0.2296 
ADULT 0.1580 
JNFLU 0.4881 
LASS ET l.0143 
LO !.3819' 
CATI -5.9769 
CAT2 -0.7923' 
COL -0.0668 
CONST -1.3877 
Likelihood ratio test 84.41 
Percentage predicted correctly 76.92 
Number of observations= 260. 
Dependent variable= 1 if the household is rationed,= 0 otherwise. 
# significant at the 5 percent level; 
+ significant at the I percent level. 
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Asymptotic t-ratio 
0. 1671 
-OJ 113 
0.3180 
0.0461 
-1.0791 
0.0977 
l.3636 
l.3255 
l.1375 
1.5040 
4.5529 
-0.0215 
-2.9828 
-0.2479 
-0.7740 
Having an outstanding debt with a formal lender significantly increases the 
probability of being credit rationed, ceteris paribus. And requiring the loan for 
Category 2 purposes significantly reduces the probability of being credit rationed in 
the formal sector. This is an expected result, since the formal sector only provides 
loans for production purposes. Furthermore, various schemes existed for 
encouraging farmers to invest in fixed assets such as tractors, paddy processing 
machines, and pumps. The variables EDU and LASSET are not found to be 
significant predictors of formal sector credit rationing. The variable EDU even has 
the unexpected sign. Most formal sector loans in the survey area were for animal 
husbandry (pigs, cows), fisheries, and silk production, suggesting that experience, 
rather than level of education, is important for such activities. 13 
We again compare the determinants of being formal sector credit 
constrained in our case with that in China. At least two studies have dealt with this 
issue in China: one by West (1991), and the other by Feder et al. (1990). The basic 
similar feature in all three studies is that being credit constrained is defined as an 
upper bound, since both households whose loan requests were denied or reduced, 
and households which felt their loan requests would be rejected, are included. 
West's regression identifies four variables as significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level or higher: age of household head, number of household workers, 
' loan outstanding, and household's location. Feder et al. ( 1990), using data collected 
in December, 1987 in Gonzhuling in Jilin province, found that three variables were 
significant at the 90 percent confidence level or higher: number of adults in the 
household, savings in financial institutions, and last season's income. Recalling that 
13 Household surveys in rural China also indicate that formal education may not be as important for 
cropping, animal husbandry, and fishery activities. 'Education level also may not be a good proi..'Y 
for successful management in commerce, industry, or transportation' (West, l 991: 90), 
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the two significant variables in our regression are loan outstanding and loan use 
Category 2, it can be seen that our result is closer to that of West. These two studies 
suggest that loan outstanding is, among other things, a significant predictor of being 
formal sector credit constrained. 
6.4Summary 
Using data from the household survey, this chapter has analysed the role of 
the loan amount applied for and other factors in explaining the determinants of 
credit applications from various sources and of credit rationing in the formal sector. 
One of the main conclusions drawn earlier when examining the role of 
borrower transactions costs and the effective cost of borrowing was that small 
borrowers will rationally choose to borrow from informal lenders rather than from 
the formal sector. In this chapter, four sources of credit were distinguished, and the 
significance of the loan amount applied for variable was tested formally in a probit 
regression model of determinants of credit applications. The results confirm the 
existence of segmentation of the credit market with respect to the loan amount 
applied for. Other characteristics of the segmented market were also examined, and 
farm size and loan use also appear to be significant predictors of borrowers' 
decisions to apply for formal sector credit. The results show that a positive 
relationship between farm size and choice of formal sector credit exists essentially 
for the small farm size class, indicating that formal sector credit is more often the 
choice of households with larger farms. They also confirm that the formal sector 
concentrates on production loans, while informal lenders tend to provide loans for a 
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variety of purposes, including consumption. Households with more dependants 
have to rely on informal moneylenders for their consumption needs if they have no 
access to credit from relatives and friends. 
If formal lenders did not face ceilings on interest rates, excess demand for 
formal sector loans would not occur. They would thus be more likely to hire more 
staff to obtain additional information on borrowers, to monitor loans and to enforce 
repayment. As a result, they would be more likely to diversify and expand their loan 
portfolios to encompass consumption loans, which are more often needed by small 
and poor farmers. 14 
At least two factors have been found to explain heterogeneity in borrowing 
behaviour and segmentation of the rural credit market: regulated interest rates in the 
formal sector and tbe problem arising from asymmetric information in the rural 
credit market. Regulated interest rates create excess demand for formal sector 
credit, leading to credit rationing. Because of the higb cost of acquiring borrower-
specific information, the lack of experience in dealing with such information, and 
the lack of a sound legal system, risk-reduction behaviour by formal lenders is 
manifested in a heavy reliance on collateral requirements, a concentration on 
production loans, and the shifting of transactions costs from lenders to borrowers. 
The resulting higher borrower transactions costs make the effective cost of small 
' loans from the formal sector substantial compared to that from informal lenders. 
'While efficiency can be achieved in a segmented market if the segmentation is due 
14 The study by Zel!er (l 994: 1898) in Madagascar shows that repayment rates of consumption loans 
compared to production loans do not differ greatly. In poor households, where the main production 
factor is labor, expenditure for food, health care, clothing, and education appear critical in 
maintaining the household's ability to generate income, and credit may sometimes be a cost-efficient 
means of smoothing consurnption. 
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to the different availability of information about borrowers on the part of various 
lenders, it cannot be achieved if segmentation is due to the regulation of interest 
rates (Yadav et al., 1992: 434). With regulated interest rates borrower transactions 
costs continue to be high, resulting in formal sector loans' remaining 
unattractiveness to smaller farmers. 
An analysis of the determinants of loan rationing by the formal sector has 
also been presented, which indicates that the formal sector uses loans outstanding 
and loan use in rationing loan demand. Households that are credit constrained by 
the formal sector have to rely on informal sources for consumption-smoothing 
loans. If such households also have no relatives and friends able to help them, it is 
quite possible that they will face very high interest rates from informal 
moneylenders. If the goal is to reach more of the rural poor through formal sector 
loans, the formal sector has to expand the scope of its loan portfolio. In order to do 
so, formal lenders must be permitted to charge rates high enough to cover all eosts 
involved in operating their expanded loan portfolio. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
A.6.1 Probit Model 
In the probit model, an Index/, which is a linear function of the independent 
variables and has a range from - oo to+ oo, is created. For observation t, I, is 
This index is then translated to a range of 0-1 using a cumulative density 
function. The normal distribution is assumed, such that the probability of 
occurrence of the dependent variable, P( Y = I) is as follows: 
!. 
' ·.. l 2 P, = F(I,) = F(X,(J) = J !'>-exp(- t 12)dt 
'"""v 2n 
where F() represents the cumulative normal density function. At I, O, the 
probability is 0.5, and the regular cumulative normal table can be used to calculate 
the probabilities with various values of I,. 
Note that the estimated coefficients show the effect of a change in an 
independent variable on the index, rather than on the dependent variable. After the 
coefficients have been estimated, the predicted probabilities can be computed as 
A A , 
Y, = P, = F(X;(J) 
Also note that the effect on the dependent variable is different for each 
observation. For each observation t, this marginal effect can be calculated for the 
kth coefficient when using/() as the normal density function: 
Because the marginal effect is different for every observation, it is often computed 
at the mean value of X and Y. 
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i3P -, ( ) ME,= lar, = f(X /J)/3, 
The elasticity for the kth coefficient is calculated as 
Elasticity at means can be calculated as 
SHAZAM output labels this as 'elasticity at means'. 
A test of the null hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are zero can be 
carried out using the likelihood ratio procedure. The log likelihood function, L(/J), 
is given by: 
T 
L(/Jl = I ( Y, in[Fcx: /Jl] + (1 -Y,) tn[! - F(x: /Jl]j 
t"'l 
Define Sas the number of successes ( Y, = 1) observed in N observations. Then the 
maximum value of the log likelihood function under the null hypothesis is 
L(O) =sin! 8 ) +(N-S)1i<N-S)1 
\N \ N J 
If all coefficients except the intercept are zero, the likelihood ratio test 
statistic, 2[ L(/J) - L(O)], has an asymptotic :!rk·I! distribution. 
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A.6.2 Summary of Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in 
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) 
Table A.6.1 
Summary of Statistics of Variables Used in Equation (6.1)* 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Variance Min Max 
AGE 44.708 10.428 108.75 22 80 
AG ESQ 2107.1 986.97 974110 484 6400 
SEX 0.5923 0.4924 0.2424 0 1 
EDU 7.5423 2.3616 5.5774 2.00 13.00 
FARAf 7.2308 3.1849 10.143 1.00 16.00 
FARM.SQ 62.388 56.479 3189.8 1.00 256.00 I 
DEP 0.9115 0.7378 0.5443 0 3 
ADULT 3.8269 1.1377 1.2943 1 8 
INF LU 0.0692 0.2543 0.0647 0 1 
L 2.9745 7.5863 57.552 0.00 100.00 
CATI 0.1846 0.3887 0. 1511 0 1 
CAT2 0.4538 0.4988 0.2488 0 1 
I1(formal) 0.3000 0.4591 0.2108 0 l 
Ji(rela. & frie.) 0.2000 0.4008 0.1606 0 l 
Ji( moneylenders) 0.2154 0.4119 0.1696 0 1 
Ji(other info.lenders) 0.2296 0.4197 0.1761 0 1 I 
* Number of observations= 260. 
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Table A.6.2 
Summary of Statistics of Variables Used in Equation (6.2)* 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Variance Min Max 
AGE 44.708 10.428 108.75 22 80 
AG ESQ 2107.1 986.97 974110 484 6400 
SEX 0.5923 0.4924 0.2424 0 1 
EDU 7.5423 2.3616 5.5774 2.00 13.00 
FARM 7.2308 3.1849 10.143 1.00 16.00 
FARlv!SQ 62.388 56.479 3189.8 1.00 256.00 
DEP 0.9115 0.7378 0.5443 0 3 
ADULT l 3.8269 1.1377 1.2943 l 8 
IN FLU 0.0692 0.2543 0.0647 0 l 
LASS ET 0.0984 0.2157 0.0465 0.00 2.8571 
CATJ I 0.1846 0.3887 0.1511 0 1 
CAT2 I 0.4538 0.4988 0.2488 0 I 
LO(formal) 0.1154 0.3201 0.1025 0 1 
COL (formal) 0.4885 0.5003 0.2508 0 1 
h (formal) 0.2885 0.4539 0.2060 0 1 
*Number of observations~ 260. 
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Table A.6.3 
Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Equation (6.1) 
AGE AG ESQ SEX EDU FAR\! FARMSQ DEP ADULT INFLU L CAT! CA1:2 
AGE 1.00 
AGESQ 0.99 1.00 
SEX 0.04 0.02 1.00 
EDU ·0.!8 -0.2! 0.19 l.00 
FARM ~0.23 -0.23 0.15 -0. !4 1.00 
FAR\!SQ -0.2! -0.20 0.13 ·0.12 0.98 LOO 
DEP -0.46 -0.42 -0.04 -0.Q? 0.20 0.17 LOO 
ADULT 0.15 0.08 0.12 -0.02 0.39 0.39 -0.37 LOO 
INF LU -0.04 ·0.05 0.16 om 0.34 0.37 -0.05 0.30 LOO 
L -0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.31 -0.09 ·0.07 -0.13 0.10 0.t7 LOO 
CATI ·0.01 0.02 -001 ·0.16 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.00 ·0.01 -0.!6 LOO 
CAT2 -0.19 -0.21 0.08 0.31 -0.08 -0.06 ·0.10 0.09 O.ll 0.29 -0.43 LOO 
Table A.6.4 
Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Equation (6.2) 
AGE AG ESQ SEX EDU FARM FARJc!SQ DEP ADUlT INF/.U !,ASSET lO CAT! CAT2 COL 
AGE I 00 
AG ESQ 0.99 LOO 
SEX O.iJ4 0.02 1.00 
EDU -0.18 .0.21 0.!9 1.00 
FARi\f -0.23 ..0,23 0.15 -0.14 !.00 
FARMSQ -0.21 -0.20 OJ3 -0.12 0.98 1.00 
DEP -0.46 -G.42 -0.04 -0.07 0.20 0.17 LOO 
ADULT 0.1 s 0.08 0.12 ·0.02 0.39 0.39 -0.37 LOO 
!NFLU -0.04 ·0.05 0.!6 0.07 0.34 0.37 -0.05 0.30 LOO 
lASSET ·0.04 -0.06 0.12 0.32 -0.08 ·0.07 -0.!2 008 0.17 LOO 
lO -0.01 -0.02 0.30 0.!3 -0. !9 -0.!7 ~0.12 -0.02 M0,05 -0.02 LOO 
CATI -0.01 0.02 -0 OI -0.16 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.00 ~O.Ol ·0.18 -0.14 1.00 
CAT2 ·0.?9 -D.21 0.08 0.31 -0.08 -0.0il -0.!0 009 0.15 OJI 0.15 -0.43 LOO 
COL -0.ll ·0.09 0.1 l 0.1 I 0.20 0.19 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.20 "0.33 0.27 0.33 LOO 
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Table A.6.5 
Estimation Results of Determinants of Credit Applications 
(Excluding Non-borrowers) 
Explanatory Formal sector Relatives and 
variable friends 
AGE -0.0537 0.1055 
(·0.6232) (0.9840) 
AGESQ. 0.0006 -0.0010 
(0.6207) (-0.9115) 
SEX 0.0764 -0.0467 
(0.2981) (-0.2025) 
EDU 0.0031 0.0!16 
(0.0550) (0.2115) 
FARM 0.4824' -0.0548 
(2.3826) (-0.2801) 
FARMSQ 
[0.3807j 
-0.0242 0.0005 
(·2.0406) (0.0459) 
[·2.2107] 
DEP -0.2231 -0.04!0 
(· l.0407) (-0.2143) 
ADULT ·0.0645 -0.1199 
(-0.4247) (-0.8692) 
JN FLU 0.4605 -0.4817 
(0.7171) (-0.7337) 
L 0.1401' 0.0023 
(2.514!) (0.1572) 
[0.6252] 
CATI 0.3760 -2.0270+ 
{0.6397) (-4.4585) 
CAT2 2.490 l + -l.49+ 
{5,7540) {·5.9728) 
CONST 
-3.0319 -1.7522 
(· l.2973) (·0.6757) 
Likelihood ratio 
test 157.02 72.17 
Percentage 
predicted 
correctly 87.35 Sl.22 
Number of observations~ 245. 
Numbers in ( ) are asymptotic I-values; 
Numbers in [ ] are elasticities at the mean; 
Numbers in { } are marginal effects at the mean. 
Moneylenders 
-0.0036 
{-0.0448) 
-0.0001 
(·0.0028) 
0.1006 
(0.4790) 
-0.0260 
(-0.5544) 
-0.3304* 
(· 1.9484) 
[·0.2607] 
0.0173* 
(l.7920) 
[2.3783] 
0.2639 
(1.5398) 
{0.1029} 
0.0277 
(0.2255) 
-0.4894 
{-D.9815) 
-0.0222 
{-l.0651) 
-5.8384 
{-0.01!8) 
-0. 1379 
{-0.6291) 
0.8587 
(0.4172) 
39.99 
77.96 
Dependent variable= l if the household applies for credit, ~ 0 otherwise. 
+ significant at the l % le,·el; 
# significant at the 5% level; 
• significant at the I 0% level. 
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All other informal 
lenders 
0.0716 
(0.5449) 
-0.0007 
(-0.5053) 
-0.4777 
(-l.4031) 
-0.0437 
(-0.4922) 
-0.0394 
(·0.1407) 
0.0042 
(0.2688) 
-0.0042 
(-0.0152) 
0.1512 
(0.7897) 
-0.0381 
(-0.0224) 
-0.7106' 
(·2.3088) 
[-6.2343] 
2.7401+ 
(6.0879) 
-0.3814 
(-0.8276) 
-2.2676 
(·0.7140) 
186.79 
93.88 
Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The emphasis of the Vietnamese government on rural development is 
understandable. After nearly ten years of reform, Vietnam is still predominantly 
agrarian and rice is still the major agricultural product. About 80 percent of the 
population Jive in rural areas, and 70 percent of these rely exclusively on farming. 
Agriculture has played a leading role in the transition to a market-oriented economy 
through the introduction of the product contract system in 1981, and the household 
contract system in 1988. This transition has resulted in a substantial increase in the 
demand for credit by rural households to finance working capital and investment. 
The formal financial sector has been restructured from a mono-bank to a 
two-tier banking system. The VBA was established as an independent entity to 
undertake commercial banking activities in the rural sector, and has been moving 
towards financing rural households and away from financing SOEs and 
cooperatives. The VBA and other rural financial institutions such a~ the RSBs and 
the PCFs have experienced a considerable expansion in the volume of loans to 
agriculture. The government has used a number of credit programs to foster 
agricultural production, and has also attempted to help the rural poor by creating the 
VBP, whose main function is to provide them with cheap credit. 
These efforts have met with both success and failure. Although the fom1al 
institutions have been successful in providing credit for production activities, they 
have been unsuccessful in extending loans to a large portion of the rural 
population-in particular the poor and small borrowers-as had been hoped. The 
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purpose of this dissertation has been to show that the imposition of interest rate 
ceilings and other repressive financial policies not only leads to segmentation of the 
rural credit market, but also reduces the supply of credit to the poorer segment of 
the rural population-the very people who are supposed to be helped by the 
government The SBV and government policy of imposing ceilings on lending 
interest rates has resulted in excess demand for loans, and forced formal institutions 
to devise substitutes for interest rates for rationing the available funds amongst 
potential borrowers. These substitutes include restricting loans to production 
purposes, relying heavily on collateral requirements, and the implementation of a 
complex credit delivery system within which formal sector lenders can sort out, 
screen, and shift part of their transactions costs to potential borrowers. In these 
circumstances, borrowers in the fom1al credit market incur excessive transactions 
costs, making small Joans unattractive as compared to those from alternative 
sources. As a result, the credit market is segmented. While formal institutions focus 
on production Joans, the demand for consumption Joans is satisfied in the informal 
market. Farmers with access to the formal sector are mainly large borrowers with 
suitable assets to use as collateral. Small borrowers lack access to this sector. This 
chapter summarises the empirical findings of the previous chapters, and discusses 
several policy implications. 
7. 1 Summary of Results 
Chapter 2 presented a theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of 
formal credit institutions and farm households in Vietnam. A simple model of the 
supply of credit was presented to show that under interest rate ceilings, and given 
173 
two risk-groups of borrowers, the high risk-group will be rationed by the lender. It 
was shown that in the context of rural Vietnam, high-risk borrowers are rationed 
mostly through the lender's stringent requirement of collateral for loans, and the 
restriction of loans for use in production activities only. By requiring potential 
borrowers to provide collateral and to furnish a variety of data reflecting feasibility 
studies for production loans, the formal sector credit delivery system causes 
borrowers to sustain high transactions costs. Through such procedures in selecting 
and screening potential borrowers, formal sector lenders can also off-load part of 
their normal transactions costs onto borrowers. 
A basic model of demand for credit, taking into account the fact that farmers 
have to meet transactions costs to obtain loans in addition to the nominal interest 
cost, was then presented. This model indicated that borrower transactions costs have 
at least three impacts on the decision to borrow and on profitability. First, larger 
borrower transactions costs mean higher total borrowing costs and less profit for 
borrowers, ceteris paribus. Second, with a given interest rate and level of borrower 
transactions costs, there is a minimum loan size below which the borrower would 
not be willing to borrow. For any given interest rate, the larger are the borrower 
transactions costs, the higher the borrowing threshold. Third, a farmer who did not 
have the funds to cover the out-of-pocket costs expenses incurred in applying for 
the loan prior to receiving it would not be able to borrow. Even a farmer who did 
have enough funds but faced a high probability that the loan application might be 
rejected (and thus risked losing the funds for nothing) might not want to attempt to 
borrow. 
This model is also used to explain the segmentation of the rural credit 
market. In the case in which there is a formal sector lender and an informal lender, 
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the segment associated with lmver borrower transactions costs but higher rates of 
interest and smaller loans is dominated by the informal lender. The other segment, 
associated with higher borrower transactions costs but lower rates of interest and 
larger loans, is dominated by the formal lender. It was sholN'll that ceilings on 
interest rates are an important determinant in the structure of credit markets. When 
formal institutions are forced to charge loan rates below market clearing levels, and 
thus face excess demand, increased collateral requirements and the shifting of 
transactions costs to borrowers are often used as substitute rationing mechanisms 
(Adams and Vogel, 1986). When borrower transactions costs are raised as a result 
of this rationing process, some potential borrowers-mainly the smaller ones-will 
go to other lenders, resulting in the market structure just described. 
Chapter 3 reviewed rural credit conditions, and showed that the structure of 
the rural financial markets has undergone substantial change in the last few years. A 
new system of rural credit delivery involving more diversified financial institutions 
is emerging from the old mono-bank structure. Prior to the restoration of household 
farming, and to the adoption of fiscal and monetary reforms, rural credit was 
supplied by SBV branches throughout the country to communes, cooperatives and 
state farms, according to planned allocations. Since 1989, however, the government 
has undertaken a wide range of financial and agricultural reforms, as a result of 
which the VBA now constitutes an extensive rural banking system, and has a strong 
influence on the rural credit market. From relying on the SBV for 80 percent of total 
loanable funds in 1990, the VBA' s self-mobilised funds have increased 
substantially, accounting for 77 percent of the total by 1994. 
The reorientation of the VBA' s lending portfolio toward rural households 
and small businesses started in 1990. This switch has demonstrated that lending to 
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farm households on the basis of commercial banking criteria is financially viable. 
However, the SB V's current interest rate policies of setting ceilings on lending rates 
and imposing a maximum spread between deposit and lending rates has forced the 
VBA-now essentially operating as a profit-oriented lender-to ration credit. A 
complex credit delivery system through which the VBA can screen out many 
potential borrowers and shift part of its transactions costs to them is applied. 
Arguing that cheap credit is a way of achieving social objectives, and in 
response to the concentration of the VBA on large farmers, the government's efforts 
to target cheap credit to the rural poor have involved establishing the VBP in 1995, 
and launching a number of credit programs. 1 With low lending rates, and no 
emphasis on savings mobilisation, the VBP is not financially sustainable, and has 
always to rely on subsidised funds from the government and donors. 
Since the demand for rural credit is much greater than the amount available 
through the VBA, the emergence of several alternative private financial institutions 
was encouraged by the SBV during 1992-93. During these two years, the network 
of collapsed former rural credit cooperatives was replaced by private RSBs and 
PCFs. However, these institutions' dependence on the VBA for loanable funds also 
means that they do not compete effectively with it. 
Despite the significant expansion of formal sector credit in recent years, 
' informal lenders still provide the bulk of rural financial services. It is noteworthy 
that the former planning model was implemented only partially, and informal 
markets have always coexisted with the planned economy. Financial liberalisation 
1 There are a number of government programs which provide credit for poverty alleviation. The 
main ones are the programme for hunger eradication and poverty reduction, the program to re-green 
barren hi!ls, and the nalional program for employment promotion. 
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since 1989 has further contributed to a flourishing of informal credit markets. In the 
context of rural Vietnam, there are four major types of participation in informal 
finance: mutual lending among family members, relatives, friends and neighbours; 
hui; moneylenders; and traders. While formal lenders are observed to concentrate 
only on secured loans for production purposes, informal lenders also offer 
unsecured loans for non-production needs. The rural credit market is therefore 
segmented into various sub-markets, in which formal and informal lenders perform 
complementary roles. As was explained, the formal sector credit delivery system 
involves high borrower transactions costs, which impinge most heavily on small 
borrowers. It was shown that borrowers seeking small loans preferred to obtain 
them from informal lenders, who charge a higher rate of interest but impose low 
transactions costs-and, in contrast, that borrowers seeking larger loans preferred to 
obtain them from formal lenders, who charge lower interest rates but impose high 
transactions costs. 
Chapter 4 described the survey area, sample design and representativeness, 
and characteristics of the surveyed households and credit activities. The primary 
data used in the analysis of borrower transactions costs, the determinants of credit 
applications and formal credit rationing were derived from a household survey and 
conversations with the district VBA, village/commune leaders, and representatives 
of women's unions and farmers' associations in villages/communes, in 1996. The 
survey site was perceived as representative of the socioeconomic and physical 
environments of the Red River Delta in the north of Vietnam. The sources of credit 
included formal institutions (the district VBA and two PCFs) and various informal 
lenders, such as relatives and friends, traders, moneylenders. A sample survey of 
150 rural households was conducted, using a stratified two-stage sampling method. 
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A questionnaire was used to obtain information about loan amounl~ applied for and 
actually borrowed, the costs of borrowing from different sources, the time taken to 
obtain loans, the existence of formal sector credit rationing, and characteristics of 
the interviewees. 
A preliminary examination of the lender and household credit data indicated 
the coexistence of various submarkets that provide credit services that differ from 
each other-ranging from formal sector, low interest rate loans, for production 
activities and with strict collateral requirements, to unsecured high interest rate 
loans for a variety of purposes from moneylenders and traders. It also showed that 
there were significant differences in the amounts borrowed and the borrower 
transactions costs ratios among the different sources of credit. 
Chapter 5 discussed the concept of borrower transactions costs, then 
proceeded to quantify them, to conduct a comparison between the effective cost of 
borrowing from the formal sector and various segments of the informal sector, and 
to examine the determinants of borrower transactions costs. Borrower transactions 
costs were defined as all non-interest expenses that a borrower had to pay in dealing 
with a loan. These included the following: (I) loan charges by the lender, service 
fees collected by local officials or leaders in the communes and villages, and service 
fees related to collateral certification; (2) travel expenses; (3) other costs of 
attracting bank officers' attention; and (4) the opportunity cost of the time involved 
in the loan transaction. 
The estimation of transactions costs indicated that the prospective borrower 
from the formal sector had to have on hand about VD 50 thousand to cover 
preliminary out-of-pocket costs. It was shown that the cost of work days lost, and 
travel plus other expenses (entertainment, gifts, bribes etc.), made up the two largest 
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parts of borrower transactions costs (42.5 percent and 37.8 percent, respectively). 
Borrower transactions costs were found to be an important barrier that discouraged 
small borrowers from applying for formal sector loans. While these transactions 
costs made up 9. 7 percent of the loan size for the smallest borrowers, they 
accounted for only 0.4 percent of the loan size for the largest borrowers. The 
effective costs of borrowing, taking into account both the explicit interest rate and 
transactions costs, were calculated and compared among different sources of credit. 
The results showed that partition of the credit market occurred at a loan size 
between VD 500-1,000 thousand, where the effective cost of borrowing from the 
informal and formal markets was approximately the same. 
The results of estimations of formal sector borrower transactions costs were 
then compared with those for other countries. Transactions costs computed from our 
study in Vietnam were a little higher than those for Peru, based on the sample 
average, but for small loans they were far higher than those in all other countries 
except Bangladesh. Also, transactions costs in our study were equivalent to about 
38 percent of the explicit interest rate, which was higher than those in Peru and the 
Philippines. 
Borrower transactions costs in the formal sector were hypothesised to be 
determined by several factors, including the nominal interest rate, the loan amount 
applied for, factors characterising borrowers themselves (prior credit relationships 
with the bank; influence in the community), institutional arrangements involved in 
the credit delivery system, and the proximity of borrower's residence to the bank. A 
simultaneous equations model was used to estimate the determinants of borrower 
transactions costs. The estimation of the transactions costs function using TSLS 
regression applied to this showed significant relationships between transactions 
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costs (in absolute terms), the loan amount applied for and interest rates: the larger 
the loan amount applied for, the higher the transactions costs; and the lower the 
interest rate, the higher the transactions costs. These results were consistent with the 
findings of Ahmed (1982) in Bangladesh, and Cuevas (1984) in Honduras. The 
results indicated, in particular, that at a nominal interest rate of 2 percent per month, 
a 0.2 percent increase in the nominal interest rate involves a 3 .6 percent decrease in 
borrower transactions costs, while a I 0 percent increase in the loan amount applied 
for would increase transactions costs by 1.9 percent. The insignificant relationship 
between transactions costs and prior credit relationships suggests the bank's lack of 
experience in making use of accumulated past information on borrowers. 
Chapter 6 attempted to identify the determinants of credit applications from 
various sources, and of formal sector credit rationing. In order to formally test the 
hypothesis that small borrowers seek loans from informal sources while larger 
borrowers prefer to apply for formal sector loans, probit estimations were 
undertaken to examine the statistical significance of the loan.amount applied for, 
among other variables, in the equations for credit applications. These regressions 
were estimated separately across loans from formal lenders, relatives and friends, 
moneylenders, and all other informal sources, with the characteristics of the 
household, the household head and the loan contracts as independent variables. The 
results confirmed the existence of segmentation of the credit market with respect to 
the loan amoLmt applied for. 
Other characteristics of the segmented market were also examined, and farm 
size and loan use appeared to be significant predictors of borrowers' decisions on 
whether to apply for formal sector credit. It is noteworthy that the positive 
relationship between farm size and choice of formal sector credit occurred 
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essentially for the class of small farm size, indicating that formal sector credit is 
delivered principally to households with large farms. The results also showed that 
households with more dependants had to rely on informal moneylenders to smooth 
their consumption. It was also found that the signs of most significant variables in 
the formal sector credit regression were opposite to those in the informal market 
regressions, suggesting that formal institutions and various agents of the informal 
sector are alternative sources of credit. 
Chapter 6 also presented an analysis of the determinants ofloan rationing by 
the formal sector. The approach adopted for determining whether a formal sector 
applicant or a non-formal sector applicant can be classified as constrained or not-
constrained was that suggested by Feder et al. (1990). The probit estimation showed 
that the existence of loans outstanding on the part of applicants and loan use are 
used by the formal sector in rationing loan demand. 
Due to the limited time and financial support available the sample size for 
the survey was small, so an assessment of the wider applicability of the study is 
necessary. Although small in area, Vietnam is geographically diverse, and it is 
difficult to take any district as representative of the whole. The country is 
commonly divided into seven geographic-economic regions: Northern Uplands, 
Red River Delta, North Central, Central Coast, Central Highlands, Southeast, and 
Mekong Delta. Regional disparities in the incidence of poverty are often used to 
rank development among the regions. According to the VLSS, the poorest area 
is the North Central region, with a poverty incidence of 71 percent, followed 
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by the Northern Uplands reg10n, with a poverty incidence of 59 percent.2 
These two regions are poorer than the national average, and account for about 40 
percent of all the poor in Vietnam, while comprising only 29 percent of the 
population. They are characterised by poorer infrastructure, with households mainly 
engaged in .subsistence and semi-subsistenee farming and forestry. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the Southeast (which includes Ho Chi Minh City) is found to 
exhibit the lowest incidence of poverty (33 percent), and households in this region 
have higher income levels than the national average. The Red River Delta has a 
poverty incidence rate of 49 percent, slightly lower than the national level of 51 
percent (\Vorld Bank, 1995b: 10). Government officials in Namha province stated 
that Namha can be seen as representative of the Red River Delta, and conversations 
with VBA officers in Namha province revealed that the VBA in Binhluc district is 
ranked about average for the province in terms of banking performance. 
However, since there is a highway and a railway running through the 
district, the survey area is somewhat above the nation-wide average with respect to 
access to markets, and hence in the degree of commercialisation. (Although the 
survey households are more representative of farm households that still rely 
primarily on farm activities in general, and rice production in particular, they do 
have some access to non-farm activities, such as transporting local food, and many 
individuals work as wage earners in small local enterprises.) Thus the estimates of 
2 The poverty lines for Vietnam are set based on a benchmark per capita calorie requirement of 
2, JOO calories per day, with the composition of the underlying food bundle chosen as representative 
of typical consumption patterns in Vietnam while taking into account geographic price differentials 
in the cost of the same food basket. Using this approach, separate poverty lines have been calculated, 
taking into account local variations in prices for seven different regions, and for urban and rural 
areas in each region. Taking the population-weighted average of these seven regions, the national 
average poverty line is set at VD 1,090 thousand per person per year. Comparing this poverty line 
with the distribution of per capita consumption expenditure from the VLSS, about 51 per cent of the 
Vietnamese population are classified as poor (World Bank, 1995b: 7). 
182 
borrower transactions costs dravvn from our study are likely to be underestimates of 
the average for the whole country. Formal sector borrower transactions costs are 
expected to be much higher for people living in remote and mountainous areas, and 
especially for ethnic minorities, who are generally more isolated from the formal 
sector. Most of the latter live in remote areas far from passable roads and from 
financial institutions providing c~redit and savings facilities. Longer distances from 
the bank, poorer information systems, a lack of awareness of formal lenders' 
existence in the area, a lack of understanding of loan regulations in the formal 
sector and so on are factors that contribute to higher borrower transactions costs, 
higher out-of-pocket costs and higher borrowing thresholds for people living in 
such areas, so they have less access to formal sector credit 
7.2 Policy Implications 
The policy implications that can be drawn from the study relate to interest 
rate policies, and financial and institutional innovations in the fonnal sector. 
7.2.l. Appropriate Interest Rate Policies 
The SBV currently imposes both ceilings on lending rates and a maximum 
spread between deposit and lending rates at formal sector institutions in rural area. 
It argues that a maximum lending rate provides some restraint on risky lending 
practices, while a maximum spread between deposit and lending rates encourages 
commercial banks to maintain the deposit rate high enough to attract savings. 
However, recent studies have argued that ceilings on lending rates are set too low as 
compared to market clearing rates (at one half or one third of comparable informal 
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rates).3 Interest rate ceilings create excess demand and force the VBA to ration 
credit, which it does in part by shifting part of its transactions costs to borrowers so 
as to raise the effective cost of borrowing. It is also noteworthy that the VBA, 
which dominates the formal rural credit market, is a state-owned bank. Employees 
of the bank have little incentive to maximise its profitability. In these 
circumstances, interest rate ceilings--which imply subsidies to loans recipients-
create an incentive on the part of potential borrowers to bribe bank officials in order 
to obtain such loans, and for the officials to solicit such bribes. It can therefore be 
expected that rationing mechanisms will be chosen partly on the basis of their 
capacity to maximise pay-offs to officers of the bank, rather than to maximise the 
profits of the bank itself. 
The switch from lending to cooperatives and state-owned farms to 
individual households that typically request relatively small loans increases the 
importance of transactions costs at the VBA. Employees of the VBA have little 
experience of how to assess the creditworthiness of new clients. Building new 
relationships between the bank and its clients, and removing antiquated and 
inefficient work habits involves substantial costs for the VBA. In these 
circumstances, the current maximum spread of 0.35 percent per month between 
deposit and lending rates is >videly perceived not to provide adequate net interest 
income to sustain even the most efficient rural banks (UNDP and UNICEF, 1996: 
66). As mentioned in Chapter 4, the VBA in Binhluc in 1994 had a monthly average 
deposit rate of 1.53 percent, while the monthly average lending rate was 2.52 
percent, implying a spread of 0.99 percent. This spread generated a profit for the 
3 See, for example, Cao and Dao (J 992), Tran et al. (1992), SPC and GSO (1994), DAI (1995), 
UNDP and UNICEF (1996), and Creusot e1 al. (1998). 
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bank of VD 388 million. If the maximum spread of 0.35 percent had been applied, 
the bank would have experienced a loss of VD 2,102 million, ceteris paribus. A 
recent study of microcredit programs in the Red River Delta by Creusot et al. 
(1998: 20) showed that, in order to be financially sustainable in lending to small 
farmers with an average loan size of US$50, the spread would need to be as high as 
2 percent. 
In an attempt to help the rural poor, the VBP was established to provide 
them with loans with low interest rates, and a number of cheap credit programs 
were launched. As experienced in other developing countries, these low interest 
credit programs have encountered serious financial difficulties and are characterised 
by various shortcomings. Cuevas and Graham (1984b) showed that banks in 
Honduras that managed such programs incurred substantially higher loan 
transactions costs per unit of money lent than did the banks that avoided them. It is 
apparent that the subsidised rates applied at the VBP do not even cover its operating 
costs, thus undermining its financial sustainability and discouraging savings 
mobilisation (World Bank, 1996: 11). Furthermore, cheap credit often flows to low 
rate of return projects. In fact, borrower transactions costs tend to be inversely 
correlated with the rate of return (Sacay et al., 1985: 125). Farmers with low 
profitability tend to be willing to pay higher transactions costs. Cheap loans are 
often not available when needed, and are restricted to particular purposes., A 
collaborative study based upon the experiences ofNGOs, {JN agencies and bilateral 
donors in 1996 found that, in Vietnam, the poor are capable of repaying loans at 
interest rates equal to or higher than those available for equivalent loans from the 
main rural financial institutions (UNDP, 1996). 
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The above criticisms of ceilings on interest rates and subsidised rates for the 
rural poor do not, however, imply the necessity for full interest rate liberalisation at 
this stage for Vietnam. The country has not yet established a level of 
macroeconomic stability that is robust enough to bear the impact of fully market 
determined interest rates (World Bank, 1995a: v). Also, because the VBA and the 
VBP are fully backed up by the government, interest rate liberalisation might 
encourage these banks to accept excessively risky borrowers, thus further 
jeopardising their profitability and soundness. The appropriate interest rate policy 
implication, therefore, is that the lending rate ceilings should be gradually increased 
until the spread between deposit and lending rates be.comes high enough to cover 
the banks' cost of funds, administration costs and loan losses. Formal lenders are 
observed to focus on production loans, since they face excess demand for credit and 
lack adequate information on potential borrowers. According to them, production 
loans generate cash flows that make it possible to service the loan, in contrast with 
non-production loans. If ceilings on interest rates were set higher, the excess 
demand for formal sector loans would be reduced, and formal lenders could afford 
to hire more staff to obtain more information on borrowers, to monitor loans and to 
enforce repayment. As a result, they would be more likely to extend formal 
financial services to encompass consumption loans, since other aspect of borrowers' 
capacity to repay could be considered. 
As shown in Chapter 5, the higher is the interest rate, the lower the borrower 
transactions costs, since lenders have less incentive to shift such costs away from 
themselves. Thus the formal sector could be expected to become more 'borrower 
friendly' if interest rates were higher. Application fees would be likely to be 
waived, and the VBA would have an incentive to simplify the procedures for 
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obtaining loans. It might even go so far as to set up small mobile banks to 
accommodate individuals in small communes/villages. All of these changes could 
be expected to contribute to a reduction of travel costs and other non-interest 
borrowing costs. Furthermore, with higher interest rates and less excess demand for 
credit, bank officials would have less power to extract unintended benefits for 
themselves. Thus formal sector borrowersc would face lower out-of-pocket costs and 
have lower borrowing thresholds, and the partition of the credit market would be 
changed in favour of a larger number of small farmers. Experience in many 
developing countries shows that changes in Joan transactions costs have an 
important impact on small farmers' borrowing decisions, since these costs are large 
relative to nominal interest rates (Adams and Nehman, 1979). If loan rates are not 
increased, the incentive to reduce borrower transactions costs will not exist, and 
many small farmers \"Viii continue to rely on the informal market. 
As has been emphasised throughout this dissertation, segmentation of the 
rural credit market results from the low interest rate policy. While economic 
efficiency can be achieved in segmented markets if the segmentation is due to the 
different availability of information about borrowers on the part of various lenders, 
it cannot be achieved if it is due to controls on interest rates. While formal 
institutions have very narrow loan portfolios focused exclusively on production 
activities, informal lenders provide a much wider range of financial services. Hence 
with higher interest rates, segmentation induced by the ceilings will tend to be 
eliminated, and formal lenders will participate more actively in rural lending. 
Higher loan interest rates will also encourage the mobilisation of savings by 
formal institutions. There is abundant evidence that substantial amounts of savings 
can be mobilised in the niral areas of developing countries, and that positive real 
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rates of interest for depositors are particularly effective in mobilising these savings. 
Recent data show that farmers in Vietnam can and do save, and that they respond 
significantly to policies such as higher real rates of interest (Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). 
Success in savings mobilisation is a key factor determining the viability of financial 
institutions. The role of fully fledged financial intermediaries is not only to lend but 
also offer deposit facilities for savers. Financial institutions that have a high share of 
savings relative to government fundings in their total liabilities are likely to have a 
continual flow of funds available for lending, and they may tend to be more careful 
and efficient in their allocation of loans; those that neglect savings mobilisation are 
not genuine intermediary institutions, and their reliance on government or donor 
funding tends to extend to reliance on these sources to cover losses incurred from 
bad lending practices (Adams and Vogel, 1986: 486). This is apparently true in the 
case of the VBP, which always depends on government and donor funding; its 
lending rates are so low that it cannot offer attractive deposit rates. By involving 
themselves actively in savings mobilisation, financial institutions can obtain useful 
information about the savings behaviour of their clients that allows them to improve 
their estimates of creditworthiness, and to help farmers to learn about doing 
business with banks. 
7.2.2 Financial and Institutional Innovations 
Borrower transactions costs can be separated into those that result from 
interest rate ceilings and/or loan targeting, and those that are in essence associated 
'vi.th the friction of financial intermediation. Attributing the VBA' s limited reach to 
small borrowers solely to interest rate ceilings and other financial controls, and not 
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to the inherent characteristics of the rural credit market, may lead to unrealistic 
policies or an overemphasis on 'getting-the-price-right' interest rate reform. Interest 
rate increases can be used only up to a point, beyond which the probability of 
repayment might be reduced due to moral hazard and adverse selection. This is 
particularly true for Vietnam, where the macroeconomy has not yet been fully 
stabilised so as to be able to absorb the impact of interest rates being fully 
liberalised. Furthermore, interest rate liberalisation is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to minimise large loan bias. Papua New Guinea provides an example of 
this bias still existing, even in the case of unsubsidised rural credit (Fernando, 
1990). Hence any attempt to increase the VBA's outreach to the rural poor simply 
by raising interest rates--especially in remote and mountainous areas-would have 
limitations, and other measures related to financial and institutional innovation 
should be adopted. 
Gradual liberalisation of interest rates should, therefore, be complemented 
by a widening of the operating frontier of formal sector financial institutions. Since 
the VBA is a major provider of formal financial services in rural areas, reform of 
the VBA's operations is at the heart of formal sector financial innovation. Given the 
long history ofrepression and restrictions, and the fact that it is still at an early stage 
of the innovation process, the scope for innovation and reform of the VBA is wide. 
An important i1movation could be the reorientation of the VBA's direct lending to 
individual rural households to allocating wholesale credit using commission agents, 
linking the bank with informal lenders and SH Gs, and moving to group lending. 
A recent innovation has been the introduction of the services of commission 
agents such as NGOs (the women's unions and the farmers' associations) and rural 
financial institutions, such as RSBs and PCFs. This idea has a long history, and 
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there have been a number of types of commission agents in developing countries. 
Recent experience in India (Puhazhendi, 1995) and the Philippines (Llanto and 
Chua, 1996) using NGOs as commission agents shows great success in reducing 
both lender and borrower transactions costs. NGOs in rural Vietnam, such as the 
women's unions and the farmers' associations, are important mass organisations 
which have a broad network covering nearly every village and commune.4 
Compared to the VBA, these agents have various advantages in attracting deposits, 
collecting information on potential borrowers, collecting loan repayments, and 
educating the rural population regarding transactions with banks and the application 
of new technology in farming. These agents can therefore contribute to reducing the 
transactions costs of rural credit, and hence provide the VBA with improved access 
to small borrowers amongst the rural population. 
Many authors have also recommended the use of the informal lenders as 
commission agents (Adams and Vogel, 1986; Yotopoulos and Floro, 1991). They 
recommend that enhancing the strength of formal sector intermediaries does not 
necessarily mean substituting formal for informal credit. Experience from various 
countries shows that monopoly profits in informal lending are less than had been 
\\idely assumed, and that informal lenders provide some financial services more 
efficiently than do formal credit institutions, especially for the poor, and there is a 
growing consensus that informal credit is well suited to most rural conditions (Von 
Pischke et al., l 983). 
The rural credit market in Vietnam is fragmented; formal and informal 
lenders serve groups of clients with distinct characteristics and needs, and there is 
4 These NGOs were established during the Vietnam War, and are considered essentially as 
government-related organisations. 
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almost no interaction between them. The potential complementary role of formal 
and informal credit arises from the fact that the former specialises on larger, more 
established borrowers, leaving the informal sector to service the rest. There is little 
flow of funds between the two segments. \Vhereas the VBA relies heavily on 
collateral, informal lenders use a web of interpersonal relationships as vehicles for 
creating and enhancing trust. As mentioned previously, although repressed in the 
former centrally planned economy, informal lenders always coexisted with formal 
lenders. Informal lenders have long personal relationships with their borrowers and, 
given their locational advantage in obtaining information, they are usually very 
effective in disbursing loans, monitoring borrowers, and handling loan repayments. 
Chapter 5 showed that borrowers from informal sources appeared to incur much 
lower transactions costs than those from formal sources. Linking up with informal 
lenders that have a comparative advantage in reaching the poor cost-effectively 
would thus allow the VBA to increase its outreach to a larger portion of rural 
households. Our survey also found some examples of traders obtaining loans from 
the VBA and on-lending mainly to small farmers in the region; such traders are 
cited by the bank as the most reliable and efficient borrowers. The policy of 
channeling formal sector credit through informal lenders can therefore be justified 
on efficiency grounds. 
Another recent important innovation by the VBA has been to lend through 
groups, and to enhance linkages between the VBA and SHGs. Ladman and Afcha 
(1990) viewed group lending as an innovation in reaching a wider clientele of small 
borrowers in a cost-effective manner, and as one of the most promising recent 
financial market innovations. Adams and Ladman (1979: 85) suggested a number of 
reasons why a formal lender might want to use group loans. First, the lender's costs 
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can be reduced, since a single loan is made to a group of farmers instead of a 
number of individual loans. Second, loan delinquency should be reduced if the 
group members are jointly liable for the repayment of loans. And third, more 
technical assistance can be provided for any given cost of delivery. Group loans 
should also bring benefits to the borrowers, principally in terms of lower 
transactions costs, since many of the procedures associated with applying for and 
repaying loans can be done on a collective basis. 
However, as noted by Adams and Ladman (1979), group lending programs 
have met with mixed success. While the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is often cited 
as a successful example of group lending, experience in Bolivia, in contrast, 
suggests that group lending does not necessarily enable lenders to realise the 
benefits listed above (Ladman and Afcha, 1990). Although the theory of peer 
monitoring (Stiglitz, 1990) suggests the benefit of this approach, success still 
depends on the purpose of the group organisation and how groups are organised. 
Huppi and Feder (1990) conclude that most of the unsuccessful experiences have 
been due to shortcomings in implementation rather than due to the inadequacy of 
the approach itself. 
In Vietnam, the VBA's use of group lending programs has become 
widespread since 1991, and such programs have also been adopted more recently by 
other formal financial institutions. Such schemes have taken two basic forms: 
jointly liable borrower groups, and group credit facilities without joint liability. 
While the former is characterised by not requiring collateral, full repayment of all 
group loans is mandatory before new loans are provided, and loan repayment is the 
collective liability of the group. With these arrangements the VBA and other formal 
rural lenders can reduce the transactions costs associated with making and 
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collecting repayments on what otherwise would be many small loans. Some 
157,000 groups have been formed, either by the VBA itself or through service 
organisations or NGOs (World Bank, 1996: 54). Group size ranges from IS to 50 
members, and there are normally two or three groups in each village. Although so 
far there is no comprehensive empirical evidence to shed light on the advantages 
and disadvantages of group lending programs in ·Vietnam, the cost advantages of 
group transactions are perceived to be being realised on the lending side (World 
Bank, 1995a: 62). Our estimates of the determinants of borrower transactions costs 
suggest that group lending brings about a reduction in borrower transactions costs, 
but the lack of statistical significance in this relationship indicates that the potential 
advantages of group lending in reducing the time involved in the borrowing process 
and eliminating cumbersome loan procedures have not yet been realised. Since the 
sample size is not sufficiently large, more research on the effect of group lending on 
borrower transactions costs should be undertaken. Recent successful experience in 
other countries has provided lessons that argue for the formation of smaller, more 
homogenous groups that minimise the 'free rider' problem and for avoiding both 
the top-down formation of groups and the neglect of savings mobilisation (Ghate et 
al., 1992). 
SHGs in Vietnam are nothing new, having been widespread in the form of 
hui in villages for decades in the rural area (Than, 1993: 90). In 1991, SHG 
development was officially sanctioned, with NGOs the promoting agency. 5 At 
present, neither the VBA nor other formal financial institutions can directly cover 
rural Vietnam at the village level, so linking the VBA with SHGs may become a 
viable means of reducing transactions costs and improving rural households' access 
' The Council of Ministers Degree No 202, June 28, l 991. 
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to formal finance. Since these groups belong to the infonnal financial sector and do 
not have the required maturity to qualify fully for linking with the VBA, efforts 
should be directed to upgrading existing SHGs into full-fledged local financial 
intermediaries. 
Linking the VBA with SHGs and making group loans can also enhance 
savings opportunities among the rural poor. At present, there are generally no 
savings requirements for groups formed by the VBA. Innovations in lending should 
be accompanied by innovations fur mobilising household savings. The availability 
of deposit services in rural areas is extremely limited, forcing rural households to 
save in low return, very small scale investments in physical assets that are both 
relatively unsafe and illiquid. Hence an essential function of formal financial 
intermediaries is to mobilise small amounts from many savers so that loans for 
relatively large projects involving economies of scale can be made. On average, 
depositors vtill have lower incomes than borrowers (Adams and Vogels, 1986: 485). 
Linking the VBA and other formal financial intermediaries with SHGs is therefore a 
better way to help the rural poor than is cheap credit. The initial experience of 
linking the VBA with SHGs-the 'Credit Scheme for Poor Farmers' of the 
Farmers' Association in Dong son district, Thanhboa province-shows great 
success (Seibel, 1992: 77). 
It is apparent that, although not the only explanation, an important factor for 
the lack of the VBA's outreach in rural areas is excessive transactions costs. The 
present VBA network is a district-based system, and loan approvals, disbursements, 
and repayments, and deposits require clients to visit the district-based bank office. 
The poor accessibility and communications prevailing in rural areas imply 
substantial costs in providing financial services. The financial innovations and 
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reforms recommended in this chapter would help to reduce these costs, providing 
access to formal sector credit to many more rural borrowers, especially small ones. 
With a decline in the transactions costs of borrowing, and the consequent increase 
in demand for credit in the formal market, the demand for credit in the informal 
market will decrease, so interest rates in that market will tend to decrease. In other 
words, an expansion of the VBA would result in greater competition, and would 
tend to reduce any monopoly profit that may occur in informal lending. 
The VBA is a state-owned financial institution .. Although it has achieved a 
substantial increase in savings mobilisation from the non-bank public, an important 
source of its funds is the govermnent. As a result, it is still burdened with social 
welfare objectives, and still operates as an agent of the government in carrying out 
government programs. Hence, accompanying reform in interest rate policy and 
financial innovation, a decentralised decision making process that gives more 
independence to the VBA would help it respond more quickly to price signals, and 
gain more experience in acting as a fully-fledged commercial bank. At the same 
time, as the VBA has moved away from the central credit planning system, a greater 
need for project and risk analysis capabilities, especially in relation to new clients, 
has emerged. Training in financial management and the use of accounting software 
should be provided to bank management and staff. These improved skills will 
enhance the VBA's autonomy and accountability in a new competitive 
environn1ent. 
In order to encourage the VBA to be more innovative, stronger competition 
within the formal sector should be fostered. RSBs and PCFs should be expanded 
195 
and strengthened, and financial policies should be liberalised to allow for more 
small-scale, private, non-bank financial institutions to be established in rural areas. 
Although relying on collateral for loans, the VBA still fears losses from 
defaults if loans are disbursed for non-production purposes because of the difficulty 
in foreclosing on defaulters' collateral. The bank currently relies heavily on the 
local peoples' committees in the foreclosure process. In principle, this role would be 
more efficiently and effectively fulfilled by the courts. However, given a weak and 
inadequate legal system, the liquidation of collateral in the event of default is 
currently treated in a fragmentary manner. Judicial methods of resolution are 
avoided by the VBA if possible, due to their complexity, the time and expense 
involved, and the VBA's lack of experience in dealing with such matters. Hence, 
establishing transparent enforcement of the rights and obligations of parties 
involved in financial contracts would allow the VBA, while still relying on 
collateral, to diversify its loan portfolio, and provide more comprehensive financial 
services to the rural population. The cost of monitoring loan use therefore might be 
reduced, and willful default would become less common, contributing to a 
reduction in the total cost of lending. 
Widespread rural poverty will force policymakers in Vietnam to continue to 
promote agricultural development, and agricultural credit will continue to be a 
major part of these efforts. Rural financial markets that serve the majority of the 
rural population can play a crucial role in economic development. As in other 
developing countries and transitional economies, the Vietnamese government 
attempts to influence lenders' behaviour through regulations. Although the concept 
of a market economy has been widely accepted, the government is attempting to 
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modify it to become a 'socialist-oriented' model, so that it can control and 
command it (Riedel and Commer, 1996). The tendency of the government to use 
policies that repress the financial market in general, and the rural financial market in 
particular, through interest rate ceilings will not provide a healthy environment for 
the gro'Wth of rural finance in the future. The rural financial market could contribute 
more to overall efficiency and equity objectives if appropriate policies were 
adopted. Lessons learnt over the past forty years about rural credit markets in most 
developing countries, particularly those involving state-owned agricultural credit 
institutions, have suggested a minimalist, market-oriented role for the government. 
The mere injection of credit through state-owned financial institutions, without 
being accompanied by an appropriate interest rate policy and in the absence of 
imaginative financial innovations has failed to bring formal sector credit to a large 
portion of the rural population, and to create a healthy rural financial market. If the 
past is any guide to the future, policies should focus on creating a competitive 
environment and on proper institutional design. A healthy rural financial market 
requires that interest rates should be high enough to enable formal sector lenders to 
cover the costs of providing financial services, and positive deposit rates should be 
maintained so as to enhance the mobilisation of private savings in rural areas. 
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